China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for Japan and the United States

<p>Interannual variation of tropical cyclone (TC) landfall frequency is not consistent along the coast of East Asia, with large contrast of north and south East Asia coast regions in boreal summer. This study examines interannual variations of TC landfall frequency over north and south East Asia and identifies roles of the western North Pacific subtropical high (WNPSH) and TC genesis frequency associated with these variations. Although the total number of landing TC of north and south East Asia is similar, interannual variations of TC landfall frequency are relatively independent to each other, with the corresponding correlation coefficient north and south of 25°N is only –0.024 from 1979 to 2017. TC landfall over north East Asia is largely modulated by the circulation related to the WNPSH, while TC landfall in the south has no significant relationship with the WNPSH or other remote large-scale circulations. The WNPSH effectively regulates TC landfall in the north by modulating TC genesis east of the Philippines and steering flows. Nonetheless, the two factors have weak contradictory effects on TC landing in the south region. The frequency of TC genesis around the South China Sea directly connects to the TC landfall over south East Asia, which is modulated by the surrounding genesis environment, including relative humidity and relative vorticity. This work favors for a better understanding of the seasonal forecasts of TC landfall frequency and the subsequent climate service over East Asia.</p>

The rise of China has transformed the political and economic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. China is undeniably the new Asian powerhouse of the twenty-first century that has propelled the region's economies amid difficulties in other parts of the globe. However, despite the opportunities that China's growth offers, there are concerns over China's increasing influence and behaviour in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Economic dependence on China may constrain autonomous policymaking in smaller countries, especially on policies that impinge on Beijing's national interests. Countries across the region are concerned that China is transforming its economic strength into military might, and that its armed forces have become more assertive in the maritime domain. In the face of a rising China, many Asian countries believe that the United States remains the best guarantor of regional stability. As a result, they have facilitated an increased US military presence as part of the Obama administration's Asian pivot or rebalance. (1) However, regional states cannot be assured about the future, as historical experience is a reminder that given the vagaries of international politics, relying on the protection of an external power is not a long-term solution. (2) The United States may reduce its presence in Asia, as it did after the Vietnam War. Therefore, a general policy practice--especially in Southeast Asia--is to hedge against such an outcome. (3) In other words, regional states prefer the flexibility and pragmatism in their interactions with Washington and Beijing by continuing their engagement with China in regional affairs while keeping the United States involved as a counterweight. Despite the common stance of maintaining a balance between the United States and China, an effective hedging strategy is increasingly delicate and difficult to sustain. Recently, various factors have pushed some countries towards one power and pulled them away from the other. Maritime disputes between China and a number of Asian countries, including Japan in the East China Sea and Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei in the South China Sea, are good examples. Rising tensions in the South China Sea has resulted in Vietnam and the Philippines moving closer to the United States in an effort to deter further Chinese assertiveness. (4) For Thailand, pursuing a flexible policy towards the Great Powers is not a new diplomatic strategy. The historical legacy of Thailand's interaction with outsiders has shaped a diplomatic culture that values flexibility and pragmatism in its foreign policy. It has been dubbed bamboo bending with the wind, suggesting a policy that is always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend whichever way the wind blows in order to survive. (5) Guided by the principles of flexibility and pragmatism throughout its modern history, Thailand has managed to mitigate major security threats, including European colonialism in the nineteenth century, the Japanese occupation during the Second World War and the communist expansion in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. However, as with other mainland Southeast Asian states, since the end of the Cold War Thailand has faced difficulties resisting China's influence, and thus on a number of policy issues, Bangkok has gradually tilted towards Beijing. Recent developments in Thai politics and the country's foreign policy cast doubt on whether Thailand is skillful enough to maintain its traditional balancing diplomacy. Most significantly, the military coup in May 2014 has widened the rift between Thailand and the United States, and the junta has moved closer to China. (6) This article assesses Thai foreign policy and argues that the rise of China has tested the effectiveness of Thailand's flexible diplomacy. Although Thailand generally manages to maintain close ties with both Washington and Beijing, its balancing act is more ad hoc than a well-crafted strategy. …

