Climate Change and Democracy: Insights from Asia and the Pacific

Climate effects on health in Small Islands Developing States

A “lifeline out of the <scp>COVID</scp>‐19 crisis”? An ecofeminist critique of the European Green Deal

Mental health and climate change: tackling invisible injustice

Climate change is increasingly being framed as a “climate crisis.” Such a crisis could be viewed both to unfold in the climate system, as well as to be induced by it in diverse areas of society. Following from current understandings of modern crises, it is clear that climate change indeed can be defined as a “crisis.” As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1.5oC special report elaborates, the repercussions of a warming planet include increased food insecurity, increased frequency and intensity of severe droughts, extreme heat waves, the loss of coral reef ecosystems and associated marine species, and more. It is also important to note that a range of possible climate-induced crises (through, e.g., possible increased food insecurity and weather extremes) will not be distributed evenly, but will instead disproportionally affect already vulnerable social groups, communities, and countries in detrimental ways. The multifaceted dimensions of climate change allow for multiple interpretations and framings of “climate crisis,” thereby forcing us to acknowledge the deeply contextual nature of what is understood as a “crisis.” Climate change and its associated crises display a number of challenging properties that stem from its connections to basically all sectors in society, its propensity to induce and in itself embed nonlinear changes such as “tipping points” and cascading shocks, and its unique and challenging long-term temporal dimensions. The latter pose particularly difficult decision-making and institutional challenges because initial conditions (in this case, carbon dioxide emissions) do not result in immediate or proportional responses (say, global temperature anomalies), but instead play out through feedbacks among the climate system, oceans, the cryosphere, and changes in forest biomes, with some considerable delays in time. Additional challenges emerge from the fact that early warnings of pending so-called “catastrophic shifts” face numerous obstacles, and that early responses are undermined by a lack of knowledge, complex causality, and severe coordination challenges.

The Negative Bidirectional Interaction Between Climate Change and the Prevalence and Care of Liver Disease: A Joint BSG, BASL, EASL, and AASLD Commentary

COP27 Climate Change Conference: urgent action needed for Africa and the world

The state and local governments are implementing emissions trading systems and carbon neutral policies to reduce greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, the Earth is facing a climate crisis due to the increase in greenhouse gases generated from energy generation, steel and chemical industries, energy in the home and transportation, industrial processes such as cement, agriculture, and waste. The number of cases of youth and future generations filing climate lawsuits in the Constitutional Court and courts regarding the climate crisis is increasing, and the issue of guaranteeing basic climate rights under the Constitution is becoming a social issue.&#x0D; Therefore, a public legal response is urgently needed so that the state and local governments can protect the lives, bodies, and property of citizens in order to respond to the climate crisis and achieve sustainable development, and guarantee the right of current and future generations to live in a pleasant environment.&#x0D; In this paper, after examining the concept of climate crisis and Korea's climate crisis response legislation, we review legislative precedents and precedents in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France to find implications for Korea. In addition, the provisions on climate crisis response are stipulated in the Constitution, guaranteeing basic climate rights to protect against damage caused by climate change, the role of the Climate Crisis Response Act, climate crisis response and cooperation through cooperative climate governance, and the freedom of the current generation to respond to the climate crisis. We review the role of public law by discussing emergency declarations and public law issues in response to the crisis of climate change, guaranteeing future generations' temporal climate crisis protection rights, and protecting future generations.&#x0D; For climate protection and response to the climate crisis, the Constitution should specify climate change reduction goals, basic climate rights, and cooperative measures to respond to the climate crisis, and legislatively consider the “urgent need” of the climate crisis beyond the concept of climate protection. In addition, in order to ensure equity and fairness due to infringement of basic rights related to the climate crisis, basic climate rights should be guaranteed under the constitution as well as legislative, scientific, and judicial responsibilities. In addition, the Climate Crisis Response Act should be enacted on necessary measures to make the climate crisis effective by public law. The Climate Crisis Response Act shall be guided and complementary in relation to the Building Act, the National Territory Planning Act, the Economic Act, the Disaster Safety Act, etc., and shall prescribe clear legal responsibility and due process for the climate crisis. In addition, climate crisis response requires cooperation by establishing climate governance between the state and local governments, between local governments, and between countries, so climate change reduction technologies and climate crisis response strategies should be shared, and legal countermeasures should be prepared in cooperation with each other. In addition, in order to reasonably allocate the cost burden of the climate crisis, the right to protect the temporal climate crisis should be clearly established legally and systematically to lead a life in a comfortable environment in accordance with the principle of equity and proportionality for current and future generations. The state or local government's climate emergency declaration and emergency plans on climate change crises and risks, administrative measures under executive orders, scientific predictions of climate crises and improve the vulnerability of disasters, and the role and legal responsibility of responding to climate crises should be considered in public law.

