CHUKOTKA AND THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

The article deals with the resettlement policy of the Russian Empire in the Turkestan region in the context of acculturation. It is noted that the resettlement of Russian peasants in Turkestan was regulated by the generally accepted Russian legislation, but it had its own local features. The peculiarity of the Russian colonization consisted in the following: firstly, in the region there lived foreign-speaking population with a different mentality and a different religion; secondly, in the most areas Turkestan was conquered by force of arms, and this fact did not add local population’s confidence in the Russian authorities. Nevertheless, according to the author, the grounds for acculturation were at the beginning of the resettlement process, when there began to establish economic relations between Russian settlers and local residents. The analysis of the further resettlement policy of the Russian Empire leads to the conclusion that both objective and subjective reasons were the obstacle to further acculturation. The latter ones consisted in the incorrect decision of the Russian authorities on the isolation of the Russian-speaking population from the indigenous population, the withdrawal of “surplus” land from the local population, the excesses in the work of the Resettlement Department, whose members often abused their power. The negative role was also played by the commitment to the Russian authority, the Turkestan administration, and even Russian settlers’ adherence to the “civilizing mission of Russia”, explaining the necessity of introducing “wild” peoples to the European civilization, which served as an argument for justifying the need to bear the “good” to “unenlightened peoples”. The author makes the conclusion about the imperfection of the resettlement policy of the Russian administration, which consisted in the absence of the legal framework and clear plan of resettlement.

This research discusses the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the Indonesian economy, focusing on the energy sector. Amidst the increasing complexity of global geopolitical issues, international events such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine have significant global consequences, even for countries not directly involved in the conflict. This study is grounded in the theory of the political economy of war, serving as the analytical framework to understand how these dynamics affect Indonesia's economic sector. As a direct consequence of the invasion, the global energy sector distribution has been disrupted. Nations that previously imported energy from Russia must now seek alternative sources to meet their energy needs. Indonesia, being one of the world's largest producers of non-oil and gas energy, emerges as a primary choice of alternative energy export source. The research findings indicate a substantial increase in the export of non-oil and gas energy from Indonesia, which, in turn, has a positive impact on the growth of the country's economic sector. The research employs a descriptive-qualitative approach, collecting data from literature reviews and online research to complement secondary data. The results of this study offer insights into how changes in global geopolitical dynamics can affect a country's economy, even when not directly involved in such events. Indonesia, for instance, has seized the opportunity to boost its non-oil and gas energy exports, thereby influencing the growth of a specific economic sector in the country. This research provides valuable contributions to understanding the interplay between geopolitical events and the global economy.

This chapter evaluates the challenges posed by RT’s immersion in the mediated populism environment. Unlike the EU elections, the 2018 Salisbury poisonings elicited a coordinated Kremlin campaign. The chapter assesses the impact of mediatization on the ability of Russian state actors, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to mount effective informational campaigns promoting the Kremlin-preferred line during international crises with Russia at their center. It also compares RT’s reporting strategies (targeting international audiences) to those of Russia’s domestic state-affiliated broadcasters. This analysis adds new complexity to the arguments concerning the facility with which RT adapts populist idioms, some originating in liberal democratic media ecosystems, for authoritarian state purposes, including the obfuscation of Russia’s responsibility for actions that elicit wide international critique. It also prepares the ground for an account of the nature of, motivations for, and responses to the tide of Russian disinformation and state propaganda released after the invasion of Ukraine.

This paper focuses on a series of cookbooks published by Indigenous Australian groups. These cookbooks are typically produced with government funding, and are developed by nutritionists, dieticians, and health workers in consultation with local communities. They are designed to teach Indigenous Australians to cook healthy, nutritious, low-cost meals. In this paper, Fredericks and Anderson identify the value of these cookbooks as low-cost, public health interventions. However, they note that their value as health interventions has not been tested. Fredericks and Anderson question the value of these cookbooks within the broader context of the health disadvantage faced by Indigenous Australians. They argue that the cookbooks are developed from a Western perspective of health and nutrition that fails to recognise the value of traditional Indigenous foodways. They suggest that incorporating more Indigenous food knowledge and food-related traditions into cookbooks may be one way of improving health among Indigenous peoples and revitalising Indigenous knowledge.

