Clickbait in Pyongyang: Influencers, ethics and the political economy of foreign tourism in North Korea

COVID-19 is an infectious respiratory disease that first appeared in December 2019 in Wuhan, China and first spread throughout the country and then worldwide. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, concerned about the rapid spread of COVID-19, officially declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) barred foreign tourists from China on January 21, 2020, and then completely closed its border with China. In this article, I will explore the impact of COVID-19 on North Korean society and research the cooperation plan between South and North Korea. I will also briefly introduce in the post-COVID-19 period. To better understand the health care system and health conditions in North Korea, I will first analyse the infectious disease management system and, in the context of this, then try to investigate in detail how COVID-19 has affected North Korea. From an economic point of view, I will examine the changes in economic cooperation between North Korea and China, and then try to explain the social changes caused by restrictions on movement and lack of goods, and the political situation in North Korea during the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, I will try to research the situation facing North Korea and suggest a way for cooperation between South and North Korea in the future. The basic aim of this research is to find a useful alternative for joint cooperation in the field of health care and safety and to improve cooperation between South and North Korea in the post-COVID-19 era.

Last orders in Pyongyang

Drought is the main agrometeorological disaster in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which has great influences on the growth of the crops and directly affects grain yield. Technologies of agricultural production level is low sciences of investment is little, and irrigation installation is poor in DPRK. Therefore, it is easy to cause a reduction in grain yield if drought occurs in DPRK. The Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) had proposed to warning food security of DPRK in 2017. Meanwhile, the food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations had also claimed that the rainfall in summer was insufficient and the grain yield would be reduction in DPRK. Hence, assessing the drought condition in DPRK is very important to understand the effects of drought on grain yield in 2017. In this study, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM)3B43 time series dataset from 1998 to 2017 was used to monitor the temporal and spatial characteristics of drought in DPRK in 2017. At national scale, the results show that the annual precipitation in 2017 was clearly lower than average precipitation during 1998 and 2017 in DPRK. Particularly, the annual precipitation was the lowest since 1998 in southern DPRK. A large number of studies show that Z-index can accurately assess the grade of drought. In this study, Z-index was applied for assessment the drought condition basis on TRMM data in 2017, which is used by the National Meteorological Center of China. The main agricultural regions were strongly affected by the drought in the study area, such as, in Hwanghaenam-do, Hwanghaebuk-do and Pyonganbuk-do. Furthermore, we assessed drought condition of crop growing season during March and September in 2017. According to Z-index, there was obvious drought in March, June and September in DPRK. The drought was severity in western DPRK in March. The magnitude of drought in Pyonganbuk-do was extreme drought and the Z-index value was -2.41 that was the lowest in 2017. Meanwhile, the magnitude of drought was severe drought in parts of Chagang-do and Pyongannam-do indicating obviously affected by drought. Moreover, 1.14 × 105 km2 (93.5%) area was affected by drought in June including Pyonganbuk-do, Pyongannam-do, Pyongyang City, Hwanghaebuk-do, Hwanghaenam-do and Hamgyungnam-do where showed magnitude of the drought is extreme drought. The maximum Z-index value was −1.95, that appeared in the Hwanghaenam-do. In addition, 75.3% of the study area appeared drought in September, especially eastern and central DPRK. The magnitude of drought was extreme drought in Gangwon-do. Totally, there were more than 2.0×104 km2 of croplands affected by drought in DPRK in 2017. The grain yield would be reduced due to drought occur during growing season in 2017. Thus, it is expected that the food gap would be appearance in 2018. Food aid should be provided by the international community in future.

The Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea) found it possible to work with the new United States (US) administration and with a new government in Japan, despite initial apprehension about both. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) did not. More mundane economic worries include such issues as contaminated foodstuffs from China and patent infringements, which surface from time to time. Relations with Japan continued along the relatively smoother path of 2008, with President Lee and Japanese Prime Minister Asō Tarō, who met twice during the year in Seoul, finding common ground on approaches to the DPRK and the need for a strong relationship with the US. The nuclear issue remained the dominant theme in the DPRK's international relations. The last months of the Bush administration saw an impasse in the Six Party Talks that remained unresolved as the Obama administration came into office in January 2009. Keywords:China; Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); international relation; Japan; nuclear issue; Republic of Korea (ROK); Six Party Talks; United States (US)