Introduction 1. The Rise of East and South-East Asia: Challenges and Security Perspectives Andrew T. H. Tan International Relations and Security Perspectives 2. China's International Relations and Security Perspectives Jing Huang 3. The Limitations of Deterrence: China's Response to Military Balancing in the Western Pacific Jonathan Holslag 4. The Threat Conundrum in East and South-East Asia Andrew T. H. Tan 5. The False Promise of Economic Interdependence: Chinese Foreign Policy in North-East Asia Nicholas Khoo 6. China's Approach to North Korea: Seeking Stability and Influence Amid Changing Circumstances and Conflicting Imperatives Robert G. Sutter 7. China-Japan Relations: Competition Amidst Interdependence Paul J. Smith 8. China and Taiwan Relations: Challenges and Prospects Sheryn Lee 9. China-South-East Asian Relations Since the Cold War Ja Ian Chong 10. Japan - (More or Less) Normal Military Power Axel Berkofsky 11. The Future of the US-Japan Alliance Christopher W. Hughes 12. North Korea's Security Perspectives Hazel Smith 13. North Korea's Impact on North-East Asian Security Nolan Theisen 14. Inter-Korean Relations and the Challenge of North-East Asian Regional Security John Swenson-Wright 15. South-East Asia's International Relations and Security Perspectives Jurgen Haacke 16. The USA's Relations with East and South-East Asia Mark Beeson Regional Non-Traditional Security Issues 17. Globalization and East and South-East Asia Alistair D. B. Cook 18. Environmental Challenges in East and South-East Asia J. Jackson Ewing 19. Environmental Challenges in China Graeme Lang 20. Future Pandemics: Transnational Health Challenges in East and South-East Asia Allen Yu-Hung Lai, Adam Kamradt-Scott and Richard Coker 21. Transnational Organized Crime in East and South-East Asia Roderic Broadhurst and Vy Kim Le 22. Terrorism in South-East Asia After 9-11 Andrew T. H. Tan 23. Maritime Security in East and South-East Asia Justin V. Hastings 24. Demographic Ageing in China: Economic Problem or Social Opportunity? Phil Mullan and Bill Durodie 25. Japan's Demographic Crisis: Security Implications and Obstacles to Resolving an Issue Symptomatic of National Decline Brad Williams 26. The Future of Regionalism in East and South-East Asia Christopher B. Roberts

The Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna was established on January l, 2000 by merging the Institutes of Sinology and Japanese Studies. Initially comprising the pillars Sinology, Japanese, and Korean Studies, the fourth pillar, the Chair of East Asian Economy and Society (EcoS), was established in 2007. The first Head of Department was Erich Pilz (2000-2001), followed by Sepp Linhart (2001-2012), both leading researchers on Japanese history, society, and culture. The current head is Rudiger Frank (since 2012), specialized in East Asian politics and economics, in ge- neral and North Korea, in particular. In addition to six professors, the Department of East Asian Studies currently has a staff of about 50 permanent and temporary researchers and lecturers (Institut fur Ostasienwissenschaften der Universitat Wien, 2001-2013).In addition to language courses, the disciplines Sinology, Japanology, and Koreanol- ogy offer strong social and cultural science studies. EcoS focuses on current political, security, and economic relations in East Asia and the respective national political and economic systems. The Department of East Asian Studies applies a broad area defini- tion of East Asia by incorporating North-East and South-East Asia. In this context, South-East Asia, in particular the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in promoting East Asian regionalism, has always figured prominently in the respective EcoS courses. Yet, in order to demonstrate the growing international rel- evance of this region, it has been a strategic aim of Rudiger Frank to institutionalize South-East Asian Studies at the EcoS Department to complement its range. In Octo- ber 2013, the position of a university assistant at the postdoc level was created. Two university assistants (praedoc) and one study assistant, concentrating on North-East Asia, complete the EcoS team. Overall, the teaching and research program at EcoS reflect the interconnectedness of North-East and South-East Asia. For instance, two key areas of research are state socialist systems (notably China, North Korea, and Vietnam) and climate change, the environment, and energy.Since October 2008, EcoS offers a four-semester Master of Arts (MA) as well as a PhD course on East Asian Economy and Society. Since an adaption of the curriculum in 2011, the MA is offered exclusively in English, and South-East Asia features explic- itly as an area of research in addition to the North-East Asian countries China, Japan, and the two Koreas. The Master course promotes the inter- and transdisciplinary comparative analysis of international relations and of domestic politics and econom- ics in the region in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In their Master thesis, students have to compare specific topics in at least two countries, either in North- or South-East Asia. The program provides students with a broad range of possibilities to specialize in topics of their choice. In addition, students have to acquire basic lan- guage skills in an East Asian language, particularly in Chinese, Japanese, or Korean. An admission requirement is a Bachelor or an equivalent college or university degree; eligible majors are, for instance, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese Studies, (Internation- al) Business Studies, or Political Science. The five core modules are Contemporary East Asian Language, East Asian Economy, East Asian Politics, East Asian Society and Research, and Master's Colloquium.Due to the popularity of the program in other European but also East Asian coun- tries, student numbers have far exceeded the initial planning for 25 students per study year (217 Master students in the summer term 2013). Due to the shortage in staff, room, and teaching resources, the rectorate decided to introduce admission re- quirements, starting with winter term 2013/2014. Since then, students have to apply for admission to EcoS; inter alia, they have to submit a demanding letter of motiva- tion, detailing their research interests and goals after graduation. …

