Abstract
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (Am Econ Rev 92:1577–1587, 2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible objects. Each agent announces a vector of bids and a project, which is used as a tie-breaking rule for the case where several aggregate bids finish first in the bidding. We show that removing the (non-intuitive) project announcement and using instead the projects which received some agent’s highest bid to break ties, severely hinders the performance of the mechanism. Specifically, a Nash Equilibrium exists only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.
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