China’s Perspective on the International Maritime Order

Regional and global ocean governance share complex, co-evolutionary histories in which both regimes – among others – interacted with and used the ocean and resources therein to consolidate, expand, and express power. Simultaneously, regional and global ocean governance relations have changed continuously, particularly when we are trying to understand their differences within the logic of regionalisation, regionalism, and globalisation. The paper is generally based on deductive reasoning and reflects scholarship in security studies, political science, international law, international relation, development studies, and African studies. It delves into the critical aspect of understanding the nexus/relationship between regional and global ocean governance in critical traditional and contemporary ocean policy domains, specifically from an African regional ocean governance standpoint. Ocean governance processes that are historically confronted by globalisation, multilateralism, and post-colonisation are confronted by the rise of regionalism, especially the need for nation-states and regions to respond to and manage traditional and emerging ocean challenges. Responses to these challenges by various actors, including states, economic blocks, private sector, financial institutions, and non-governmental organisations, development partners, etc., result in different forms of relationships that refocus regions’ activities toward globally defined ocean agendas. A review of different policy domains (including maritime security, environmental, economic, and socio-political governance) critical for regional ocean governance sets a robust background for understanding the contextual factors and concerns inherent in the regional-global ocean governance nexus. These outcomes, therefore, help us to arrive at a five-fold taxonomy of different types/degrees of linkages developed around the regional-global ocean governance relationship spectrum described as (1) discrete, (2) conflictual, (3) cooperative, (4) symmetric, and (5) ambiguous. Comparatively, experience and perspective from Africa are utilised to support raised arguments about these linkages. Furthermore, this spectrum allows for the diagnosis of the utilities and most prevalent arguments that regional governance’s effectiveness is directly related to the nature of the interaction between regional governance schemes and global governance; and vice-versa. This paper’s outcomes reveal how government, institutions, actors, and researchers address the relationship between regional and global ocean governance and generate a valuable way to think about current and future global and regional ocean governance direction while outlining some logical possibilities for an effective form of ocean governance.

Global ocean governance is the concretization of global governance. Various interest groups interact with and coordinate ocean issues. Global ocean governance is inevitably linked to the new global governance landscape. In recent years, a series of new scenarios in global governance have emerged. These situations have further shaped the plurality of participants and the diversity of mechanisms in global ocean governance. Science and technology innovation and application are prerequisites and prime movers for the evolution of global ocean governance. Major worldwide crises, represented by global climate change and the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, have added great uncertainty to the future development of global ocean governance. The divergence of interests and positions between emerging countries and developed countries, as well as the reshaping of the global geopolitical landscape in recent years, has led to the stagnation or deadlock of a series of international negotiations and international cooperation platforms related to global ocean governance. With the deepening of global governance, non-state actors are not only objects of ocean governance but also bearers of legal obligations and enjoy varying degrees of legal rights, participating in agenda setting, rule construction, and monitoring implementation at different levels of ocean governance. From a critical jurisprudence perspective, in the practice of global ocean governance, the relationship between non-governmental organizations, states, and international organizations is more likely to be one of reconciliation than the “state–civil society” dichotomy of moral imagination. This new set of circumstances exposes the divisive and fragmented nature of global ocean governance. This study concludes that the new situation of global ocean governance constitutes a historic opportunity for countries to reexamine the role of the rule of law during the Anthropocene to bridge the fragmentation and gaps in mechanisms and achieve a truly integrated, holistic, and closely nested global ocean governance. The question of how to implement the rule of law requires the introduction of theoretical perspectives such as the Anthropocene, complex systems theory, and the community of a shared future for humanity to undertake a fundamental critical reflection and rethinking of global ocean governance.