Background A previous report from the COMBINE AF database (A Collaboration Between Multiple Institutions to Better Investigate Non-Vitamin K Antagonist Oral Anticoagulant Use in Atrial Fibrillation), which includes data from RE-LY, ROCKET AF, ARISTOTLE, and ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48, demonstrated that the advantages of direct oral anticoagulants (DOACs) over warfarin were more evident in Asian patients with atrial fibrillation (AF) than in non-Asians. However, Asia is a vast region, and randomized data comparing clinical outcomes among AF patients of Asian race across different regions within Asia remain limited. Methods Using the COMBINE AF database, we performed an individual patient-level meta-analysis to compare clinical outcomes in patients of Asian race from 4 regions: East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan), Northeast (NE) Asia (Japan, South Korea), Southeast (SE) Asia (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) and South Asia (India). Results There were 9,943 pts (64% males) of Asian race enrolled from 4 Asian regions (East: 3,388, NE: 2,751, SE: 1,673, South: 2,131) randomized to warfarin or DOACs. Patients in East Asia were older (median age: East 71 yrs, NE 70 yrs, SE 67, South 65; p<0.001), heavier (mean body weight: East 68.5kg, NE 65.7kg, SE 65.9kg, South 63.1kg; p<0.001) and had a higher prevalence of past history of stroke or transient ischemic attack (East 44.2%, NE 31%, SE 42%, South 31.1%; p<0.001) than those of other regions. The median times in therapeutic range with warfarin varied widely by regions in Asia (NE 62.5%, SE 60.1%, East 57.1%, South 48.6%; p<0.001). Compared to East Asia, regional differences for several clinical outcomes were observed (Fig 1). NE Asia had a lower risk of stroke/systemic embolic events (SEE)(adjusted hazard ratio [aHR] 0.70), ischemic stroke (0.73), intracranial hemorrhage (ICH)(0.62) and net clinical outcome (NCO: stroke/SEE, major bleeding [MB], or death)(0.79) compared to East Asia (all p values <0.05). SE Asia had a higher risk of NCO (aHR 1.27), while South Asia had a lower risk of stroke/SEE (0.73), ischemic stroke (0.68) but a higher risk of NCO (1.57) compared to East Asia (all p values <0.05). Compared to warfarin, standard-dose (SD) DOACs significantly reduced the risks of stroke/SEE, MB, ICH, CV death and the NCO to a similar degree across Asian regions (each Pint >0.1, Fig 2). SD DOACs significantly reduced the risk of ischemic stroke in SE and South Asia, but not in East and NE Asia (Pint 0.013). The risk of GI bleeding with SD DOAC and warfarin were similar in Asia regions, with no heterogeneity (Pint 0.13). Conclusions Although the adjusted risks of clinical events in AF patients of Asian race differed significantly between Asian regions, the reductions in stroke/SEE, MB, ICH, and CV death with SD DOACs compared to warfarin were consistent across Asian regions.

