Abstract
Peirce's publications on the method of scientific investigation (as distinct from his work in formal logic and mathematics) are his most important and valuable contributions to philosophy. His views on this subject are superior in clarity and cogency to his voluminous writings on metaphysics and cosmology. He subscribed to a fallibilistic conception of knowledge that is poles apart from a wholesale skepticism; his formulations of the conditions for meaningful discourse and of the pragmatic maxim, though not free from difficulties, have been fruitful sources of much subsequent philosophical and scientific analyses; and his classification of and discussions of types of argument or reasoning employed in scientific inquiry continue to be valuable and insightful clarifications of this important subject. In contrast to his account of scientific method, Peirce's evolutionary theory of ultimate reality, though marked by originality and ingenious speculation, has little merit as a contribution to genuine knowledge.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
