Clash of Worlds: The Comintern, British Hong Kong and Chinese Nationalism, 1921 – 1927

The ‘Party and Youth League’ model in the Chinese communist movement was copied from Soviet Russia, but its practice by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Youth League has been little studied, especially at the local level. This article draws on a variety of sources to analyse the model's operation in Shanghai. My findings reveal a lasting rivalry between the Communist Party and the Youth League in Shanghai, which both experienced a rise and fall from 1925 to 1927. Despite efforts from leaders on both sides, this conflict went unresolved. The Youth League's transformation from a ‘younger brother’ to a ‘powerful competitor’ within the revolutionary communist community vividly reflects the fact that the Chinese communists were far removed from the iron rule of Bolshevism at that time, and highlights the complexities and difficulties of localizing the international communist movement.

Reviewed by: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 Gordon Y. M. Chan (bio) Chan Lau Kit-Ching . From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ix, 342 pp. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 0-312-22428-1. As Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching aptly observes, Hong Kong's first encounter with Chinese Communism predates July 1, 1997. It has been involved in the Chinese Communist movement ever since the movement's inception in 1921, and for many years before the Communist takeover in 1949 Hong Kong had served as headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Guangdong. The examination of this previously neglected history promises to shed light on our knowledge of the revolutionary movement not just in the locality of Hong Kong but also in Guangdong and the Chinese nation as a whole (pp. 1-2). Based in Hong Kong, Chan enjoyed a favorable position while exploring this topic. Besides ready access to local archives, both government and private, the proximity of Hong Kong to Guangzhou allowed her to conduct archival research conveniently in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, which hosts the most comprehensive collection of pre-1949 Party documents on Guangdong (including Hong Kong) accessible to both Chinese and foreign historians.1 Furthermore, the Feng Ping Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong has an impressive and expanding acquisition of historical materials on the CCP in Guangdong, published [End Page 412] both publicly and internally in the People's Republic of China (PRC). These resources were within "easy reach" (p. 12) for Chan, who teaches at the University. Given Chan's obvious advantages, the outcome of her research is, however, disappointing. Notwithstanding some shrewd observations, this present work is marred by a marked unfamiliarity with the historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution. A quick historiographical survey will refute Chan's belief that there is "a dearth of regional studies of the Chinese Communist Movement, especially in the English language" (p. 2). Over the last two decades, Western scholarship has produced intensive studies of the revolution in local contexts,2 although they are predominantly rural in focus. Chan's study could well be a valuable contribution to the underrepresentation of the Chinese Communist urban revolution in the recent literature. Unfortunately, her lack of awareness of many major issues at stake, coupled with her reluctance to discuss the possible implications of her own findings with other scholars in order to enhance our general understanding of the CCP's history, suggests otherwise. The structure of this book is simple. Its four main parts trace the history of the CCP in Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1921 to 1936. The story begins with the small Guangzhou Communism Group that was initiated, in 1921, by Chen Duxiu, together with three Guangdong students he had taught in Beijing who had been exposed to the "new thoughts" of the May Fourth Movement. About a year later, the Socialist Youth League, which was to be superseded by the Communist Youth League in 1925, was established in the province. This organization represented the earliest Communist presence in Hong Kong (the CCP was not founded in the colony until 1924). As a British colony, Hong Kong expectedly exhibited many political and socioeconomic features distinct from those of Guangdong. The awareness of their existence impelled many Hong Kong cadres to ask their superiors on the other side of the border for special treatment and greater autonomy in pursuing revolutionary activities. Several times Chan emphasizes that these appeals mark the initial conception of "one country two systems"—a principle that the PRC employed to resolve the colonial questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The inference drawn here is interesting. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the desire of the regional Party branches for more autonomy based on concerns about their peculiar local conditions was common in the early history of the CCP and was by no means unique to the Communists in Hong Kong.3 Before 1925, Communists had made little headway in Hong Kong; it took the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike/Boycott to bolster their position. Because of this...