From a geopolitical perspective, the Asian littoral divides into three subregions: Northeast Asia (the People's Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka). Both Northeast Asia and South Asia contain political and economic Great Powers. In the latter, India's economic activities and growing politico-security influence extend to all of Asia. In the former, Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan play significant global economic roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major political-security players. By contrast, Southeast Asia contains no Great Powers with global reach. While the region consists of several states with vibrant economies--Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand--or economic potential--Vietnam and Indonesia--in geopolitical stature, Southeast Asia pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia neighbours. Yet Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. The primary goal of this article is to explain how this has happened, what the implications are for Asia's future and whether Southeast Asian states organized for the past forty years through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be able to maintain their pivotal position in Asian affairs. For the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been marked by a difficult asymmetry: the most dangerous disputes lie in Northeast and South Asia while the region's multilateral institutions designed to manage and reduce conflict have originated in Southeast Asia. While ASEAN has maintained its organizational integrity, it has added new internal and external dimensions. The former include the incipient ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization which has been particularly vocal in condemning Myanmar's human rights violations, and the Track Three ASEAN People's Assembly, an NGO that brings a variety of societal interest groups together to lobby ASEAN governments. ASEAN-dominated organizations encompass the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security matters, ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China), various ASEAN+1 dialogues with important states, the ASEAN-Europe meeting (ASEM), and most recently, regular dialogues with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Africa and Latin America. The newest and most contentious addition to the mix is the East Asian Summit (EAS) inaugurated in December 2005. The EAS brings ASEAN+3 countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand--all of which have signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a membership condition. Conceptualizing ASEAN The Asia-Pacific region has no hegemon. Instead, political, economic and social networks proliferate. Regional issues are addressed through collective action. The various frameworks have diminished the strength of the absolute sovereignty norm that dominated ASEAN at the time of its 1967 creation. Over the ensuing decades, security issues have become increasingly transnational. Money laundering, human trafficking, environmental degradation, multi-national river development, migratory maritime species, terrorism and piracy require multilateral regime building rather than ad hoc diplomacy. In theory, at least, organizations such as ASEAN have established procedures and decision-making rules in which all governmental stakeholders have a voice. (2) Conceptualizing ASEAN, International Relations theorists generally employ three analytical frameworks: neo-realism, neoliberalism and constructivism. (3) Neo-realists disdain ASEAN's role in regional security because, in their view, institutions are epiphenomenal. Stability depends on the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific and not on an international organization of small and medium states confined to Southeast Asia. …

The extent to which core‐periphery hierarchical trade patterns have significantly changed with the emergence of Asia remains debated. This paper addresses the debate by examining the spatial patterns and mobility of Asian countries in global solar energy trade. Based on network analysis from 1990 to 2013, it shows that Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia emerged as core countries as early as 1990. The Asian core expanded to six countries by 2013, including Japan, South Korea, China, and Singapore. China in particular moved steeply upward in the spatial hierarchy. The United States also experienced considerable vertical mobility, but Germany is the most stable core. The rise of East and Southeast Asia, however, did not decrease economic inequality internationally. Rather, new patterns of network inequality may be observed both within Asia and globally. Less developed Southeast and South Asia—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Pakistan—experienced no or marginal mobility.

El comercio y el consumo de opio en Asia, y particularmente en China, durante los siglos XVIII y XIX, así como sus implicaciones en la historia contemporánea de dichas regiones, han sido objeto de un debate que se ha revitalizado durante los últimos veinte años.

During the 1970s, there was a great deal of interest in the discourse on the law of the sea and ocean policy. However, since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 that discourse has been on the wane. Ratification of the Convention by the United States can increase the chances of the Convention enjoying universal acceptance. The Convention serves as the basis for settlement of competing claims, mostly unilateral claims made by states on the uses and resources of the ocean. One positive development in recent years is the global trend toward international adjudication. However, solving disputes through adjudication is not yet part of the legal culture of East Asian countries. In view of the increasing tension in the East Asia region, both in the Northeast and Southeast Asian seas, all states concerned need to return to the path of dialogue. Keywords:international adjudication; North East Asia; South East Asia; UNCLOS