Introduction Amidst ecological collapse and environmental catastrophe, humankind is surrounded by indications that our habitat is turning against us in monstrous ways. The very environments we live within now evoke existential terror, and this state of ecological monstrosity has permeated popular media, including video games. Such cultural manifestations of planetary catastrophe are particularly evident in video game monsters. These virtual figures continue monsters’ long-held role in reflecting the socio-cultural anxieties of their particular era. The horrific figures that monsters present play a culturally reflexive role, echoing the fears and anxieties of their social, political and cultural context. Media monsters closely reflect their surrounding cultural conditions (Cohen 47), representing “a symptom of or a metaphor for something bigger and more significant than the ostensible reality of the monster itself” (Hutchings 37). Society’s deepest anxieties culminate in these figures in forms that are “threatening and impure” (Carroll 28), “unnatural, transgressive, obscene, contradictory” (Kearney 4–5), and abject (Kristeva 4). In this article I ask how the appearance of the monstrous within contemporary video games reflects an era of climate change and ecological collapse, and how this could inform the engagement of players with discourse concerning climate change. Central to this inquiry is the literary practice of ecocriticism, which seeks to examine environmental rather than human representation in cultural artefacts, increasingly including accounts of contemporary ecological decay and disorder (Bulfin 144). I build on such perspectives to address play encounters that foreground figures of monstrosity borne of the escalating climate crisis, and summarise case studies of two recent video games undertaken as part of this project — The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (Nintendo EPD) and The Last of Us Part II (Naughty Dog). An ecocritical approach to the monsters that populate these case studies reveals the emergence of a ludic form of ecological monstrosity tied closely to our contemporary climatic conditions and taking two significant forms: one accentuating a visceral otherness and aberrance, and the other marked by the uncanny recognition of human authorship of climate change. Horrors from the Anthropocene A growing climate emergency surrounds us, enveloping us in the abject and aberrant conditions of what could be described as an ecological monstrosity. Monstrous threats to our environment and human survival are experienced on a planetary scale and research evidence plainly illustrates a compounding catastrophe. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a relatively cautious and conservative body (Parenti 5), reports that a human-made emergency has developed since the Industrial Revolution. The multitude of crises that confront us include: changes in the Earth’s atmosphere driving up global temperatures, ice sheets in retreat, sea levels rising, natural ecosystems and species in collapse, and an unprecedented frequency and magnitude of heatwaves, droughts, flooding, winter storms, hurricanes, and wildfires (United Nations Environment Programme). Further human activity, including a post-war addiction to the plastics that have now spread their way across our oceans like a “liquid smog” (Robles-Anderson and Liboiron 258), or short-sighted enthusiasm for pesticides, radiation energy, and industrial chemicals (Robles-Anderson and Liboiron 254), has ensured a damaging shift in the nature of the feedback loops that Earth’s ecosystems depend upon for stability (Parenti 6). Climatic equilibrium has been disrupted, and growing damage to the ecosystems that sustain human life suggests an inexorable, entropic path to decay. To understand Earth’s profound crisis requires thinking beyond just climate and to witness the interconnected “extraordinary burdens” placed on our planet by “toxic chemistry, mining, nuclear pollution, depletion of lakes and rivers under and above ground, ecosystem simplification, vast genocides of people” which will continue to lead to the recursive collapse of interlinked major systems (Haraway 100). To speak of climate change is really to speak of the ruin of ecologies, those “living systems composed of many moving parts” that make up the tapestry of organic life on Earth (Robles-Anderson and Liboiron 251). The emergency that presents itself, as Renata Tyszczuk observes, comprises a pervasiveness, uncertainty, and interdependency that together “affect every aspect of human lives, politics and culture” (47). The emergence of the term Anthropocene (or the Age of the Humans) to describe our current geological epoch (and to supersede the erstwhile and more stable Holocene) (Zalasiewicz et al. 1036–7; Chang 7) reflects a contemporary impossibility with talking about planet Earth without acknowledging the damaging impact of humankind on its ecosystems (Bulfin 142). This recognition of human complicity in the existential crisis engulfing our planet once again connects ecological monstrosity to the socio-cultural history of the monstrous. Monsters, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen points out, “are our children” and despite our repressive efforts, “always return” in order to “ask us why we have created them” (20). Ecological monstrosity declares to us that our relegation of greenhouse gases, rising sea levels, toxic waste, species extinction, and much more, to the discursive periphery has only been temporary. Monsters, when examined closely, start to look a lot like ourselves in terms of biological origins (Perron 357), as well as other abject cultural and social markers that signal these horrific figures as residing “too close to the borders of our [own] subjectivity for comfort” (Spittle 314). Isabel Pinedo sees this uncanny nature of the horror genre’s antagonists as a postmodern condition, a ghoulish reminder of the era’s breakdown of categories, blurring of boundaries, and collapse of master narratives that combine to ensure “mastery is lost … and the stable, unified, coherent self acquires the status of a fiction” (17–18). In standing in for anxiety, the other, and the aberrant, the figure of the monster deftly turns the mirror back on its human victims. Ecocritical Play The vast scale of ecological collapse has complicated effective public communication on the subject. The scope involved is unsettling, even paralysing, to its audiences: climate change might just be “too here, too there, too everywhere, too weird, too much, too big, too everything” to bring oneself to engage with (Tyszczuk 47). The detail involved has also been captured by scientific discourse, a detached communicative mode which too easily obviates the everyday human experience of the emergency (Bulfin 140; Abraham and Jayemanne 74–76). Considerable effort has been focussed upon producing higher-fidelity models of ecological catastrophe (Robles-Anderson and Liboiron 248), rather than addressing the more significant “trouble with representing largely intangible linkages” between micro-environmental actions and macro-environmental repercussions (Chang 86). Ecocriticism is, however, emerging as a cultural means by which the crisis, and restorative possibilities, may be rendered more legible to a wider audience. Representations of ecology and catastrophe not only sustain genres such as Eco-Disaster and Cli-Fi (Bulfin 140), but are also increasingly becoming a precondition for fiction centred upon human life (Tyszczuk 47). Media artefacts concerned with environment are able to illustrate the nature of the emergency alongside “a host of related environmental issues that the technocratic ‘facts and figures’ approach … is unlikely to touch” (Abraham and Jayemanne 76) and encourage in audiences a suprapersonal understanding of the environmental impact of individual actions (Chang 70). Popular culture offers a chance to foster ‘ecological thought’ wherein it becomes “frighteningly easy … to join the dots and see that everything is interconnected” (Morton, Ecological Thought 1) rather than founder before the inexplicability of the temporalities and spatialities involved in ecological collapse. An ecocritical approach is “one of the most crucial—yet under-researched—ways of looking into the possible cultural impact of the digital entertainment industry” upon public discourse relating to the environment crisis (Felczak 185). Video games demand this closer attention because, in a mirroring of the interconnectedness of Earth’s own ecosystems, “the world has also inevitably permeated into our technical artefacts, including games” (Chang 11), and recent scholarship has worked to investigate this very relationship. Benjamin Abraham has extended Morton’s arguments to outline a mode of ecological thought for games (What Is an Ecological Game?), Alenda Chang has closely examined how games model natural environments, and Benjamin Abraham and Darshana Jayemanne have outlined four modes in which games manifest players’ ecological relationships. Close analysis of texts and genres has addressed the capacity of game mechanics to persuade players about matters of sustainability (Kelly and Nardi); implicated Minecraft players in an ecological practice of writing upon landscapes (Bohunicky); argued that Final Fantasy VII’s plot fosters ecological responsibility (Milburn); and, identified in ARMA III’s ambient, visual backdrops of renewable power generation the potential to reimagine cultural futures (Abraham, Video Game Visions). Video games allow for a particular form of ecocriticism that has been overlooked in existing efforts to speak about ecological crisis: “a politics that includes what appears least political—laughter, the playful, even the silly” (Morton, Dark Ecology 113). Play is liminal, emergent, and necessarily incomplete, and this allows its various actors—players, developers, critics and texts themselves—to come to