Reviewed by: The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival by Bruce J. Dickson Kerry Brown (bio) Bruce J. Dickson. The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. xii, 352 pp. Hardcover $27.95, isbn 978-0-19-022855-2. The title of this new work by American political scientist Bruce J. Dickson is a little misleading. It sounds like the book will be largely speculative and join a long list of those that have already appeared contemplating various challenges the Communist Party faces along with assessments of how it might deal with these. In fact, at the heart of this study is material taken from a number of public opinion surveys conducted in China between 2010 and 2014 in different places and across different socioeconomic groups. In that sense the book is more about current public opinion in modern China than anything that is going to happen in the future. Chinese public opinion is something of a mystery. Pew and other surveys produce annual assessments of the mood within China toward the government, and they invariably record high levels of satisfaction. This is hardly surprising in view of the high costs those who challenge the Party’s monopoly on power pay—some of whom Dickson refers to in his chapter on democracy and the understanding of it within the country. Despite this, surveyors do now have strategies to uncover more nuanced aspects of Chinese opinion, and Dickson’s book illustrates some of these. The fact that the data presented covers a period of elite leadership transition, from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, during 2012 and into 2013, adds to its significance. Beyond their intrinsic value, therefore, they also provide a useful audit of how this event—one which had a huge impact on the wider public but was, as far as we know, decided by only a handful of people—affected public views about where they thought their country was going. [End Page 268] Some things widely evidenced in already extant surveys elsewhere are simply reaffirmed here. On the whole, Chinese respect central leaders more than they do local ones. Perceptions of the corruption, efficiency, and work ethic of local leaders are almost uniformly negative. There are also clear differences linked to generation and age. The older generation of Communist Party members who joined in the era prior to the 1980s are shown to have done so for idealistic reasons. Those who joined afterward largely did so through pragmatic calculations of the usefulness of membership for their career. A more complex issue addressed in the book is that of what motivates fidelity toward the one Party state among the public. Dickson refers to the large amount of material that shows that through modernization, rising living standards, and development (the things the Party currently builds public support on in China) countries are likelier to eventually end up as multiparty democracies of one form or another. In many ways, until now, China has bucked this trend. But the key question is whether, for all its declarations of marching into an eternal, glorious future, the Party is in fact stimulating the kinds of wealth-creating model that will end up leading to its inevitable demise. Dickson is frank about some of the tactics the Party utilizes now to support its rule—tolerance for most things but utter inflexibility on the matter of organized challenges in the political realm. For those who dare wander into this area, it deploys repression and threats. The problem with this tack, however, is its expense, and the likelihood it has of eventually alienating people. Does this use of such harsh methods indicate that deep down the Party is aware of the paradox of pushing for a society whose prosperity, levels of education, and demands will eventually put it out of business? Anxiety about its sustainability must be one of the reasons why the Party in recent years has been assiduous in utilizing nationalistic narratives to gain support. But Dickson is right in contesting the usual statement that Party legitimacy post-Mao until the era of Xi, relied on GDP growth to gain public...

The early relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) is regarded as an important issue in contemporary Chinese history, but the explanation of this phenomenon has differed for a long time. There is a major dispute in controversy in interpretations of this event. Some hold that the KMT ”accommodated Communists,” and the CCP insists that the Communists ”allied with the KMT,” The CCP realized that allying with the KMT was the correct choice at the time, and it was also in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist revolution strategy. Why dose the CCP say so? And what is the truth? This essay, from the perspective of the history of the Chinese Communist movement, attempts to understand what the CCP means by the ”historical conditions of the time?” Why was cooperation with the KMT the right historical choice? Is it possible or not to say, from the point of view of the CCP, that joining the KMT was ”the only choice?” In the 1920's, both parties were facing the difficulties of social mobilization, and there also existed the complementary interaction for revolutionary identification. In fact, the CCP leaders of that time clearly recognized that the only method which Dr. Sun Yet-sen would accept was that Communists could join the KMT as individuals, instead of as a group under the name of the CCP. On the other hand, because the Comintern was supporting both the CCP and the KMT, if the CCP did not join the KMT, the Comintern might have had to choose between the two parties. Since the danger of losing the support of the Comintern was much greater than that of joining the KMT, we may say that for the CCP, joining the KMT was in fact the one and only choice they had at the time.

The three periods, 1937-8, 1939-43, and 1944-5 were the principal phases of the Communist movement during the Sino-Japanese War. The outbreak of war transformed the political and military environment for all Chinese parties and forced the Chinese Communists into fundamental reconsideration of all important policies, of strategy and of tactics. The principal issues confronting Party Central during the first year and a half of the war were the following: The united front; Military strategy and tactics; and Leaders and leadership. At the outbreak of the war, Mao Tse-tung's position in the Chinese Communist movement was that of primus inter pares. The Communists used the euphemism ' friction' to describe their conflicts with the Nationalists during the middle years of the war. Chinese Communist Party and its principal armies expanded greatly during the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese were preparing for their greatest military offensive in China since 1937-8, Operation Ichigo.