Energy market integration and regional institutions in east Asia

e16615 Background: Bladder cancer remains a significant global health burden, particularly in older adults, with its incidence and mortality varying widely across regions. The median age at diagnosis of bladder is 73 years with 80% over the age of 65 in United States. Age of patients can impact management often requiring a multidisciplinary approach. Methods: Incidence rates for individuals aged 70+ across seven superregions (Central, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-income countries, North Africa and Middle East, Latin America and Carribean, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast, East Asia and Oceania) were extracted from the 2021 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) database and analyzed using ARIMA in Stata 18.0 to forecast rates from 2022–2050. Mortality rates were forecasted using the GBD foresight visualization tool. Percentage changes in incidence and mortality compared to 2021 were calculated and analyzed. Results: Bladder cancer incidence rates are projected to increase in North Africa and the Middle East (+6.8% by 2030, +23.0% by 2050), Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania (+5.2% by 2030, +17.0% by 2050), South Asia (+2.0% by 2030, +7.3% by 2050), Latin America and the Caribbean (+1.6% by 2030, +5.2% by 2050), and Sub-Saharan Africa (+1.8% by 2030, +6.5% by 2050). In contrast, High-Income Regions and Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia are expected to decline, with High-Income Regions showing the steepest decrease (-10.6% by 2030, -52.0% by 2050). Mortality rates are projected to rise in High-Income Regions (+3.6% by 2030, +18.8% by 2050) andCentral Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia (+3.6% by 2050, despite a -0.9% drop by 2030). Declines by 2030 are anticipated in Latin America and the Caribbean (-2.9%), North Africa and the Middle East (-4.5%), Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania (-3.0%), and Sub-Saharan Africa (-2.9%), though many regions show stabilization or modest increases by 2050, such as South Asia (+7.0%) and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania (+12.4%). Conclusions: The study underscores the need for greater emphasis on regions in Asia and Africa expected to see an increase in incidence rates. The increase in mortality in many regions call for greater research in geriatric oncology and targeted interventions in older adults. Incidence rate (per 100,000 population) Mortality rates (per 100,000 population) Region 2021 2030 2050 2021 2030 2050 Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 64.99 61.28 57.28 39.78 39.41 41.22 High-income countries 110.38 98.67 53.03 48.40 50.13 57.49 Latin America and Caribbean 29.84 30.31 31.38 22.34 21.69 22.31 North Africa and Middle East 68.04 72.69 83.69 34.90 33.33 35.24 South Asia 18.75 19.14 20.13 15.39 15.26 16.47 Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania 40.60 42.71 47.49 24.02 23.30 27.01 Sub-Saharan Africa 26.57 27.06 28.31 23.64 22.96 22.90

The Promise and Limits of Structural Explanations of Foreign Policy Sunil Dasgupta (bio) After the collapse of the Soviet Union cut India's strategic moorings in 1991, New Delhi looked for new anchors for its foreign policy. It found great success in the West, with its rapprochement with the United States and its accommodation into the international nuclear regime, but India's engagement of other Asian states—called the Look East policy—has seen mixed results. Frédéric Grare's new book, India Turns East: International Engagement and U.S.-China Rivalry, offers a framework in which the mixed results of the Look East policy are explained by the larger structural conditions of U.S. and Chinese power in the region. Grare documents the vast efforts of the Indian government and its national security leaders to build the Look East policy into a strategic lever against China. He argues that India and China have been engaged in a long struggle over the leadership of Asia going back to Mao and Nehru, even fighting a war in 1962. In the 1990s, Indian leaders recognized that China's rapid economic progress was going to heighten the military threat and open the possibility of Chinese hegemony in Asia. India had originally embarked on the Look East policy to attract foreign investment from Asian states that were by then already on their way to prosperity. Motivated by the rise of China, this effort "grew rapidly into a comprehensive strategy with political and military dimensions concerning the entire Asia-Pacific region" (p. 1). Through case studies of India's efforts vis-à-vis the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Myanmar, Japan, and Australia, Grare shows the promise and evolution of these relationships. But the book is most compelling when it discusses the limits that have circumscribed these ties. In particular, India has been outmatched by China and has failed to effectively coordinate its efforts with the United States. Similarly, Grare examines thematic cases of Sino-Indian competition in Asian trade and economics and within regional organizations where China is a looming presence. Chapter 5 of the book demonstrates that even a country like Australia, so firmly in the Western camp, has an ambivalent relationship with India because of the appeal of China's power and market. Consequently, Grare [End Page 142] portrays the outcome of the Look East policy as epiphenomenal of the dynamics of the relationship between United States, China, and India. Driven by its rivalry with China, India looked to the United States for help. U.S. political leaders who had begun to worry more about China themselves responded with vigor, transforming the U.S.-India relationship. India's Look East policy was similar to the U.S. pivot and rebalance in Asia. Despite the success of U.S.-India bilateral relations, however, Grare finds that the differences in the interests and capabilities of the two countries have hobbled their coordination in Asia. Countries in East and Southeast Asia, for example, recognize the difference in relative capabilities and thus prefer to work directly with the United States rather than work through India. India's Look East diplomacy has led the country to join regional organizations, but it has not become a net provider of security in the region. Although Grare's argument that closer coordination between India and the United States might have helped is true, the conclusion is that structural conditions proved hard to surmount. The triangular relationship between the United States, China, and third states or regions has been the primary manner in which structuralists have seen different parts of the world for the last two decades. Those who study the foreign policies of African states see a similar U.S.-China dynamic playing out across that continent. European leaders who at one time saw in China a balance to U.S. power now fear U.S. withdrawal. Japan and India have wanted to become closer, yet the full promise of that relationship remains unrealized as the United States, China, and Japan sort out their own triangular relationship. This structural view of the world is popular but also contested. There is a long tradition of scholars who have highlighted the...