If there is a problem that has emerged as a global disaster along with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is climate change. This is why the discourse of “climate crisis” has been actively conducted from various angles in recent years. Based on these facts, this study focused on analyzing the use of words related to climate change and how the ideological tendencies pursued by media companies correlate with climate issues, especially the “climate crisis” reports that have been increasingly used recently. The results of the study are summarized as follows.&#x0D; First, based on data from BIGKinds, a news big data analysis service provided by the Korea Press Promotion Foundation, it was confirmed that relatively various language variations have been appearing in climate change-related terms over the past 30 years, such as “climate change,” “weather variation,” “abnormal climate,” “climate crisis,” “climate disaster,” and “extreme climate.” Second, in our society, the term “climate change” has been used more frequently since the 2000s instead of “weather change” over the climate issue, which is markedly different in nature from natural fluctuations in the past, and “climate change” has been the most frequently used to date.&#x0D; Third, “climate change” showed a sudden upward curve in contrast to other years by showing 15,455 times in 2009 and 26,945 times in 2021. It was confirmed that there is a close correlation between the climate change cause discourse of “global warming” in 2009 and the climate change response discourse of “greenhouse gas reduction” and “carbon neutrality” in 2021.&#x0D; Fourth, the second most frequent vocabulary after “climate change” is “climate crisis,” which has shown a total frequency of 33,827 over the past 30 years, and this phenomenon has appeared as a distinct trend, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.&#x0D; Fifth, media reports that focus on highlighting the “climate crisis” issue have been confirmed to have a clear correlation with the ideological tendencies of media companies, and in newspaper editorials as well as general articles, liberal media companies are more actively approaching the “climate crisis” issue than conservative media companies.

