Children's Judgments of Possibility Align With Their Judgments of Actuality

Differentiating “could” from “should”: Developmental changes in modal cognition

This paper describes the results of a study conducted to answer two questions: (1) Do children generalize their understanding of distinctions between conventional and moral violations in human-human interactions to human-agent interactions? and (2) Does the agent's ability to make claims to its own moral standing influence children's judgments? A two condition, between- and within-subjects study was conducted in which 60 eight and nine year-old children interacted with a personified agent and observed a researcher interacting with the same agent. A semi-structured interview was conducted to investigate the children's judgments and reasoning about the observed interactions as well as hypothetical human-human interactions. Results suggest that children do distinguish between conventional and moral violations in human-agent interactions and that the ability of the agent to express harm and make claims to its own rights significantly increases children's likelihood of identifying an act against the agent as a moral violation.

Young children often deny that improbable events are possible. We examined whether children aged 5-7 (N = 300) might have more success in recognizing that these events are possible if they considered whether the events could happen in a distant country. Children heard about improbable and impossible events (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2) and about ordinary events (Experiment 2) and either judged whether the events could happen in a distant country or locally (Experiments 1A and 2) or with their location unspecified (Experiment 1B). Children were more likely to judge that extraordinary events could happen in a distant country than when the same events were described locally or with location unspecified; also, older children were more likely to deny these events could happen when they were local compared with when their location was unspecified. We also found some evidence that manipulating distance affects judgments more strongly for improbable events than for impossible one. Together, the findings show that children's assessments of whether hypothetical events are possible are affected by the geographic context of the events. The findings are consistent with accounts holding that children normally assess whether hypothetical events are possible by drawing on their knowledge of the ordinary world but further suggest that children modify this approach when considering events in distant lands. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

This paper describes the preliminary results of a study conducted to answer two questions: (1) Do children generalize their understanding of distinctions between conventional and moral violations in human-human interactions to human-agent interactions? and (2) Does the agent.s ability to make claims to its own rights influence children's judgments? A two condition, between-subjects study was conducted in which 60 eight and nine year-old children interacted with a personified agent and observed a researcher interacting with the same agent. A semi-structured interview was conducted to investigate the children.s judgments of the observed interactions. Results suggest that children do distinguish between conventional and moral violations in human-agent interactions and that the ability of the agent to make claims to its own rights significantly increases children.s likelihood of distinguishing the two violations.

Causal judgments are widely known to be sensitive to violations of both prescriptive norms (e.g., immoral events) and statistical norms (e.g., improbable events). There is ongoing discussion as to whether both effects are best explained in a unified way through changes in the relevance of counterfactual possibilities, or whether these two effects arise from unrelated cognitive mechanisms. Recent work has shown that moral norm violations affect causal judgments of agents, but not inanimate artifacts used by those agents. These results have been interpreted as showing that prescriptive norm violations only affect causal reasoning about intentional agents, but not the use of inanimate artifacts, thereby providing evidence that the effect of prescriptive norm violations arises from mechanisms specific to reasoning about intentional agents, and thus casting doubt on a unified counterfactual analysis of causal reasoning. Four experiments explore this recent finding and provide clear support for a unified counterfactual analysis. Experiment 1 demonstrates that these newly observed patterns in causal judgments are closely mirrored by judgments of counterfactual relevance. Experiment 2 shows that the relationship between causal and counterfactual judgments is moderated by causal structure, as uniquely predicted by counterfactual accounts. Experiment 3 directly manipulates the relevance of counterfactual alternatives and finds that causal judgments of intentional agents and inanimate artifacts are similarly affected. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that prescriptive norm violations (in which artifacts malfunction) affect causal judgments of inanimate artifacts in much the same way that prescriptive norm violations (in which agents act immorally) affect causal judgments of intentional agents.

Do children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) develop the ability to take into account an agent's mental states when they are judging the morality of his or her actions? The present article aims to answer this question by reviewing recent evidence on moral reasoning on children with autism and typical development. A basic moral judgment (e.g., judgments of violations in which negative intentions are followed by negative consequences) and the ability to distinguish between conventional and moral violations appear to be spared in autism (Leslie et al., 2006). However, a closer look at the data reveals that these capacities can be explained by the tendency of ASD individuals to rely heavily on actions consequences and other external factors rather than agents' mental states. By contrast, studies that presented typically developing (TD) children with accidental and failed attempts actions have shown that even preschoolers can display an intent-based moral judgment (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni and Surian, 2016). The tendency to rely on outcome in ASD children is further confirmed by those studies that direcly show that ASD individuals fail to attend to the agents' intentions when the cases are more complex or ambiguous, like in accidentally harmful actions or failed attempts to harm. We propose that the impairment in understanding others' mind hinders the development of an intent-based moral judgment in children with ASD.