Is China's IR Academic Community Becoming More Anti-American? Meng Weizhan It is my impression that the majority of American scholars who study China and the majority of Chinese scholars who study the United States are committed to promoting friendly relations between the two countries and to helping their own people understand each other better. Unfortunately, their efforts are often misunderstood. Starting at the end of 2018, a disturbing rumor began to circulate in China's international relations (IR) academic community: several scholars told their peers that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was prohibiting them from visiting the United States. By April 2019, a report in the New York Times confirmed that "the FBI has mounted a counterintelligence operation that aims to bar Chinese academics from the United States if they are suspected of having links to Chinese intelligence agencies. … As many as 30 Chinese professors in the social sciences, heads of academic institutes, and experts who help explain government policies have had their visas to the United States canceled in the past year, or put on administrative review, according to Chinese academics and their American counterparts" (Perlez 2019). According to a report in the Global Times (Fan 2019), more than 280 Chinese scholars have been investigated or harassed by the FBI. These incidents have shocked academic circles in both China and the United States. Perhaps the US government assumes that this is fair treatment for Chinese scholars because many American scholars have complained that they have been banned from entering China due to expressing views that offend the Chinese government. I fully support academic freedom and believe that all governments should be tolerant of any views expressed by scholars. Nevertheless, it is puzzling that the Chinese scholars whose visas have been canceled include some of those best known for their balanced views of the United States and its foreign policy. In order to verify this, we should explore whether the Chinese scholars whose US visas have been canceled have said anything that would harm the interests of the United States. If they have not done so, then they have been treated unjustly. [End Page 139] I will also examine the changes in the perceptions of the US among mainstream IR scholars in China since President Donald Trump took office, focusing in particular on the period after the Sino-US trade war that began in June 2018. Despite the trade war, there is no evidence of a trend toward greater hostility among mainstream IR scholars in Beijing toward the United States. Many doves (wen he pai) with respect to US policies openly and strongly advocate pacifism, oppose nationalism, and call for maintaining friendly relations with the United States. Some well-known hawks (qiang ying pai) have also expressed their views that the Chinese government should seriously reflect upon its own domestic and foreign policy decisions to consider how it may prevent China from becoming isolated. In short, my conclusion, from extensive reading of these scholars' writings and listening to their public remarks, is that an overwhelming majority of Chinese IR scholars do not regard the United States as an enemy at all, and I argue that China should continue to reform its economic system and be more open to better integration with the Western-led international economic system. My assessment is that few among them advocate that the Chinese government should adopt tougher policies toward the United States or promote anti-American sentiment among the general public. China's state media and public opinion are indeed becoming increasingly anti-American, but mainstream IR scholars rarely publish extreme views in newspapers or new media. In this essay, I examine the public views of IR scholars at universities and research institutions in Beijing. The vast majority of Chinese IR scholars and the editorial departments of academic and policy research journals on this subject are based in Beijing, and they are likely to have a direct impact on decision making within the Chinese government. In Beijing, there are only ten universities and institutions with a true academic and policy influence on China's strategies, including policies toward the United States. Four of these are top universities, namely Peking University...

China’s maritime strategy in the new vision

This paper opens a scholarly discourse about Chinese scholars’ engagement with TWAIL (Third World Approach to International Law). This paper shows that Chinese international law scholars and TWAIL align in their resistance to Eurocentrism in international law, while they differ in their attitude towards whether to refrain from “national allegories” and criticize international law as a state-centric invention. A state-centric approach means that mainstream Chinese international lawyers tend to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards international law, employing it as a strategic weapon. During the course of this inquiry, this paper also observes a critical strand in Chinese academics – mostly outside of the international law discipline, and within the disciplines of history and philosophy – that is dedicated to redeeming China's subjectivity and history, which may be useful to understand Chinese critical spirit.

Since Chinese scholars are playing an increasingly important role in shaping the national landscape of discussion on AI ethics, understanding their ethical concerns and preferred solutions is essential for global cooperation on governance of AI. This article, therefore, provides the first elaborated analysis on the discourse on AI ethics in Chinese academia, via a systematic literature review. This article has three main objectives. (1) to identify the most discussed ethical issues of AI in Chinese academia and those being left out (the question of “what”); (2) to analyze the solutions proposed and preferred by Chinese scholars (the question of “how”); and (3) to map out whose voices are dominating and whose are in the marginal (the question of “who”). Findings suggest that in terms of short-term implications, Chinese scholars’ concerns over AI resemble predominantly the content of international ethical guidelines. Yet in terms of long-term implications, there are some significant differences needed to be further addressed in a cultural context. Further, among a wide range of solution proposals, Chinese scholars seem to prefer strong-binding regulations to those weak ethical guidelines. In addition, this article also found that the Chinese academic discourse was dominated by male scholars and those who are from elite universities, which arguably is not a unique phenomenon in China.

China's belt and road initiative (BRI) under the vision of 'maritime community with a shared future' and its impacts on global fisheries governance

Regional ocean governance: Polycentric arrangements and their role in global ocean governance

Chinese Narrotologies

This chapter analyzes the Taiwan's participation in ocean governance, within the constraints it faces in global diplomacy; and it takes note of the recent changes in cross-Strait relations. Comment is also offered on a way forward by which might be brought constructively into institutions from which it is now excluded or is restricted to only a limited policy making role. Taiwan's participation in global ocean governance has been denied over the past three decades mainly because of People's Republic of China (PRC) concerns over Taiwan's sovereignty and insistence on the One-China principle in dealing with so-called Taiwan issues, particularly those involving Taiwan's request to participate in UN-related organizations. The chapter concludes that Taiwan's efforts to participate in the UN General Assembly, ICAO, SPLOS, ICP, UNFCCC, CBD, and other ocean-related legal instruments and institutions should be welcomed. Keywords:cross-strait relations; global ocean governance; people's Republic of China (PRC); Taiwan; UN-related Organizations

Ocean governance and maritime security in a placeful environment: The case of the European Union