Seoul's Supporting Role in Pyongyang's Sanctions-Busting Scheme Sung-Yoon Lee (bio) Sanctions sway with the political wind, and all year the political wind behind sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been gathering into a storm—one that threatens to reverse course and derail the enforcement efforts built up over the past two years. For the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore on June 12 provided a powerful wind to further clear the way for muffling existing sanctions on Pyongyang. Sanctions, like domestic law, are not self-executing but require constant effort to enforce. For sanctions to bear the intended results, the political will, human resources, and disincentives to subverting enforcement all must be in place, continually, until the target nation's strategic calculations are profoundly affected by the persistent pressure. If the will dissipates—for example, following a sudden change in the diplomatic environment—enforcement can weaken. When sanctions implementation comes undone and third parties return to the business-as-usual mode of nonenforcement, or in some cases even actively subsidize the target nation, the toughest sanctions on the books will be bereft of meaning. Moreover, in the wake of premature relaxation, sanctions can hardly be reactivated instantly. The resumption of enforcement takes much more time than the re-enforcement of domestic laws, as the process is largely determined by the degree and duration of international cooperation. In short, sanctions are as much dependent on the vagaries of the political wind as the currents at sea are on the natural wind. And South Korea, by virtue of its ethnic affinity and geographic proximity to the North, is a key factor in this meteorological game. The sanctions on North Korea are precariously close to undergoing an atmospheric shift in the aftermath of the dramatic first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and the DPRK. The Singapore Summit was an optically gripping political drama, choreographed by North Korea, from which Kim Jong-un walked away [End Page 13] with an overwhelming victory.1 Having made no substantive concession of his own, he won both tangible concessions from President Donald Trump, such as the suspension of the annual combined military exercises between the United States and the ROK, and the less visible, albeit far greater, victory of buying time and money for the DPRK to perfect its own nuclear posture review. The United States' engagement in a drawn-out negotiation process that could end sanctions required considerable help in the production stage, ironically, from the nation that stands to lose the most in the event of Pyongyang's completion of its nuclear strategy—South Korea.2 This essay looks first at the history of sanctions against the DPRK and then at how South Korea has undermined its own and, by extension U.S., efforts at implementing sanctions. The essay concludes by examining the future tenacity of the current sanctions regime after the Trump-Kim summit in June 2018. A Brief History of Sanctions on the DPRK U.S. sanctions against North Korea only became meaningful both on paper and in practice with the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. In fact, prior to this occasion, with the exception of the U.S. Treasury Department's designation of Banco Delta Asia as a primary money-laundering concern under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act in September 2005, U.S. sanctions against North Korea, contrary to popular perception, had been erratic, defensive, and weak—in both degree and kind—compared with U.S. sanctions against many other states.3 Between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the U.S. designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988, the sum of U.S. economic sanctions on the country consisted of trade sanctions pursuant to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act. However, such sanctions are notoriously ineffective, as the targeted state is almost always able to find alternative trading partners, including U.S. allies. The designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism after North Korean agents planted a bomb on a South...

