Abstract

CORPORATIONS within the United States have long enjoyed the right to choose the corporate law regime that governs their internal affairs.1 A corporation based in Texas may select the corporate law of Texas, or the same corporation may instead select the corporate law of Delaware. Many corporations, regardless of where they operate, choose Delaware corporate law.2 The choice available to corporations has generated competition among states for incorporations. From this competition has emerged one of the fiercest debates within the corporate law literature: does state competition for incorporations result in a beneficial race-to-the-top or a harmful race-to-the-bottom? The race-to-the-top argument is straightforward.' Where a corporation selects corporate law rules that maximize the interests of

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