This study investigated heavy metal contamination in drinking water in five Asian regions (East, Southeast, South, Central, and West Asia) with an interest in inorganic arsenic (iAs), lead (Pb), mercury (Hg), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr) and nickel (Ni). Human exposure, risks, and the disease burdens in terms of loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) were analyzed. Concentrations of heavy metals and risks in different regions were variable. Hazard index (HI), cancer risk (CR) and DALYs were used as the health metrics. The total cancer risk was highest in Southeast Asia (2.18 × 10−4) followed by South Asia (1.61 × 10−4), West Asia (1.04 × 10−4), Central Asia (8.85 × 10−5) and East Asia (3.94 × 10−5). Cancer risks exceeding 1 × 10−4 (1 in 10,000) were considered higher risk while Southeast Asia had the highest risk. In terms of population-adjusted DALY, South Asia had the highest (1.95 × 105) followed by Southeast Asia (8.66 × 104), East Asia (2.34 × 104), West Asia (1.91 × 104) and Central Asia (4.60 × 103). Lung cancer emerged as the main outcome in all regions, accounting for 85% and 94% of cancer risks, and DALYs respectively. The findings highlight regional disparities, requiring intervention strategies in a few regions. The actions may include implementing regulations, treatment technologies and establishing monitoring systems to ensure water quality.

The victory of the conservative Liberal Party led by Tony Abbott in the September 2013 general elections means that is now committed to the preparation of a new white paper --the country's third in six years--to be released in early 2015. The timing was pre-determined on the back of public promises by Abbott and then shadow minister David Johnston during the campaign to deliver the new white paper within eighteen months of entering government. Plans are already underway to ensure that the document will be delivered on time. (1) While the top priority for planners over several decades has been to ensure the defence of Australia by acquiring military capabilities to repel any direct enemy advances against the mainland, the 2000, (2) 2009 (3) and 2013 (4) white papers delivered by the John Howard, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard governments, respectively, have all upheld the importance of strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific as a critical national security interest. This was reaffirmed in the pre-election policy document released by Senator Johnston who has now been sworn in as Australia's Defence Minister. (5) Although the somewhat meaningless phrase Century (6) is now widely used in Australian strategic, and economic discourse, some of Australia's neighbours suspect that Canberra focuses too heavily on large Northeast Asian powers such as China and Japan, and not enough on major Southeast Asian players, the latter region defined in this article as the subregion of Asia consisting of countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of Papua New Guinea and north of Australia. To be fair, Canberra's attention is appropriately directed towards its three largest trading partners in Asia--China, Japan and South Korea --which are all in Northeast Asia, while the structural causes of potential region-wide instability is primarily a Northeast Asian phenomenon as possible instability is primarily driven by China's re-emergence as a Great Power. Even so, previous Australian white papers have tended to take a predominantly approach to Southeast Asia in that they posit that Canberra should ensure that it has adequate military capabilities to manage and contain risks to its national interests should adverse developments occur in that region. While this is a sensible and prudent position to take, little ground has been made in terms of exploring the strategic possibilities of Southeast Asia, and in particular how Australian relationships in Southeast Asia and the capabilities that it brings to the table can contribute to the broader objective of ensuring strategic stability in Asia. In other words, the strategic analysis underpinning the next white paper ought to do several things. Rather than treating Southeast Asia as a standalone strategic region, it needs to link bilateral and multilateral opportunities in Southeast Asia with the future shape of strategic decisions made by powerful players in East Asia, and China in particular. In addition, in conceiving of Australia's future place and role in Southeast Asia, Canberra needs to go beyond its risk management approach. Instead, Canberra should view Southeast Asia as a region filled with strategic opportunity, which directly feeds into the goal of ensuring greater stability throughout Asia. In making this argument, the paper comprises three parts. First, it offers a brief summary of recent Australian strategic and thinking on Southeast Asia. Second, it outlines why China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability or instability in the region, and how China's strategy in achieving its objectives can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia. Finally, the paper offers some suggestions as to the role can seek to play in Southeast Asia that will contribute to strategic stability in Asia more generally. …