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

본 논문은 2006년 유엔 장애인권리협약의 맥락에서 사회복지 관점으로부터 인권 및 장애인 권리의 현주소를 탐구하려고 시도하였다. 전반적인 논의는 일반적인 인권과 특히 장애인권의 과제들에 대한 과감한 해결이 어려운 북한의 상황에 초점이 맞춰져 있다. 유엔 장애인 권리협약은 모든 비준 당사국이 협약을 이행하기 위해 법제도의 개혁과 조화, 정책 및 프로그램 개발을 시작하도록 촉구한다. 남북한도 모두 예외가 아니다. 북한 인권에 관해서는 유엔 조사위원회에 의하지 않더라도 그 비참한 상황은 잘 드러나 있다. 그러나 이 논문에서는 한국의 인권이 북한보다 우월하다고 보는 것은 아니다. 이 논문은 그 문제에 대해 남북한과 그밖에 다른 나라들에게 공통된 추가 조치를 위한 영역들을 제시하였다. 장애인 권리에 관한 일반적인 논의와 별개로 본 논문의 특별한 기여는 북한에 관한 최신 정보와 자료를 도출하려고 노력한 사실에 있다. 그것은 유엔과 북한 자체로부터 나온 여러 출처에 의존하였다. 북한 장애인 당국은 장애인의 인권 개선을 위해 외부로부터의 도움을 청하려는 열의로 매우 노력하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 또한 그것은 재정적 지원 및 물질적 지원에 대한 국제적 협력의 많은 필요성을 보여준다. 본 논문은 유엔장애권리협약 제32조가 규정하는 국제협력의 기치 아래, 남북한의 장애인단체간 협력에 긍정적 신호로 평화와 안정을 위한 단계적 조치를 취하는 남북한 간의 최근 정치발전에 주목하고 있다. 보다 비판적으로, 본 논문에서는 균형 잡힌 법제도 개혁, 정책 개발을 보장하며 국제 협력 분야를 선명하게 하기 위해 전반적인 데이터 기반을 개선해야 할 필요성을 지적하였다.This paper attempts to explore the place of human and disability rights from the perspective of Social Welfare within the context of the UN Disability Rights Convention of 2006. The overall discussion is focused especially upon the situations of human and disability rights in the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (North Korea) as it is being challenged to drastically address the issues of human rights in general, and disability rights in particular. The UN Disability Rights Convention challenges every ratified State party to commence legal reforms, legal harmonization, and policy and program developments to implement the Convention. Both North and South Korea are not exceptions to this. Even without drawing upon the UN s the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, the dire situation of human rights in North Korea is well documented. However, this paper does not assume South Korea s human rights are any way superior to that of North Korea. This paper spells out areas for further action common to two Koreas and to any other nations for that matter. Apart from the general discussion on disability rights, the distinctive contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it has endeavored to draw upon any latest information and data on North Korea. It relied on various sources from UN and also from North Korea itself. One can note that North Korean disability authorities are making strenuous efforts to improve human rights of persons with disabilities in their desires to seek assistance from outside. It also shows an enormous need for international cooperation in seeking financial and material supports. This paper notes the latest political development between North and South Korea in taking “phased” steps for peace and stability as a positive sign for North and South Koreans DPOs collaboration under the banner of International Cooperation of the article 32 of the UN Disability Rights Convention. More critically, this paper points to the further need to improve the overall data bases to ensure balanced legal reforms, policy developments and sharpen the areas of international collaboration.

The core questions addressed by Noland (2019) are how, and whether, engagement could foster market-orientation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and reduce direct state control over the country's economy. Noland presumes that the DPRK regime's objective is to obtain revenue with minimum changes to its internal practices and associated risks to political stability, and argues that the nature of engagement is important in inducing desired changes in the country. Noland highlights the modality of economic exchange in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and analyzes whether the KCI model could serve as a means of transformative engagement. Through his analysis, Noland demonstrates that the labor practices in the KIC appear to be both exploitative and limit the extent the DPRK workers are exposed to new ways of organizing work, and concludes that it is unlikely to generate the desired changes. In order to encourage real institutional change, Noland concludes that the DPRK's partners must emphasize “more transformative approaches,” especially by means of introducing international norms and voluntary codes into the country. Otherwise, Noland assesses that the economic growth would merely enable the DPRK to achieve its status of “a de facto nuclear state.” In order to promote “effective transformative engagement,” Noland focuses on the means to expose DPRK workers to “new ways of organizing work.” To advance this argument further, it is also necessary to address the broad question of how the empowerment of workers could lead to real institutional changes in the country. As Babson (2019) notes, for the DPRK's economic growth, the regime would need to reform the economic system by embracing the role of markets, stimulating private initiative, and transforming international relations. The reformative measures include (but are not limited to) building institutions for legal and financial systems, trade and macroeconomic management; state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform; and shaping the economic leadership and core agencies as well as the role of the international financial institutions. Additionally, it should be noted that “animal spirits” among the empowered workers and entrepreneurs are an essential ingredient for any market growth. What options are available for external partners to affect such a reformative process? How can these countries help the empowered DPRK workers challenge state control over the economy and promote a desired realignment of the incumbent domestic coalition? These broader questions may deserve scrutiny as well. In this regard, experts are debating the extent to which the SOE reform since 2014 and the increasing level of private business activities could affect the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its external partners. Sakai (2018) argues that the DPRK regime does not intend to pursue a Chinese-style of economic reform and continues to oblige all DPRK citizens and entities to obey absolutely the “leadership,” while emphasizing the importance of “self-development spirit,” as opposed to international cooperation. Sakai offers a cautious view with regard to the opportunities for external partners to affect the DPRK's reformative process. To the contrary, Mimura (2017) highlights a possible window of opportunity to affect the DPRK's thinking about foreign partnership by focusing on the internal debate surrounding the new economic strategy since January 2018. Mimura observes that SOE autonomy is a key subject in the debate and focuses on the increasing autonomy for SOE managers, as opposed to the state planners, in making decisions on issues related to human resource management and production and sales of excess commodities. Babson (2019) also points to an increasingly blurred boundary between SOE and private business activities, referring to the emergence of successful entrepreneurs in both SOEs and private ventures. Babson recommends to explore options for enterprise organization models that would best support the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its partners. Such endeavor would complement Noland's proposal on the empowerment of DPRK workers. The DPRK's new line of economic policy is surely intended to secure the survival of the regime which would reject any external pressure if it felt threatened. The transformative engagement approach could succeed so long as the DPRK leadership became confident of its merits, which would likely require a prolonged period of adjustment, at a minimum. The DPRK's future decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, if it ever happens, would be affected by the regime's confidence in the security environment in which the economy is a crucial, but not necessarily the sole, factor. Political rapprochement is also another essential element in undertaking effective transformative engagement.