Are children's judgments about what can happen in dreams and stories constrained by their beliefs about reality? This question was explored across three experiments, in which four hundred and sixty-nine 4- to 7-year-olds judged whether improbable and impossible events could occur in a dream, a story, or reality. In Experiment 1, children judged events more possible in dreams than in reality. In Experiment 2, children also judged events more possible in dreams than in stories. Both experiments also suggested that children's beliefs about reality constrain their judgments about dreams and stories. Finally, in Experiment 3 children were asked about impossible events more typical of dreams and stories. In contrast with the other experiments, children now affirmed the events could happen in these worlds.

Children often say that strange and improbable events, like eating pickle-flavored ice cream, are impossible. Two experiments explored whether these beliefs are explained by limits in children's causal knowledge. Participants were 423 predominantly White Canadian 4- to 7-year-olds (44% female) tested in 2020-2021. Providing children with causal information about ordinary events did not lead them to affirm that improbable events are possible, and they more often affirmed improbable events after merely learning that a similar event had occurred. However, children were most likely to affirm events if they learned how similar events happened (OR=2.16). The findings suggest that knowledge of causal circumstances may only impact children's beliefs about the possibility after they are able to draw connections between potential events and known events.

Pricing formulae for defaultable corporate bonds with discrete coupons under consideration of the government taxes in the united model of structural and reduced form models are provided. The aim of this paper is to generalize the comprehensive structural model for defaultable fixed income bonds (considered in [1]) into a comprehensive unified model of structural and reduced form models. Here we consider the one factor model and the two factor model. In the one factor model the bond holders receive the deterministic coupon at predetermined coupon dates and the face value (debt) and the coupon at the maturity as well as the effect of government taxes which are paid on the proceeds of an investment in bonds is considered under constant short rate. In the two factor model the bond holders receive the stochastic coupon (discounted value of that at the maturity) at predetermined coupon dates and the face value (debt) and the coupon at the maturity as well as the effect of government taxes which are paid on the proceeds of an investment in bonds is considered under stochastic short rate. The expected default event occurs when the equity value is not enough to pay coupon or debt at the coupon dates or maturity and unexpected default event can occur at the first jump time of a Poisson process with the given default intensity provided by a step function of time variable. We consider the model and pricing formula for equity value and using it calculate expected default barrier. Then we provide pricing model and formula for defaultable corporate bonds with discrete coupons and consider its duration and the effect of the government taxes.

Pricing formulae for defaultable corporate bonds with discrete coupons under consideration of the government taxes in the united model of structural and reduced form models are provided. The aim of this paper is to generalize the comprehensive structural model for defaultable fixed income bonds (considered in [1]) into a comprehensive unified model of structural and reduced form models. Here we consider the one factor model and the two factor model. In the one factor model the bond holders receive the deterministic coupon at predetermined coupon dates and the face value (debt) and the coupon at the maturity as well as the effect of government taxes which are paid on the proceeds of an investment in bonds is considered under constant short rate. In the two factor model the bond holders receive the stochastic coupon (discounted value of that at the maturity) at predetermined coupon dates and the face value (debt) and the coupon at the maturity as well as the effect of government taxes which are paid on the proceeds of an investment in bonds is considered under stochastic short rate. The expected default event occurs when the equity value is not enough to pay coupon or debt at the coupon dates or maturity and unexpected default event can occur at the first jump time of a Poisson process with the given default intensity provided by a step function of time variable. We consider the model and pricing formula for equity value and using it calculate expected default barrier. Then we provide pricing model and formula for defaultable corporate bonds with discrete coupons and consider its duration and the effect of the government taxes.

Disgusting emotion was evolved to avoid disease infection. When the risk of contracting disease increases, people become more compliant with social rules to avoid the infection of disease. Previous studies showed that when primed with disgusting emotion (vs. neutral emotion), young adults rated moral violation behaviors more severely. In the present study, we examined the developmental trend of the influence of primed disgusting emotion on moral judgment across age groups. Participants rated either disgusting or neutral pictures and then completed a standardized moral questionnaire. Results showed that 10 and 16-year-old participants’, but not 6 or 13-year-old participants, rated the moral violations more severely when disgust primed. These findings suggest that the influence of disgusting emotion on moral judgements is not constant but varies at different developmental stages.

