Abstract
The moral philosophy of medicine may be based on: prima facie principles (nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice) and subsidiary principles (truth-telling, promise-keeping, confidentiality), virtues (fidelity, compassion, practical wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance, integrity, self-effacement) or on the principle of utility (welfare maximization). In this chapter I claim that the purely rationalistic philosophy of medicine based on either duties or principles (including the principle of maximizing utility function) presents an incomplete picture of moral life which is not sufficient to cover the complexity of medical ethics, in particular the ethics of reproduction. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian virtue approach to ethics could significantly enhance the understanding of medical ethics and its application in the clinical context. Therefore, I consider the possibility of a view combining duties with virtues in a unified moral scheme.
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