Despite overwhelming consensus among scientists about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (Bray, 2010; Oreskes, 2004), there remains significant reluctance on the part of citizens and politicians to take the action needed to address it. This resistance has been repeatedly identified in social research (Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2010; Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012) and is mirrored by the lack of progress made by salient political summits (Rogelj et al., 2010). Perhaps as a response to this, scholarly journals and articles that are focused on climate change are growing. Natural scientists tell us that we know what needs to be done to avert dangerous climate change (IPCC, 2014), and economists tell us that delaying action in the short term will lead to much greater costs in the long term (Stern, 2007). Understanding public responses to climate change and developing solutions to catalyse action is a critical challenge for the social sciences, and we propose that the development and elaboration of a social psychology of climate change would be a cornerstone of such an approach. We do not make the claim that social psychology has all the answers but rather that the theories, models and research methods of social psychology can provide a powerful arsenal to complement the approaches of other disciplines. Researchers have already begun to apply social psychological theory and methods to the issue of climate change, and we highlight in the following sections examples of the insights that have flowed from this. We cannot assume, though, that our theories and findings will automatically generalise to the climate change context. As Moser (2010) has noted, there are unique dimensions to climate change that make it distinct from other environmental, risk and health issues: The causes of climate change are invisible to humans, the impacts are distal and it is complex and riddled with uncertainties. Modern urban humans are to some extent insulated from their physical environment, and the lags between the climate and social systems make it difficult for people to understand their role in influencing climate. These factors suggest the importance of developing a social psychology of climate change, empirically testing, integrating and refining existing theories and models to develop new frameworks. The notion that psychology can play a role in understanding and addressing climate change is not a new one. The American Psychological Association's Task Force on the interface between psychology and global climate change comprehensively detailed the ways in which psychological research can help to understand people's perceptions of the risks of climate change, the contribution of human behaviour to climate change, the psychosocial impacts of climate change, the ways in which people can adapt and cope with climate change and the psychological barriers that could limit climate change action (Swim et al., 2009, 2011). It is also not a new idea that social psychology can play an important role in understanding and addressing environmental problems and solutions (Clayton & Brook, 2005). Social psychology, specifically, has a long tradition of theory and research that is relevant to addressing key climate change questions. Attitudes, social cognition, persuasion and attitude change, social influence, and intragroup and intergroup behaviour, for instance, are fundamental foci for social psychology and have direct relevance for understanding the human and social dimensions of climate change. The time is ripe to understand the range of research that has been developing in social psychology on attitudes, beliefs and actions, to build upon these insights, and integrate them with knowledge from other sciences to develop models and theories indigenous to the climate change context. In the following section, we provide a brief overview of recent social psychological research that addresses three broad themes relevant to understanding and responding to climate change. These themes are as follows: (i) social psychological influences on climate change attitudes and beliefs; (ii) facilitators and barriers to climate change action; and (iii) changing climate change attitudes and behaviour. Although there is some overlap in these themes, as an organising principle they intuitively map on to key questions that arise in relation to climate change. Our aim is to highlight recent examples of social psychological research that provide interesting and important insights in relation to these themes. Swim, Markowitz, and Bloodhart (2012) have noted that much of the social psychological research on climate change has emerged since 2006; we focus in on the most recent of this research that has been published since 2010. We also outline how the studies in the special issue relate to these themes. We recognise that these are not the only areas where social psychological research and theory can make important contributions but they nevertheless relate to key questions that need to be addressed. We conclude the introduction by proposing considerations that social psychologists could take into account in their future research on climate change. A major focus in the climate change literature and the media more broadly has been on describing climate change attitudes and beliefs. In many developed nations, questions about beliefs and attitudes related to climate change have become a standard component of political polling (e.g. Gallup polls and Lowy Institute polls), and there are comprehensive national and cross-national surveys that address this topic. Examples include US research by the Yale Climate Change Communication project (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010), national surveys conducted in Australia (Leviston et al., 2011; Reser et al., 2012), and the U.K. (Pidgeon, 2012) and the Eurobarometer research conducted in Europe (The European Opinion Research Group, 2002). As the study of attitudes—their conceptualization, measurement, formation, function and relationship with behaviour—has been a cornerstone of social psychological research, social psychology can make important contributions to these assessments. Note that although social psychological theories usually distinguish between attitudes and beliefs, these terms are often used interchangeably in the climate change research domain, and for the sake of simplicity, we will usually use attitudes to encompass both attitudes and beliefs. Recent reviews of the attitude literature from 1996 to 2009 highlight significant trends and directions in this area of research (Ajzen, 2001; Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Crano & Prislin, 2006). These trends include the role of attitude strength and attitude ambivalence, the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, the recognition that attitudes have cognitive and affective underpinnings, and the influence of bodily and