Abstract

Exactly halfway between 191 1 and 1949 in the summer of 1930, Red Army forces seized Changsha, the capital city of Hunan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Provincial Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet, and set about creating a new order in the city. After only eight days, however, the Red Army withdrew. It was the last time for over one and a half decades that the CCP held a city the size of Changsha. The party based its eventual success in 1949 on mobilization in an extra-urban context. In both party history written in China and in foreign studies, the importance of the 1930 occupation of Changsha is assessed as the final misguided efforts at urban putschism. Party historians label this putschism the Li Lisan line. In all analyses, the failure of the Changsha soviet made the tactic of rural revolution in fortress-base more obvious and attractive. This article is not a contribution to the history of policy formation and dispute in the CCP. Rather, the failure of the Changsha occupation will be analyzed in an attempt to understand some of the problems the CCP faced in trying to make urban revolution. Available evidence suggests that the nine days the CCP forces spent in the city were dominated by military considerations. The soviet's pretensions beyond a temporary warlord occupation did not engage the citizens in revolution. In effect, the Li Lisan line was not given a chance.

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