There is an increasing call for the need to “integrate” Indigenous and local knowledge systems in ocean governance processes, on national and global scales. However, the knowledge systems, epistemes, and practices of different Indigenous and local coastal communities, whose stewardship of the planet sustains and protects marine ecosystems, pre‐date the institutionalised ocean sciences and governance with which they are meant to be integrated. The concept of integration often perpetuates othering and devaluation of various ocean knowledges that should not be subject to these problematic practices. Much of the current knowledge informing ocean governance is underpinned by colonial, military, and financial projects, in direct juxtaposition to epistemes and practices that are deeply interconnected with marine life. Writing from a marine social sciences perspective, we explore the inherent problems and limitations of integration approaches and propose reversing how we frame “knowledge” and its othering by suggesting that our scientific and governance practices are, in fact, “other” to longstanding ways of coexisting with the ocean. Without attempting to represent Indigenous knowledge systems or categorise these as unaware of scientific developments, we argue that researchers and scientists need to actively unlearn what is taught in prominent ocean sciences. By focusing on global governance through the International Seabed Authority and national ocean governance in South Africa, respectively, we explore knowledge othering and the process of unlearning what ocean governance teaches as knowledge integration to better critically consider how the ocean is, has been, and should be valued.

A Cultural Ambassador East and West: J. Hillis Miller’s <i>Lectures in China</i>

Study Focus: The present article advocates an “Afrocentric study of Africa” in Chinese academia, examines the concepts of “ Afrocentricity”, “Africology”, “Africanology” and finally proposes “Sinafricology” as a new the terminology expressing a Paradigm shift from the existing traditional African Studies to a sort of Chinese Africology/Africanology that should be promoted in Chinese Academia. Methodology: The content of this paper relies primarily on written documents (including books, scientific journals, articles, and official reports) most of which are available online as well as on the author’s teaching experience in Chinese and African Universities. Findings: 1) The hundred years’ narrow and inert framework of “Sino-Western duality thinking” instilled into the Chinese scholarship circles by the Western ideological imperialism of the 19 th and 20 th centuries have somehow overshadowed African Studies in the today’s Chinese Academia. 2) With “ Afrocentricity” as a theoretical foundation, “Africology” &amp; “Africanology” reflect the historical specificities and cultural responses of Africans from Mainland and Diasporas with regards to the universal cultural imperialism that Africa throughout history has been confronted with. 3) An “Afrocentric study of Africa” in Chinese academia is a must. For, they will be no deep understanding of the “Africana phenomena” by the Chinese scholarship without the thorough exploration of the central concepts of “ Afrocentricity”, “Africology”, and “Africanology”. 4) “Sinafricology” as a sort of Chinese “Africology”/“Africanology”, reflects a new horizon of African Studies in Chinese Academia with Africans as subjects rather than objects, while embracing the Chinese characteristics of modern academia. “Sinafricology” can achieve its goals through a 5-layers’ approach, namely the Theoretical, Methodological, Content Knowledge, Institutional and Governmental layers. Conclusion &amp; Suggestions: Based on the aforementioned findings, this article holds that an “Afrocentric study of Africa” is of an urgent need for the domestic development of contemporary Chinese social sciences. The mainstream ideologies of Africanists of African origin should be the core lenses through which any in-depth study of Africa should be undertaken. Therefore, a Paradigm Shift from African Studies to Chinese Africology/Africanology or “Sinafricology” in Chinese Academia is strongly suggested, “Sinafricology” will aim at providing its learners with an Afrocentric approach of the African reality while embracing the Chinese characteristics of modern academia. Keywords: Afrocentricity, Africology, “Africanology”, “Sinafricology”, Chinese Academia DOI: 10.7176/JEP/11-9-02 Publication date: March 31 st 2020

Up to now, the Chinese government has only made very general comments on the application of international humanitarian law to cyberspace. There are indeed Chinese academic papers concerning this issue, but the discussion of the principle of distinction is limited both in length and in academic depth. Compared with the West, research by Chinese scholars on this topic is still in a relatively preliminary stage. At present, there is no specific deconstruction or clarification of the application of the principle of distinction in cyberspace in Chinese academia. As the first paper written by Chinese scholars specifically devoted to this question, this piece provides a different perspective by injecting the positions of Chinese officials and the views of Chinese scholars. The authors aim to clarify whether the existing rules are still completely applicable in the cyber context, and if needed, to find out what kind of improvements and clarifications can be made. Weighing in on these debates, we argue that despite the potential technical challenges and uncertainties, the principle of distinction should be applied to cyberspace. It should also be carefully re-examined and clarified from the standpoint of preventing over-militarization and maximizing the protection of the interests of civilians. For human targets, the elements of combatant status identified in customary international law and relevant treaties are not well suited to the digital battlefield. Nevertheless, cyber combatants are still obligated to distinguish themselves from civilians. In applying the principle of distinction, we argue that it makes more sense to focus on substantive elements over formal elements such as carrying arms openly or having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance. In interpreting “direct participation in hostilities”, the threshold of harm requires an objective likelihood instead of mere subjective intention; the belligerent nexus should be confirmed, and the causal link should be proximate. Applying the “cyber kill chain” model by analogy helps us to grasp the whole process of direct participation in hostilities during cyber warfare. For non-human targets, all military objectives must cumulatively fulfil both the “effective contribution” and “definite military advantage” criteria, which are equally indispensable. The same requirements apply to dual-use objects. Furthermore, certain data should fall within the ambit of civilian objects.