Was Maoist China a Clone of the Soviet Union? Felix Wemheuer Lucien Bianco, Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, translated by Krystyna Horko. 448 pp. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-9882370654. $65.00. Elizabeth McGuire, Red at Heart: How Chinese Communists Fell in Love with the Russian Revolution. 462 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-0190640552. $34.95. It has become fashionable in Western China studies to write about transnational entanglements between the People's Republic (PRC) and the Soviet Union or to compare the development of both countries. The similarities of Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China are obviously many, making it impossible to cover them all in a single text. Two new books approach this comparison from different angles. Lucian Bianco looks at the great leaders and macropolitics in Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, while Elizabeth McGuire uses a focus on personal relations and microhistory in Red at Heart: How Chinese Communists Fell in Love with the Russian Revolution. This review discusses the two monographs within the larger context of Western China studies and with attention to paradigm shifts in Sino-Soviet relations. Paradigm Shifts in Western China Studies Since the mid-1930s, Western scholarship regarding the impact of the Soviet Union on the Chinese Revolution and later the PRC underwent several paradigm shifts. During World War II and under the alliance of the United States and China against the Japanese Empire, Chinese Communists were often considered anti-imperialists and nationalists. The bestseller Red Star over China, written by the American journalist Edgar Snow, contributed to [End Page 442] the view of Mao Zedong as a grassroots revolutionary. The lives of communist leaders in the revolutionary base area in Yan'an were presented by Snow as simple and egalitarian. Therefore, Snow saw Chinese communism as an alternative to bureaucratic state socialism in the Soviet Union.1 When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, the Cold War had already started. Anticommunist hardliners in the McCarthy era blamed "liberals" of the former Roosevelt administration and scholars in China studies for underestimating the communist threat and causing the "loss of China." In the 1950s, the newly founded PRC was often seen in the West as a "Soviet satellite state" and "totalitarian dictatorship." Western perception started to change significantly due to the rise of the Anti–Vietnam War movement and the New Left around 1968. Activists and many scholars then saw Maoist China through the lenses of anti-imperialism and Third World liberation movements.2 The New Left considered the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) an experiment in mass participation and rural based-development strategies. Western media reports about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution were often ignored as "anticommunist propaganda"; violence was rationalized, because "revolution is not a dinner party," as Chairman Mao had said. The guerilla fighter and the "barefoot doctor" became poster children for an alternative development model to Western and Soviet modernity. CCP criticism of "Soviet revisionism," and in part Western scholarship, emphasized the "Chinese way" of building socialism.3 From the 1930s until the early 1990s, the history of the CCP was often written as step-by-step emancipation from domination by the Comintern and the Soviet Union. The departure from revolutionary Maoism in China after "Reform and Opening" in 1978 destroyed many dreams and illusions. However, it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the archives of the Comintern and CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), that the history of the Chinese Revolution was rewritten again. The new findings from archives deconstructed the myths that the CCP had taken an independent path from the Soviet Union. Stalin's guidance and Soviet support had played [End Page 443] a crucial role in creating the second United Front with the Nationalists (GMD) against Japan in 1937 and in bringing the CCP into power in 1949.4 Archival documents show that Soviet advisers influenced the development of the political and economic system in China in the early 1950s based on the Stalinist model. In the fields of culture, education, agriculture, and policies...

1 HE history, present position and perspectives of the Communist movement in China are probably more beclouded by distortions and ignorance than any other topic of major world importance of the present day. Offhand one might find no grounds for surprise in this, for those who mortally hate and fear Communism have usually found solace in the most consciously wilful and often most ludicrous misrepresentations of the methods and activities of the Communist movement and the character and objectives of Communist thought. What complicates matters as regards the Chinese Communist movement is the fact that the fog which enshrouds it derives not only from the counter-propaganda of the Kuomintang, but in large measure from conditions within the Communist movement itself; from the propaganda of the Communist International and its apologists. There is naturally no mystery concerning the Kuomintang's opinion of the Communists, which has been forcibly expressed during these past eight years through the State police and the Kuomintang armies. That the Kuomintang regime has conducted this campaign of repression out of a deep consideration for its own interests no one will deny. But if we are to understand the nature of the Chinese Communist movement, its past blunders and its future perspectives, we must consider the Communist premise that salvation for China, the solution of its acute social and economic contradictions, lies only in the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime and its replacement by a Chinese soviet state. The Chinese Communist Party was born amid the growth of productive forces and the consequent social ferment which gave rise to the Chinese revolutionary movement in the years following the Great War. Rapidly maturing conditions for a radical change