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in our interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If unchecked, this program threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asia and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security and prosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economic growth and political stability is security, and the linchpins of security have been our commitment to our defense relationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea's long-standing challenge to security and stability in Northeast Asia acquired more ominous dimension with the emergence of major North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated large nuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence believes that the purpose of the complex is the production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition to small 5 MW(e) reactor in operation since 1985, 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactor are under construction. We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program had generated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and was poised to leap forward in terms of plutonium production. The North Korean program represented an unacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies' interests for number of mutually-reinforcing reasons: * An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversized conventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK as well as greatly increasing the costs of war in Korea. * A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite nuclear arms race in Asia generally. * Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. * North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariah states or terrorists worldwide. * With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, the nuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 and agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRK defueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel. In 1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium from that load of fuel. The DPRK remained out of compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT and then suspended its withdrawal. In June 1994 the DPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier defueling. It declared it would end its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with the ROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. In light of the DPRK's massive conventional capability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into a sea of fire we augmented our defensive capability, and in consultation with the ROK, considered wide range of options for additional force augmentations. …

IntroductionThe year 2013 marked the sixty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The relations were established within a shared ideology, at a time when both countries sought allies to strengthen their independence. Mongolia's rejection of communism and adoption of a multi-party system and market economy in 1990 were to radically change its relationship with the DPRK.However, despite their many differences and North Korea's pariah status in the international arena, Ulaanbaatar has made repeated efforts to maintain active diplomatic relations and engage North Korea. It has hosted talks in Ulaanbaatar between the DPRK and Japan, expressed interest in leasing a seaport in North Korea and, to mark the 65th diplomatic anniversary, Mongolia's head of state has visited Pyong-yang. These initiatives raise a number of questions. How have Mongolia's relations with the DPRK evolved over these sixty-five years, and can Ulaanbaatar continue to engage North Korea now that Mongolia is a democracy, has embraced a market economy, and subscribes to vastly different values and principles? Can Mongolia convince the DPRK to take part in a dialogue on regional security, as Mongolia's head of state suggested at the time of his 2013 visit to Pyongyang?Sources regarding Mongolia's relations with the DPRK remain limited and difficult to access. This article draws on literature, media reports, official Mongolian press releases and statements, and, finally, a number of informal interviews and discussions with Mongolian policy makers and politicians.1 As such, this article approaches Mongolia's relations with the DPRK through Mongolia's DPRK policy, rather than analyzing Pyongyang's attitude towards Ulaanbaatar.Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: 19482The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948 served Mongolia and the DPRK well. Both Mongolia and North Korea only maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Though de facto following Soviet priorities, the DPRK relations provided an opportunity for Mongolia to reaffirm its independence, particularly towards its southern neighbor China. In the 17th and 18th century, the territory of Mongolia had been administered as the Chinese province of Outer Mongolia. In 1911, with the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongolia proclaimed its independence yet entered a decade of disarray. The country adopted its first constitution in 1924 and proclaimed, under Russian protection, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Following Russia, Mongolia became the second country to adopt communism. Mongolia's independence, however, remained fragile, and it would take two decades-and some Soviet pressure-for China's Chiang Kai-shek to reluctantly recognize the MPR (Chiang's recognition, however, was short-lived, and Mongolia-Taiwan relations remain ambiguous to this date).On October 15, 1948, barely a month after the DPRK had been proclaimed, and on Pyongyang's initiative, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations.3 The diplomatic relations of the two states-and for that matter those with the Soviet Union-were predominantly based on shared ideology. Migeddorj Batchimeg, currently a member of parliament and former presidential advisor on national security,4 defines the initial relations between the two countries as an ideology-driven friendship.5 Indeed, during the Korean War Mongolia provided North Korea with food aid, horses (some of which were formally awarded the DPRK title heroic horse), and other material assistance. Mongolia further took in a number of young children orphaned during the war and continued to provide food aid to North Korea after the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953.6The early and rapid recognition of the two nations did not translate into frequent high-l evel visits and a thriving exchange between the two nations. …

