Chanceler Adenauer’s the Theory of Crises of the USSR

Abstract

In the article, the author analyses the foreign policy views of the FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the preconditions for the Soviet Union to change its foreign policy course. Given Adenauer's dominant position in the system of foreign policy decision-making, it was these views that for many years formed the conceptual foundations of the German eastern policy. The Chancellor's set of beliefs includes two key blocks related to the expectations of economic crisis in the USSR and the escalation of Soviet-Chinese contradictions. Economic problems combined with generational changes and the need to raise the living standards of the population should have led the Soviet Union, in the Chancellor's opinion, to limit the arms race and make concessions to the West. The Soviet-Chinese contradictions which were supposed to have a restraining effect on Soviet foreign policy were also an important factor for Adenauer. In the long term, these problems should have forced the Soviet Union to give up its position in Europe and to make concessions on the German question. These two crucial components formed the theory of crises, which the Chancellor shared with his interlocutors on foreign policy issues. The sources of the study are primarily documents from Adenauer's archive in Röndorf (Germany).