Subnational governments and non-state actors in environmental governance: Japan, Russia, and the Northern fur seal

Despite the decline of Daesh in the Middle East, the issue of foreign fighters remains relevant to the EU. There is now another major conflict on the EU’s doorstep that has also been drawing in significant numbers of foreign fighters for a few years, namely the Russo-Ukrainian War. This article investigates the phenomenon of far-right foreign fighters travelling from Europe to Ukraine. It makes three main inter-related arguments. First, although far-right extremists travelling to Ukraine constitute only a very small proportion of all the individuals joining the conflict and have turned up in smaller numbers than what had generally been predicted, they represent a security risk to the EU and its Member States for a range of reasons. Second, despite these concerns, it is important not to exaggerate the scale of the presence of far-right foreign fighters in Ukraine, notably because this may play into the hands of the Russian authorities that have described the invasion of Ukraine as a ‘denazification’ mission. Third, whilst fully keeping the previous point in mind, it would nevertheless be in the interest of the EU and its Member States to place the issue of far-right foreign fighters travelling to Ukraine on the policy agenda, even if their number is relatively small. This is particularly important considering the rise of right-wing political violence, the potential for transnationalisation, the current strength of societal discontent in some European states, and the mainstreaming of previously fringe beliefs. A more coordinated approach towards dissuading those at risk of travelling to Ukraine could be developed, alongside preparing for the eventual return of those who have already travelled to the region.

The article based on a wide source base (official materials of authorities, human rights organizations, statements and interviews of politicians and public figures, representatives of the Crimean Tatar movement, eyewitness testimonies, analytical and informational publications in the media) conducted a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s policy towards the Crimean Tatar people. The actions of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People in defense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity during the meeting on February 26, 2014 were analyzed. The position of Crimean Tatar political and public organizations on the illegal referendum on March 16, 2014 and Russia’s capture of Crimea was highlighted. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between the Russian authorities and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, which included three periods: the confrontation in late February – March 2014 (peaceful protests, boycott of an illegal referendum), the search for compromise in late March – May 2014 (when the Majlis delegated its representatives to the leadership of the «government» and «parliament» of Crimea, controlled by Russia); since May 2014, when the Russian authorities failed to bring the Mejlis under their control and set a course to ban it and persecute leaders. The facts of collaboration of the Crimean Tatars, which, however, did not become widespread, were also considered. Attempts by the Russian authorities to establish relations with the Crimean Tatars are analyzed: rehabilitation of deported nations, preservation of the high status of the Crimean Tatar language, involvement of certain representatives of the Crimean Tatars in the occupation administration. The principles of the state policy of Ukraine and Russia regarding the Crimean Tatars are compared, the fact is emphasized that Ukraine, unlike Russia, recognizes them as the indigenous people of Crimea. The main forms of repressive policy against Crimean Tatars are considered: abduction and persecution of activists, liquidation of opposition media, restriction of freedom of peaceful assembly, violation of the right to freedom of association, imprisonment and deportation of leaders of Crimean Tatar organizations.

When the United States froze the reserves of the Russian Central Bank following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it raised concerns in China. Previously, Washington had used the dollar as a weapon against countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba. This “weaponization” of the dollar and manipulation of it for domestic economic purposes by the US seems to have prompted China to reduce its vulnerability to it. There is ample data showing that China has taken several measures to mitigate the risks associated with the U.S. dollar. This chapter examines the various measures taken by China toward de-dollarization and internalization of the Yuan simultaneously and its prospects. The research is conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner, based on data from library and internet sources.

Introduction. The article based on Michael Adas’s analytical category “avoidance protest” presented by Paul W. Werth examines the view of the Kalmyk khan on the activities of the Russians to strengthen positions on the Volga-Caspian frontier, when V. Tatishchev was the head of the Kalmyk Commission and Astrakhan Governor, between 1741 and 1745. Methods and materials. Whereas previous studies considered only the Russian view on the politics toward the region and determined the attitudes of nomadic elites in terms of absolute compliance or violent opposition. However, in practice the relations between Russian authorities and indigenous people’s elite were much more complex.Using as primary sources the letters of Donduk-Dashi to V. Tatishchеv of the period between 1741 and 1745 from the National Archive of the Kalmyk Republic published by prof. D. Suseeva gives us an opportunity to examine the situation from below. Analysis and Results. We argue that although Donduk-Dashi was quite embedded within the Russian system, we cannot claim about his unconditional subordination. First, speculating on general Tarakanov’s misstep, Donduk-Dashi evaded investigations regarding the plans to relocate to the protectionof Persian shah. The second argument was built around his alleged unawareness about theposition of Russian authorities regarding the Kazakh-Kalmyk relations and entreaties to provide with guns as an attempt to divert attention away from current problems on the relations with the Kazakhs. The formal notification of the forthcoming marriage of the Kalmyk nobleman with Kazakh princess and about non-sanctioned contacts with Kazakh Middle zhuz khan demonstrates that nomad’s relations went beyond the line prescribed by the government.