external physical cues on attitudes. Recent social psychological research on climate change particularly provides examples of the influence of bodily and external cues and the distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of attitudes, and three of the papers in the special issue address the latter issue. The work on internal bodily and external physical cues is a growing research area with a special issue of the European Journal of Social Psychology devoted to the concept of embodied cognition (Schubert & Semin, 2009). As the distal nature of climate change and the relative insulation of humans from their physical environment are thought to be key barriers to greater engagement with climate change (Moser, 2010), it is perhaps not surprising that this area of research has extended into the climate change domain. Cues that help to 'bring to life' the experience of global warming could help to overcome these psychological barriers. Risen and Critcher (2011) have shown that feelings of warmth increased beliefs in global warming and that this effect was mediated through greater ease in constructing more fluent mental images of hot outdoor images. Other studies have shown that people had greater concern about global warming and donated more money to a global warming charity when they thought that the temperature outside was warmer than usual (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011), that embodied temperature influenced concern for global warming and willingness to volunteer for a global warming group (Lewandowski, Ciarocco, & Gately, 2012) and that priming heat-related cognitions resulted in greater belief in global warming and willingness to pay to reduce global warming (Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). Physical external cues, in this case the presence of bare trees in the laboratory, also increased belief in global warming (Guéguen, 2012). These studies illustrate how subtle cues can influence climate change attitudes in the moment, although the longevity of these effects on attitudes has not been explored. Another important direction in attitude research that has relevance for climate change is the recognition that attitudes have affective as well as cognitive underpinnings. This is important when considering that the high levels of risk associated with climate change means that it could elicit strong emotional responses. Cognitive approaches to understanding attitudes (e.g. expectancy-value models) have been at the forefront of how we understand attitude formation (Ajzen, 2001). From this perspective, attitudes are the outcome of a cognitive process of evaluating beliefs about the attitude object; for example, a person who has positive beliefs about a climate change policy is likely to hold favourable attitudes to that policy. Consistent with the importance of cognitive, rational processes, Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist (2012) have shown that perceived costs and benefits of climate change policies were significant predictors of support for these policies and, in most cases, were stronger predictors of behavioural willingness and policy support than other variables (e.g. demographics, climate change concern and climate change scepticism). But there is also evidence for the affective basis of attitudes and even for the primacy of affective aspects of attitudes (Verplanken, Jofstee, & Janssen, 1998; Zajonc, 1984). Recent reviews of the attitude literature suggest that, rather than attitudes being determined by one or the other, affect and cognition are both likely to be important for the formation of attitudes (Ajzen, 2001; Crano & Prislin, 2006). For example, whether affective or cognitive aspects of attitude objects are accessed more readily depends on whether the attitude object itself is more affectively or cognitively based (Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Three articles in the current issue pick up on the cognitive and affective aspects of climate change attitudes and perceptions. Although it seems intuitively likely that having greater knowledge about climate change should be related to climate change attitudes, findings in relation to knowledge have been mixed. Some research has shown that knowing more about the causes and consequences of climate change is associated with greater climate change risk judgments (Sunblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2009), whereas other studies have shown no effects or have suggested the possibility that having more knowledge could even be negatively related to climate change beliefs for those with a politically conservative orientation (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Yet, Guy, Kashima, Walker, and O'Neill (this issue) point out that knowledge is usually measured with proxy measures such as scientific literacy or self-reported climate change knowledge rather than objective knowledge of climate change, and therefore, it is premature to dismiss the positive relationship between knowledge and attitudes. Their study used an objective measure of climate change knowledge and shows that people who are more knowledgeable have greater belief that climate change is happening, and, moreover, knowledge attenuates the negative relationship between ideology (i.e. individualism) and climate change attitudes. Van der Linden (this issue) specifically addresses how affect and cognition relate to climate change perceptions. The study investigates the relationship between personal experiences of extreme weather events, affect relating to climate change, and climate change risk perceptions. The results of the structural equation modelling of a national British sample provides support for a dual-process model whereby cognitive appraisals activate risk perceptions, and risk and affect mutually reinforce each other in a feedback loop. The paper by Leviston, Price, and Bishop (this issue) explores the role of affect in climate change responses somewhat differently in that it looks at the images people bring to mind when they think about climate change and assesses the affect associated with these images. The research explores whether the types of images that people associate with climate change might be a way of psychologically and affectively engaging or distancing themselves from climate change. It is not enough that people endorse attitudes that are in tune with scientific consensus on climate change; these attitudes need to translate into positive action, whether that is individual private-sphere behaviours such as 'green' consumerism, public-sphere non-activist behaviour such as voting for political parties with environmentally responsible policies or collective environmental activism that seeks to influence decision-makers (Stern, 2000). These types of distinctions are important as the different classes of behaviour might have quite different facilitators and barriers (Stern, 2000). Another important distinction when