Hong Kong and Communist Guerrilla Resistance in South China, 1937-1945 By Gordon Y.M. Chan Throughout its history as a British colony, Hong Kong's politico-economic uniqueness had always been regarded. as a valuable asset by revolutionaries and political dissidents in modem China. For instance, it is well known that Sun Yatsen and his followers had actively exploited the colony's differences with the mainland to try to overthrow the rule of the. Qing Dynasty. They used Hong Kong as their important operational base and organized there no less than eight revolutionary attempts during the years between 1895 and 1911.1 However, a far less recognized and analyzed fact is that Hong Kong had also performed quite a substantial role in the Chinese Communist revolution. Indeed, for a long time before 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had made Hong Kong its headquarters for directing revolutionary activities in Guangdong and sometimes even the whole of South China. Surprisingly, despite Hong Kong's significant involvement in the Communist movement, which can be dated back to the movement's inception in 1921, it has so far attracted little scholarly attention.2 Therefore, it is the objective of the present paper to shed light on this underexplored topic by examining Hong Kong's relationship with the Communists' guerrilla resistance in the province of Guangdong during the Anti-J apanese War (1937-1945). China's war with Japan is generally believed to be a pivotal period for the rise of the CCP, which succeeded in seizing rural control by launching largescale guerrilla activities behind the enemy lines. Although the main arena for thjs guerrilla warfare was in North China, the Communists were far from absent in the south even after Chiang Kai-shek's repeated "encirclement campaigns" to expunge them. In particular, the Party3 was able to develop its guerrilla forces in Guangdong and established there its only two wartime bases in South China, one in the East River valley and the other on Hainan Island.4 It is normal for many scholars, who are obsessed with explaining the Communists' wartime success , to belittle these two small Communisthases. Unfortunately, such endeavor obscures the fact that in the last years of the war their existence actually gave rise to Mao Zedong's ambitious plan for a rapid expansion of Communist power in South C.hina. This plan would very likely have come to realization had it not been thwarted by the Japanese surrender in August 1945.5 Twentieth-Century China, Vol. 29, No.1 (November,2003): 39-63 40 Twentieth-Century China Nevertheless, it is true that the Communist bases in Guangdong were less consolidated than their northern counterparts, and precisely for that reason, as this paper will argue, their survival depended considerably on their connections with Hong Kong. While Hong Kong possessed many advantages, its real importance to wartime Communism in South China cannot be fully appreciated unless they are viewed in light of the Party's position in Guangdong during the AntiJapanese War. The relationship between these two issues will therefore be taken up in the first part of this paper, while the second part focuses on elucidating Hong Kong's contributions to the Communists' guerrilla resistance. These contributions can be divided into four areas: providing manpower to the guerrilla forces, supplying them with funding and other material aid, acting as a communication link between the local Communist bases and the Party Center inYan' an and serving as an arena for the Party's pursuit of the anti-Japanese united-front propaganda. A~ REASONS FOR HONG KONG'S IMPORTANCE Hong Kong's politico-economic advantages. Originally a small fishing village, Hong Kong emerged rapidly into a commercial city after its cession to the British in 1842. With its good harbor and well-established commercial facilities , Hong Kong prospered tremendously from its entrepot trade and, by the end of the nineteenth century, had already become an economic hub of Southeast China.6 Due to this development, Hong Kong possessed an efficient system of communication, which also conveniently linked Guangdong with other parts of the world. For instance, many migrants from Guangdong, the province which probably boasts the largest number of Chinese abroad...

Based on archival and historiographic material, the article offers an insight into the activities of the diplomatic institution of Lithuania in Vilnius in September-October of 1939 and the reactions of the citizens towards the establishment of such institution. The author also dwells on the candidates to become the Consul General and fates of the employees of the institution. The Consulate General in Vilnius was opened in line with the bilateral Lithuanian-Polish agreements with regard to the opening of consulates. Due to changes in the political circumstances (loss of Klaipėda region), the establishment of the Consulate in Vilnius was delayed. The first steps in this direction were made already in the summer of 1939. On 22 August 1939, by the decree of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Dr Antanas Trimakas was appointed the Consul General and in six days received the exequatur of the President of the Republic of Poland. The Head of the Consulate in Vilnius was a seasoned diplomat. The choice served the purpose as his term in office was politically difficult. Dr Trimakas’ diplomatic experience and personal characteristics helped him in representing Lithuania’s interests. In the first stage of its activities (11/09/1939–18/09/1939) the Consulate was mostly preoccupied with consular functions (visa issuance), whereas in the second stage (19/09/1939–01/11/1939) it was for the most part involved in the advocacy for the rights of Lithuania and its citizens (property protection, interventions with regard to Vilnius citizens, provision of information). The Consulate General of the Republic of Lithuania was a rather small institution which at first employed two and later three people. All of them later became victims of forced migration – the Consul General emigrated to the West, whereas his secretary V. Čečeta was imprisoned by the Soviet authorities and later deported to Kazakhstan. He returned to Lithuania 38 years later. Former employee of the Consulate B. Verkelytė-Federavičienė moved to Kaunas in 1940, started a family there and later worked in cultural and academic institutions.