The Failure of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement against North Korea Robert Huish (bio) KEYWORDS NORTH KOREA, SANCTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, MARITIME TRAFFIC [End Page 131] 2018 update Subsequent to the publication of this article, Raetsmarine Insurance provided evidence to the author to reflect that it insured the Kum San Bong (IMO 8810384) under the Mongolian flag, and not under the DPRK flag as was erroneously recorded in the MarineTraffic Database. The MarineTraffic Database has been updated accordingly. Raetsmarine’s policy is to prohibit the insurance of North Korean flagged vessels in order to be in compliance with the sanctions regime. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This article examines the ineffectiveness of current sanctions on marine traffic into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by identifying four weaknesses that allow traffic there to continue: flags of convenience, misidentification or false registration, offshore ownership, and shell-firm owners, managers, and insurers. MAIN ARGUMENT Based on a review of automatic identification system data tracking approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports between April 2016 and October 2016, current sanctions on North Korea do not appear to be impeding marine traffic into the country. The majority of marine traffic into the DPRK during this period was from Chinese ports by vessels flagged by several countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the DPRK. The registration and flagging of vessels trading with North Korea occurs via offshore firms that are based outside sanctions enforcement zones in places such as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Seychelles. Sanctions against North Korea are thus largely symbolic gestures of disapproval that do not demonstrate any capability to change the political behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime. For sanctions to influence the regime’s behavior, it would be necessary to pursue restrictions on the capital flows that allow marine traffic to enter the country rather than sanctioning the regime itself. POLICY IMPLICATIONS • The role of offshore capital reduces the potency of smart sanctions and recent financial measures against North Korea. If offshore interests are not taken into consideration, then it is unlikely that these policies will have any real effect on the regime’s political behavior. • he intermediaries of vessel owners, managers, and insurers are all financially gaining from trade with the DPRK, which presents an important target for financial measures. Insurers of some of these vessels are situated in countries that do uphold sanctions, notably the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, South Korea, and New Zealand. • The Banco Delta Asia case demonstrates an important aperture in sanctions enforcement by relying on financial measures that do not target the regime itself but go after the surrounding capital networks on which it relies. [End Page 132] In February 2016 the United States escalated its enforcement of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and in June 2016 it imposed a new set of prohibitions on the regime, citing evidence of gross human rights violations.1 Sanctions, in the form of financial restrictions and the prohibition of marine traffic, have been increasingly imposed on a global scale against the DPRK in the past several years.2 Many scholars and policy analysts have long questioned the efficacy of sanctions to alter the behavior of hostile countries or thwart human rights abuses.3 This article analyzes the efficacy of current sanctions on the DPRK, specifically those focused on curtailing marine traffic into the country. Despite the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in March 2016 and U.S. sanctions in June 2016, marine traffic into the DPRK continued throughout 2016. Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used automatic identification system (AIS) software from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to analyze marine traffic into active DPRK ports and identified approximately 70 incoming vessels, mostly arriving from Chinese ports but also from other locations, including a vessel that traveled to Sinpo harbor from Vancouver, Canada. While the methods used in this article are insufficient to produce a conclusive account of all marine traffic into the DPRK, this study finds that, despite the existence of sanctions, marine traffic regularly enters DPRK ports owing to the reflagging of vessels under flags of convenience and ownership of vessels by offshore capital management firms. This...

have been a surprisingly high number of clashes between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953. While it is well known that the brinkmanship strategy of the DPRK regime was a crucial cause of the clashes between the ROK and the DPRK, the ROK's role in provoking the DPRK has generally been ignored. Most incidents prior to the early 1990s could not have been thoroughly examined because the ROK government maintained a complete control over the domestic mass media, even though a few specialists on the NorthSouth relationship and newspapers in the ROK have begun to analyze the ROK's responsibility in very recent conflicts. More specifically, some scholars argued that the relationship between the ROK and the DPRK deteriorated significantly after the inauguration of President Lee Myung-Bak in February 2008, due to a new policy toward Korea in the Lee government.1 The so-called North Wind (Pukp'ung) incident shortly before the April 1 1 general election in 1996 is another case deserving attention. Since early April of that year, the DPRK's gunboats and heavily armed soldiers had darted in and out of South Korea. In particular, nearly 200 DPRK soldiers armed with machine guns and mortars repeatedly crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). After an investigation conducted by the Kim Dae-Jung government two years later, it became clear that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) had been the instigator in the DPRK's violation of the Armistice Agreement. This was because the unstable security situation during the election would have benefited the conservative ruling party rather than the