considering climate-change-related behaviour is the extent to which it is habitual and automatic versus reasoned and deliberative (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Automaticity of environmentally harmful behaviour poses a serious barrier, whereas automaticity of environmentally protective behaviour makes future behaviour of this type more likely (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). Yet another potentially important consideration is the goals associated with behaviours (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Behaviours can be performed for a range of reasons, and individuals' perception of their own motives could have implications for their future actions. As an example, energy conservation behaviours could be performed primarily to reduce carbon emissions or to save money; the issue with engaging in environmentally protective behaviours for non-environmental reasons is that it could undermine the development of an environmentalist identity (van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013) and reduce the likelihood of behavioural spillover (Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009). A range of social psychological theories outline the mechanisms that motivate people to take action, and these have had great reach both inside and outside of social psychology. These theories include (but are not limited to) theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and perspectives that foreground the role of norms (e.g. norm focus theory; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) and the social identity perspective (see Hornsey, 2008 for a recent review). The theory of planned behaviour has been used to examine determinants of a range of private-sphere environmental behaviours including employees' energy-saving behaviours (Greaves, Zibarras, & Stride, 2013; Zhang, Wang, & Zhou, 2014), private landholders' carbon sequestration and trading (Thompson & Hansen, 2013), renewable energy use (Alam et al., 2014) and opposition to wind farms (Read, Brown, Thorsteinsson, Morgan, & Price, 2013). Similarly, research drawing on self-determination theory has identified that experiencing more autonomous, self-determined motivation or perceiving that the government is more autonomy supportive is related to public-sphere and private-sphere environmental behaviours (De Groot & Steg, 2010; Lavergne, Sharp, Pelletier, & Holtby, 2010). Perhaps one of the most important contributions of social psychology to understanding human behaviour has been its theorisation of the influence of social norms (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1990). From a social identity perspective, the social groups to which we belong provide guidelines for appropriate behaviour through the internalisation of group norms (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hornsey, 2008). We only need to consider the powerful relationship between political party identification and climate change responses to see evidence of this process (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012). According to the social identity perspective, group norms are more likely to guide environmental behaviour when the social identity is more central and salient (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Furthermore, in salient intergroup contexts, in-group members tend to polarise away from out-group members, and their environmental intentions and behaviour will become more in-group normative (Ferguson, & 2011; & 2012). and (this issue) our understanding of how social identity and associated in-group norms influences climate-change-related behaviour. on social identity to distinguish between dimensions of group identification and whether different dimensions are more likely to guide behaviour. that extent to which group identity is important to the and rather than among group the relationship between group norms and when those behaviours are high Although much of the research to has focused on understanding and private-sphere environmental and (van & have extended their model of with collective to understand responses to climate change (Van & 2008). on a perspective & Swim, 2011), they propose and provide evidence for for people to with the climate and In the case of climate change, is a likely to be by and to the extent that they they be more likely to take action to reduce their can also be through that to their beliefs about whether group action will be in with climate change. and (this issue) this research by determinants of intentions to in collective climate emotional specifically on and as central and social norms into the Their findings that the perceived norm intentions to take part in a climate perceptions of and group In the section, we a brief overview of theories that could help to understand climate-change-related and these approaches suggest variables to to effect change. For example, research has shown the of to influence environmentally related behaviour et al., 2013; et al., 2010; Cialdini, & 2008; Cialdini, & 2008; & 2013; et al., 2012). In this section, we focus on research that addresses key that might be when to influence climate-change-related attitudes, beliefs and actions. important direction in research has been the of how to climate change to positive in climate change attitudes and beliefs. From a social psychological perspective, one of the of is the role of attitudes in & Dickel, 2011). A of the literature to a effect of attitudes on for versus et al., 2009), and there is evidence that this is more likely when people hold strong attitudes & 2007). This that people's attitudes will influence how they to to change climate-change-related attitudes and beliefs, and research is broadly with this. greater to on climate change with their own & and are more likely to climate when it to their beliefs & 2011; & 2013). In response to this, some have climate to be more when they with the For example, with greater had greater intentions when with that behaviour as the American way of & 2010), and climate greater intentions when with that the positive effects of climate change on the development of new Hornsey, & 2012). the of more we know from the work of and that people are risk and that risk in ways that highlight the of can be more than that focus on In the of climate change where is a of the and (2011) have shown that climate change that the the but the possibility of stronger intentions to and (this issue) on the model of & 2013) to provide a for climate change In they with one of policies that in renewable energy or limit The with the policies was when the with the policy. there was more with a policy of in renewable energy an when it was in terms of whereas greater was for a policy of emissions a when it was as also that the focus of their responses to the Another key issue that be is the possibility of to climate change and the risks to human and from climate change, of and are central to the of