Reviewed by: Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon Yafeng Xia (bio) Michael Dillon. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020. xi, 302 pp. Paperback $29.95, isbn 978-178-831-930-0. Among several books in English on the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (who served from 1949 to 1976), two stand out. The first, by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, “explores the nature of” Zhou’s political behavior and assesses how such behavior affected twentieth-century Chinese history.1 The second, by former senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historian Gao Wenqian, which is based on classified party documents and personal interviews with high-level party officials, provides a revisionist account of Zhou Enlai. This volume is an abridged English translation of Gao’s Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Later Years), which, having been adapted for Western readers, includes the stories of Zhou’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and elaborates the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors (chapters 2–7, pp. 21–104).2 Relying primarily on Chinese sources supplemented with writings by Western journalists who visited CCP bases during the War of Resistance against Japan and foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing in the 1950s and the 1960s, Michael Dillon presents a sympathetic account of Zhou’s life from his birth in 1898 to his death in 1976 in twenty-three chapters. This is a standard biography of Zhou, covering his childhood, education, upbringing, personality, political activism, and revolutionary activities, presenting a thorough picture of Zhou the diplomat and statesman. Dillon argues, “This private side of Zhou Enlai is one [End Page 263] of the reasons why he became the world’s favorite Chinese Communist, but Zhou’s character was complex” (p. viii). According to Dillon, Zhou “was a statesman rather than simply a political operator and achieved much on the international stage” (p. ix). But scholars on Zhou Enlai and the history of the CCP will not be pleased, as the book does not add much to what they have already known about Zhou. To correctly understand and evaluate Zhou’s historical role in the Chinese Communist movement and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is crucial that we correctly understand Zhou’s relationship with Mao Zedong, the CCP Chairman and China’s paramount leader from 1949 to 1976. The reviewer cannot agree with several of Dillon’s major assertions, such as, “Zhou had remained personally close to Mao, never criticized him in public, and was himself never criticized openly :: : . Eventually he was attacked, viciously but covertly, by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing” (p. 264). I feel that the author is unfamiliar with some of the new findings on Zhou Enlai that have been revealed in the last two decades. In the following paragraphs, I try to set the record straight. The relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is a key issue in our understanding of Chinese politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are three popular models of the relationship: Zhou was a faithful follower of Mao; Zhou was a puppet of Mao; and Zhou was a moderating force on Mao, which is the version the official Chinese Communist historiography promotes.3 Dillon falls into the third model, as he writes, “During the Great Leap and particularly the Cultural Revolution, Zhou was in an impossible position. To survive, he said and did things he would have preferred not to. By surviving, he ensured a degree of damage limitation and protected many friends and colleagues” (p. 270). For years, Zhou was “the Beloved People’s Premier,” a sensitive and effective administrator and a moderating force in the PRC’s politics. He was good-looking, urbane, brilliant, and a master diplomat. He always valued the nation’s needs above his own. He managed to save hundreds of purged officials during the Cultural Revolution. But Gao Wenqian turns the tables on Zhou. According to Gao, Zhou was a tragic backroom schemer, a puppet of his master Mao, and a man who so rigorously observed a...

This chapter describes the contribution of Comintern officer Grigorii Naumovich Voitinsky to the Chinese Communists movement. The earnest prodding from the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern on China to form a Communist Party is said to have begun when The Foreign Section of the Vladivostok Branch of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Communist Party sent Voitinsky and his group to China in April 1920. There, Voitinsky's team met with Li Dazhaoon on several occasions in the library in the Red Chamber of Beijing University to discuss the organization of the Communist movement in China, particularly, they met to discuss the formation of the Chinese Communist Party.

China's development model is undergoing dramatic change. No longer relying solely on cheap labor to manufacture exports, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is updating its approach in three distinct...

While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.

The twentieth-century rise of the United States as a global military superpower has resulted in the stationing of American armed forces personnel in dozens of allied countries and client states. On...

The Ultimate Social Network: China's Expansionary, Internationally Oriented United Front Strategies 1923-2020