Introductory Overview Most of the economies in East and Southeast Asia have witnessed rapid economic growth over the last three decades. The economic progress witnessed in these economies, and their steep industrial development trajectories, have been both impressive and unparalleled. Indeed, the region has been at the forefront of the transformation of the so-called Third World countries to emerging markets, as evidenced by fairly avid investor appetite for exposure to East Asian business assets. At least, that was the case until the mid-1990s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the regional economic downturn that immediately followed. It is said that pride comes before a fall, and perhaps East Asia had become a little too blase about its seemingly effortless ability to consistently register impressive gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, almost year after year. In this regard, the Asian financial crisis was a wake-up call for the region. Some of the policy assumptions that the East Asian economies had started to take for granted are now being reevaluated, including the sorts of economic policies and implementation strategies that had apparently served so well in recent decades. Quite understandably, in the years immediately after the regional financial crisis of 1997-98, attention was primarily focused on getting East Asia's economies back on their feet. But as time has passed, and the recovery process shows (mixed) signs of nearing completion, there is an increasing awareness that the region's economies must now see how they can advance. The fallout from the Asian financial crisis has not been the only trigger for such an economic reevaluation process in East Asia. Other related changes in the external environment have also prompted policy-makers, academics, and business people to reconsider some past assumptions. The ongoing rise of China as an economic and industrial behemoth has caused some East Asian countries to reconsider their industrial development policies, as China begins to absorb an increasingly large proportion of East Asia's aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Should China's economic growth continue, the vast scale and broad diversity of China's continental-sized economy will oblige other East Asian countries to wholly rethink their relative positions in the food chain. Or, as one commentator cogently put it: what will the rest of East Asia do for a living now that virtually everything can be made more cheaply in China ?1 Able to competitively produce a range of goods that span the entire value chain, China poses an immense competitive challenge for many East Asian countries, at least in the short to medium term. Morgan Stanley recently posited that: China's rise as the world's factory ... fundamentally threatens Southeast Asia's ability to sustain foreign direct investment and manufacturing activity. In our view, [the Malaysian, Thai, Indonesian and Philippine] economies must either dismantle or reinvent their pro-investment, export, mass manufacturing model, as the East Asian Economic Model (EAEM) platform will no longer be viable for Southeast Asia.2 In another commentary the same author went on to assert that unless a different development strategy to the East Asian Development Model (EADM) is found and executed ... Southeast Asia is destined to face a dramatic economic decline over the next ten years.3 International business activities are also mutating, with the adoption of increasingly more complex and varied international production networks becoming common practice for multinational enterprises. A large proportion of global trade is now conducted between enterprises operating within the same transnational company. Foreign investment patterns are also changing, with merger and acquisition (M&A) activity now the principal driver of global FDI flows. The pace of plain vanilla greenfield foreign investment activity - which Southeast Asia is most familiar with - has become much less vigorous, as global overcapacity in a range of products has meant that companies are extremely reluctant to bring new capacity on-stream in the current economic environment. …