climate change. the effects of in relation to health behaviour & & 2000) provide evidence that elicit greater attitude and behaviour change but only when the is by of responses propose that people that response are and they have the to out the they will in behaviours to the there is this in to the such as or The for to climate change is in a study by and greater of climate change among with stronger beliefs who had been with about climate change, whereas this not on more Research has also shown that of to from climate change, particularly can be made more take the perspective of the by climate change (Swim & in to climate change also when social are & 1999). For example, when were to evidence of energy use by their own they were more likely to climate change to causes than when the was about 2013). Furthermore, this greater to causes was negatively associated with climate change concern and support for climate change that help reduce identity can greater engagement with climate change. on the and (2010) that a to reduce the of of climate change and personal with climate change and environmental behaviour. Although can help reduce to climate change, and (this issue) that the for to environmental problems can undermine individuals' willingness to take environmental as progress that can to future environmental and human health problems can reduce the likelihood of engaging in environmentally behaviour. The is perceptions of that a of in an as the idea of scientific progress our the need to through individual actions. The from this research is that it is important not to scientific of the major barriers that has been identified in relation to action to address climate change is the distal nature of the et al., major consequences will in the future and are perceived as more likely to affect other those who are already most This of climate change that that reduce the between and the future or between the and other humans help to overcome this In support of this, that focus on environmental consequences of climate change help climate change engagement & 2013), and to take the perspective of a future human experiencing environmental problems environmental engagement & 2013). The research of and (this issue) to whether our human identity can influence willingness to take environmental Consistent with research, they that are related to greater willingness to in environmental is though, is that priming people who have to think about to have high related to potentially it an intergroup context. This provides evidence of the of about climate change and the need to understand the Social psychology can also point to some and to greater willingness to in to address climate change. and (this issue) that that whether have an versus an can make a to how many behaviours they consider engaging In that had out behaviours they would not consider resulted in being to in more behaviours than an where people consider what they would consider from a In this introduction to the special we highlight areas where social psychological research has important insights to understanding climate change attitudes, beliefs and what influences these and how they can be We used recent social psychological research and the papers from this current issue to illustrate key The strength of a social psychological of climate change is that it can help us to understand the of responses to climate change, for example, how attitudes can be influenced by both affect and cognition, how attitudes and beliefs can responses to climate change and people to climate change with and It can also provide and to the of climate change It is to see the and of social psychological research that addresses important questions related to climate change, although this has been a recent (Swim et al., 2012). we are to to make important contributions to this area of research, though, we propose that social psychologists should consider the following in their future We noted that there are a range of that can take to address climate change, from private-sphere behaviours to non-activist public-sphere behaviours to environmental activism (Stern, 2000). Although all of these approaches can some have greater than & 2009). have greater to influence and and to effect Despite this, social psychological research often investigates private-sphere actions. As a we can our contribution to climate change research by our focus to individual behaviours and public-sphere responses to climate change & 2008). As a we are to what is about climate change. The groups we belong to and the social we can be powerful influences on our attitudes, beliefs and the effect of political identification on climate change attitudes is a of this. area where these have relevance is in the of national and climate change As an example, and (2012) on social identity to the in that when the of individual and other become a identity can that will lead to greater likelihood of The consideration of intergroup and how these or positive responses to climate change (e.g. climate change and introduction of climate change is an area that could provide important A critical distinction made in relation to climate change is between and According to the on Climate Change the to human to reduce the impacts of climate change, whereas the latter to that can be made to human or systems that can help to the or the that would from or climate change and are even the measures will not some of climate change, and is needed to with this (IPCC, Yet the issue of psychological has been in climate change & Swim, 2011). This is for at (i) as noted some of climate change is research on is and (ii) a lack of understanding of could in that to or reduce to climate change that impacts or of other or social & social psychological research is to be a serious to the climate change research greater needs to be focused on of The need to to the distinction between and to the need for social psychologists to work with other disciplines. et we social psychologists to become with the and research of other relevant that address climate change to the relevance and reach of social psychological research in this that solutions to climate change cannot be developed by one the issue systems including and A is and social psychology can make a significant contribution by methods and theories that help social and cognitive In we in this introduction to the special issue to foreground social psychological theories and findings relevant to key climate change questions. Although social psychology can a of and the social psychology of climate change is and more needs to be done we have a of and theories that are to climate change. we this, the of social psychology is likely to be at the of climate We that the special issue can help the progress that has been made and catalyse the development of an indigenous social psychology of climate change. We social psychologists to this that we can be part of the to one of the and environmental of our