Since 24 February 2022, Ukraine has been operating in a different reality, which until now has been read about in history textbooks. Russia's invasion of Ukraine took not so much the whole world by surprise as the Ukrainians. Victims of direct contact with the invaders, who have been 'providing' civilian 'liberation services' in Ukraine for a year now, from a civilised life, an acquired property and a peaceful existence, are forced to look all over the world for refuge, safe places and opportunities for survival. Accepting their refugee status, and fleeing the war, they continue to witness the hostilities and wish to report on the events taking place in Ukraine to their families. The term language of war, which appears in the text, is understood in terms of the material used by the media during the conflict, i.e. how journalists express themselves about the situation in Ukraine when presenting war reports, and in terms of social and propaganda narratives. The language of war furthermore defines additional problem planes, e.g. forms of expressing emotions or the creation of various linguistic constructions, as well as the extent to which it functions on the visual plane. The article presents a list of necessary structures, and lexical units, which can be used to formulate a message about the war in Ukraine, and the crimes committed by the Russian occupier, and help in displaying reports from the front line in real-time. The material of the article can be used in lessons of Polish as a foreign language, aid groups and witness accumulation units, and interviews with victims who experienced warfare.

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces was expected to have global impact on food trade and security, since Ukraine is a breadbasket cereals and oil seeds producer. The NASA Harvest « Rapid Agricultural Assessment for Policy Support » (RAAPS) team was triggered early in the conflict to provide answers to the following questions : (i) How much winter cereals, winter oil seeds and summer crops were planted in Ukraine during the 2021-2022 cropping season?(ii) What proportion of those crops fell under the Russian occupied area? (iii) How much cropland was left unplanted in 2022 due to the war?As insights had to be produced within season, the NASA Harvest RAAPS team produced the first ever, Ukraine scale in-season crop type map based on Planet Labs 3 meter spatial -, 4 bands spectral -, and daily  temporal – resolution data.  Since   no   labeled   datasets   were   available   early   enough   in-season  for applying supervised machine learning techniques, cropland was progressively mapped   into   four   classes   (winter   cereals,   rapeseed,   summer   crops   and barren/non cultivated plots), using semi-supervised clustering techniques and heuristical thresholdings. Expert domain  knowledge  allowed to cope  with missing ground truth training data. First, active cropland was separated into winter crops and potential summer crops. K-means clustering of April and May Planet images, followed by visual cluster assignment, allowed to efficiently separate green crops (winter crops) from barren soils (potential summer crops). Then, another K-means clustering allowed to split winter crops into winter cereals and rapeseed as of end of May, based  on the intense yellow flowering signal of the latter. Finally a set of NDVI based heuristics was applied on potential summer crops in order to assess if green-up happened or not. Crops which   did   not   green   up   as   of   the   11th   of   July   2022   were   considered barren/non-planted. Road side ground surveyed crop type information collected in free Ukraine has been provided by Kussul & al. (2022) in August 2022. Validation against this data provided an overall accuracy of 94 % and a mean F1-score of 91 % for winter cereals, rapeseed and summer crops. No unplanted fields  were collected as part of the ground campaign. Several assessments of proportional area per crop type and occupation status were performed throughout the growing season, as occupation boundaries kept moving. As of the 11th of July 2022, 23.03 % of Ukraines cropland was occupied. 55.29 % of all detected barren fields were located within occupied territories, mainly scattered around the front line. 33.9 % of all winter crops were under occupied territory when harvest ready (mid July). This crop type map was used for computing harvested area, estimating yield and   for   production computation. Following NASA EarthObservatory articles were published,   providing   information   to   the   public   and   private   sector :   (i) https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150025/measuring-wars-effect-on-a-global-breadbasket    (ii) https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150590/larger-wheat-harvest-in-ukraine-than-expected 