Are children moral objectivists? Children's judgments about moral and response-dependent properties

The exact chronology and historical narrative of the Kamajors’ involvement in the war is hard to establish in detail, beyond some well-documented key events. In chapter 5 we traced the evolution of the civil defense units, and the Kamajor society, to a national Civil Defence Force (CDF) only to identify the discrepancies between the official structure of the organization—or at least the way in which it tends to be understood when taken at face value—and its actual working on the ground. Similarly, the perception of the Kamajors by others, their self-perception, and actual events do not always add up. But the power of the Kamajor society and fighting force, in so far as they were conceptualized—by themselves and others—as a military force with supernatural powers, is in a way separate from an accurate historical account of the movement. The perception shapes and guides action and as such impacts on success. It is important to bear in mind this slight disconnect between the accurate historical narrative and the individual narratives that combined to influence action and interpretations of events.KeywordsRitual PracticeCivil DefenseSecret SocietySupernatural PowerMagical PowerThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Reviewed by: The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the Demise of Authenticity: Toward a Critical Realist Philosophy of History in Jesus Studies by Jonathan Bernier Iain Luke jonathan bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the Demise of Authenticity: Toward a Critical Realist Philosophy of History in Jesus Studies (LNTS 540; London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016). Pp. viii + 180. $114. Professor Bernier's stated aim in this monograph is to bring Bernard Lonergan's work on theological method to bear on historical Jesus studies. It would be a challenge to balance both elements of that proposition, and in the end the author's roots in NT research win out. His success comes on a narrower framing of his purpose, as he applies categories drawn from Lonergan, in order to discuss the present and possible future directions of inquiry into the Jesus tradition. Part 1 of the book introduces those categories. One is a critical realism that distinguishes between the events of history and the data by which we can come to know them. Another is unapologetic subjectivity, which recognizes oneself as a locus for bias and limited knowledge, as well as for discovery and self-critique, while extending the same courtesy to other subjects, like the early Christian authors. The two ideas unite in Lonergan's concept of "horizon," which B. defines initially as "the position from which one experiences reality" (p. 29). Each concept is then substantially refined through application in part 2. The applications focus on the interrelationship of Jesus, the early church, and its Gospels. Ideally, B. wants to construct a historical line from Jesus to the movement and documents to which Jesus gave rise (p. 151), but he recognizes that the process of inference is more cyclical than that, since Christianity and its Scriptures are also the primary data by which we know anything about Jesus. B.'s epistemic framework lends itself to a courtroom metaphor. Witness testimony is not a record of events but a reaction to them; yet it is the only access the court has to what really happened. So a properly formed judgment must give a coherent account of what actual events could have produced the range and variety of testimony that are in evidence. Bernier works through this method for several examples drawn from the ministry of Jesus, the history of emergent Christianity, and the composition of the Gospels. More often than one might expect, he vindicates early Christian writers as reliable witnesses, not because they can be taken at face value but because reliability turns out to be the most plausible and coherent way to explain why they wrote as they did. This outcome can sit uneasily with the reader, especially when B. applies a higher standard of proof to skeptical claims than to his own. [End Page 723] He proposes, for example, that the lack of evidence supporting the existence of disciples at Bethany enhances the evangelists' credibility on this point (p. 75); and he neglects to supply any rationale for the anonymity of the Beloved Disciple (pp. 83-85). Nor is he consistent in acknowledging the different horizons of different authors, which would alter the comparative treatments of mission (p. 77) and synagogue (pp. 111-12) when these are "translated" from Jesus's context in Galilee to the church's experience elsewhere. In general, B.'s antiskeptical stance would be strengthened by examining plausible reasons why authorial declarations of intent might be suspect or encoded. Nevertheless, the idea of translation between horizons is a powerful hermeneutical tool for addressing the relationship between early Christian documents and the authors and communities who stand behind them. It leaves plenty of work still to be done in locating and defining what those horizons actually were, but the method offers a refreshingly different approach from one that pits documents and local churches in power struggles against one another. Instead, acute differences in worldview are to be expected, but one can begin to perceive how early Christians recognized and addressed those differences in their literary and ecclesial life. Along the way, B.'s analysis generates other intriguing insights and proposals. He takes new steps in relating Jesus to Paul on...

Reconstructing a particular political actor’s perception of a problem facing him, and his calculus regarding it, is always a difficult matter. It is especially difficult half a century later, and uniquely so in the case of Stalin. The best the historian, armed with an awareness of what actually happened, can do is to engage in a form of heuristic triangulation — using whatever documentary record there is, along with memoirs by insiders as well as outside observers, and of course published contemporary sources. None of this is without risk: documents, however authentic, can be vastly misleading; observers and memoirs may provide only a glimpse into another’s outlook; logic and coherence need not always be the best guides to reality; and actual events may reflect not only the implementation of policy decisions but unintended consequences as well. Manifestly, history writing requires not only using all available materials but also refraining from taking at face value any or all the evidence at hand. Documents, moreover, tend to be snapshots whereas political reality is often far more fluid, indeterminate, or ambiguous than a piece of paper can, or wishes to, convey. Such caution is indicated, for instance, in using the interesting Pieck — Aufzeichnungen1 to reconstruct Stalin’s expectations for post-war Europe and his policies regarding it (see Chapter 2). For example, even if we assume (perhaps rashly) that Pieck correctly recorded what he was told, what Stalin tells Wilhelm Pieck is not necessarily what Stalin thinks.