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

Grain problems in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been the focus of global attention for many years. In this context, scientific evaluations of grain supply and consumption are very important as a component of agricultural cooperation between China and the DPRK and will also promote a stable development of the society across Northeast Asia. The results of this analysis showed that DPRK grain production in 2019 was equivalent to that seen in 1975. Dominant grain-producing areas within the DPRK include the plains in the west and southwest encompassing North Phyongan, South Phyongan, Pyongyang, North Hwanghae, and South Hwanghae. The data showed that the DPRK was basically grain self-sufficient prior to 1995 but subsequently has been unable to meet the demand, even given reliance on imports and international assistance. The cultivated land area within the DPRK includes large proportions of slope farmland, an important factor that influences the grain production. The DPRK also boasts good irrigation infrastructure that provides a good basis for grain production. This means that, under normal circumstances, 56.59% of cultivated land can be effectively irrigated. Chemical fertilizer supplies have, however, been unable to meet the agricultural production demands, currently remaining at the 1970s levels. It is clear that the DPRK needs to increase chemical and organic fertilizer inputs in order to ensure soil fertility. As the southern region of the DPRK has sufficient water and is hot enough, the implementation of multi-cropping farming systems will ensure an increase of at least 4.9 million tons in grain production and will guarantee supply for at least 1.88 million people.

IntroductionThe North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government happened during a period of six years from 1977 to 1983. Although only 16 (eight men and eight women) are officially recognized by the JapaThe nese government, there may have been as many as 70 to 80 Japanese abducted. Analysts believe that some victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools, while other victims were also abducted with the intent of stealing their identities.The abduction of Japanese citizens by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, can be distinguished from other foreign policy issues that Japan faces for the following two reasons. First, this is a rare-probably the only- major diplomatic issue in which Japan is a victim of an egregious act committed by an external entity. For the first time, Japan is conducting diplomacy in order to recover the original status and receive due compensation. As is usual for a novice, unfortunately, Japan has not scored well. The Japanese government says that the abduction issue is the highest priority among the issues between Japan and DPRK and has been putting forth a remarkable effort.1 Yet the goal Japan set might have been too ambitious and might have left too little room for negotiation.The second reason for the uniqueness of the abduction issue is the remarkable convergence of basic policy lines across the Japanese political spectrum. Very few members of the Japanese Diet are openly opposed to pressuring the DPRK on this issue. According to a survey by the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,2 dubbed Sukuukai in Japanese, 82 percent of the Diet members supported the idea of additional economic sanctions in the event that the DPRK does not show the results of reinvestigation that will lead to the repatriation of all victims.3Public Outrage and Stalemate4The abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the time, very little was known about the location or fate of the missing people. When a newspaper article reported in 1980 that the missing people might have been kidnapped by a foreign agent, it did not attract much attention from the politicians and was dismissed as mere speculation by the police. This started to change after two incidents. The first was the arrest, in 1985, of a North Korean agent who was carrying the passport of Tadaaki Hara, who disappeared from a beach in Miyazaki Prefecture in June 1980. Then, in 1987, an arrested North Korean agent named Kim Hyong-hee, who perpetrated the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29 of that year, told the police that she learned the Japanese language from an abducted Japanese person whose name was Yaeko Taguchi. Taguchi had disappeared from the same beach as Hara did, but in 1978. The circumstantial evidence seemed to suggest that North Korea was somehow involved in the missing persons incidents.In early 1988, following Kim Hyon Hee's confession, the abduction issue was raised in the Diet of Japan for the first time. In March, answering a question in the Diet, Seiroku Kajiyama of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced that missing persons incidents in the 1970s and the 1980s might have been the result of abductions by North Korea. However, Kajiyama's statement did not lead to substantial action by the foreign ministry. The ministry told the family members of the missing people, to their dismay, that without formal diplomatic relations with North Korea or concrete evidence of North Korea's responsibility, the Japanese government could do little about the issue.Following the end of the Cold War and improved relations between North and South Korea, Japan sought to engage with North Korea in a more friendly manner. In 1990, a Japanese delegation led by Shin Kanemaru, a heavyweight of the LDP, and Makoto Tanabe, a senior member of the Socialist Party, visited North Korea in order to facilitate the negotiations on diplomatic normalization. …