Since 24 February 2022, Ukraine has been operating in a different reality, which until now has been read about in history textbooks. Russia's invasion of Ukraine took not so much the whole world by surprise as the Ukrainians. Victims of direct contact with the invaders, who have been 'providing' civilian 'liberation services' in Ukraine for a year now, from a civilised life, an acquired property and a peaceful existence, are forced to look all over the world for refuge, safe places and opportunities for survival. Accepting their refugee status, and fleeing the war, they continue to witness the hostilities and wish to report on the events taking place in Ukraine to their families. The term language of war, which appears in the text, is understood in terms of the material used by the media during the conflict, i.e. how journalists express themselves about the situation in Ukraine when presenting war reports, and in terms of social and propaganda narratives. The language of war furthermore defines additional problem planes, e.g. forms of expressing emotions or the creation of various linguistic constructions, as well as the extent to which it functions on the visual plane. The article presents a list of necessary structures, and lexical units, which can be used to formulate a message about the war in Ukraine, and the crimes committed by the Russian occupier, and help in displaying reports from the front line in real-time. The material of the article can be used in classes of Polish or French or German as a foreign language, support groups and gathering witnesses, interviews with victims of war.

The article is devoted to the activities of the tsarist authorities to create a health care system for the indigenous population of the region. Since Russian Turkestan was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, this system was entirely subordinated to the Main Military Medical Department of the Turkestan Military District. In its activities in relation to the indigenous population of the region, it was guided by legal instruments, which established the principles of medical care of the population, including indigenous one. The author believes that in general, the Russian authorities in Turkestan managed to achieve significant civilizational results in the field of healthcare that had a positive impact on the way of life of the indigenous population.

The Russian authorities’ decision to go to war in Ukraine made Kaliningraders trapped inside the EU and forced them to re-organise their daily activities. Successive restrictions and limitations cut off Kaliningraders from the luxury of living a European life. The semi-exclave’s residents are forced to face the new reality which responds to the role played by the Kaliningrad region regarding Russia, the EU and NATO. Once again, Kaliningraders are experiencing the primacy of the exclave’s military character prevailing over the issues important to local communities. The primary objective of this article is to identify the socio-economic impact of the war in Ukraine. The present article is based on the results of qualitative research conducted with residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has severely impacted the healthcare system, including the provision of HIV care. The ongoing war is a human-caused mass trauma, a severe ecological and psychosocial disruption that greatly exceeds the coping capacity of the community. The bioecological model of mass trauma builds on Bronfenbrenner's concept of interaction between nested systems to argue that social context determines the impact of life events on the individual and how an individual responds. This paper uses the bioecological model of mass trauma to explore the impact of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the ongoing war on HIV-positive people who use drugs in Ukraine, a particularly vulnerable population that may be negatively affected by disruptions to social networks, healthcare infrastructure and economic conditions caused by mass trauma. Data were collected between September and November 2022. A convenience sample of 18 HIV-positive people who use drugs were recruited from community organizations that work with people living with HIV, drug treatment programmes, and HIV clinics through direct recruitment and participant referral. A total of nine men and nine women were recruited; the age ranged from 33 to 62 years old (mean = 46.44). Participants completed a single interview that explored how the war had affected their daily lives and access to HIV care and other medical services; their relationships with healthcare providers and social workers; and medication access, supply and adherence. Data were analysed using the Framework Method for thematic analysis. The war had a profound impact on the social, emotional and financial support networks of participants. Changes in social networks, coupled with limited job opportunities and rising prices, intensified financial difficulties for participants. Relocating to different regions of Ukraine, staying at somebody else's home, and losing connections with social workers impacted medication adherence and created lengthy treatment gaps. Participants also experienced a decreased supply of antiretroviral therapy, concerns about accessing medication for opioid use disorder, and overwhelming fears associated with the war, which overshadowed their HIV-related health concerns and negatively impacted medication adherence. Our analysis reveals the complex impact of war on social networks and healthcare access. Maintaining support networks and competent healthcare providers will be essential amid the ongoing war.