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

Dynamic climate and digital changes are shaping the modern world, requiring responses from decision-makers at every level – political, social and economic. These changes have a direct impact on the socio-economic system and the shaping of strategies for the management of countries and organisations. Faced with complex climate, health, military and economic crises, societies and businesses have to adapt to the new reality. The climate crisis, exacerbated by both human activity and natural phenomena, is forcing societies to adopt a new way of perceiving the world and managing its resources. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the digital transformation, changing the way the economy and society work. These parallel processes require a new approach to the design and implementation of business models. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of digital and climate changes on the business models of companies and how these changes affect the shaping of strategies, business processes and projects in various sectors of the economy. Particular attention was paid to the role of business models in adapting to the challenges of the digital and climate transformations, as well as their importance in ensuring the survival and competitiveness of organisations in a dynamically changing market environment. This chapter attempts to answer crucial questions pertaining to issues, the understanding of which can be the basis for further scientific research and practical activities aimed at solving key problems of modern society, economy and business.

COP27 Climate Change Conference: urgent action needed for Africa and the world: Wealthy nations must step up support for Africa and vulnerable countries in addressing past, present and future impacts of climate change.

Women tend to be objects and victims of climate change impact. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 2020 found that gender-based violence was aligned with climate and environmental crises in various developing countries. In addition, 9.9 women were affected heavily by natural disasters in Indonesia (BPS, 2017). Meanwhile, only 20% of women's leadership constitutes the entire energy sector (WEF, 2022). Another important statement from the IPCC (2022) said that women (particularly pregnant women) became highly impacted by the climate crisis. The Assessment Report on the State of Gender Equality and Climate Change in ASEAN (2022) built evidence on the importance of recognising women’s roles in climate action in ASEAN countries. In light of this background, this paper will analyse the critical complexities of ASEAN women's leadership towards climate action in order to evaluating the implementation of SDGs goal 5 and 13. To have further deep analysis, this paper will explore the case study of Balinese and Cambodian women who have best practices of climate action, locally, nationally and globally, which also enhance ASEAN countries' commitment to SDGs. Some of the best practices in Cambodia include a Renewable Energy (RE) programme that actively engages with and promotes women-led energy enterprises by implementing “The Smoke-Free Village” approach and training women as champions for gender-transformative Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Meanwhile, in Bali, Balinese women play an important role in climate action by establishing the Bali Women Climate Entrepreneur Project which encourages 10 start-ups to join the program and many other best practices to be explored further. As a methodology, the best practices of women leadership in both countries will be collected through literature reviews, interviews, statistics from the Balinese and Cambodia government/SDGs centres, and other relevant documents’ review. From those sources, this paper is expected to be the guide to mapping women leadership in climate action and also become a guide on how to develop effective communication for women in the ASEAN region on climate change.

The Black Summer of 2019/2020 saw the forests of southeast Australia go up in flames. The fire season started early, in September 2019, and by March 2020 fires had burned over 12.6 million hectares (Werner and Lyons). The scale and severity of the fires was quickly confirmed by scientists to be "unprecedented globally" (Boer et al.) and attributable to climate change (Nolan et al.). The fires were also a media spectacle, generating months of apocalyptic front-page images and harrowing broadcast footage. Media coverage was particularly preoccupied by the cause of the fires. Media framing of disasters often seeks to attribute blame (Anderson et al.; Ewart and McLean) and, over the course of the fire period, blame for the fires was attributed to climate change in much media coverage. However, as the disaster unfolded, denialist discourses in some media outlets sought to veil this revelation by providing alternative explanations for the fires. Misinformation originating from social media also contributed to this obscuration. In this article, we investigate the extent to which media coverage of the 2019/2020 bushfires functioned both to precipitate a climate change epiphany and also to support refutation of the connection between catastrophic fires and the climate crisis.