CHALLENGERS IN A PANDEMIC: COVID-19 STATES OF EXCEPTION, OPPOSITION PARTIES, AND OUTCOMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Dominant Party Regimes in Canada and Australia: Going the Way of the Dodo Bird?

POLITICAL PARTIES have long been central to the field of political science. As the most common linkage between the formal governmental structure and the social world, parties are a natural focus for students of political institutions, political behavior, political psychology, and political theory. The variety of the literature on parties reflects their multifaceted nature and the range of questions that can be asked about them. Although the taxonomic is one of the least rewarding approaches to the study of parties, much of the analysis existing in the literature reflects our concern with the differences between one, two, and multi-party systems. Underlying this concern is the realization that the number of parties has significance. The party is a major link between political elites and the mass and an important instrument of governing in most political systems, but the ways in which these functions are performed vary widely. The number of parties in a system and the ways in which they relate to one another are associated with radically different styles of politics. The dominant party system is sometimes recognized as having a separate identity, though more often than not it is seen as a particular mutant of one of the other systems that results from idiosyncratic features of a specific historical tradition. It is our contention that the dominant party system is sui generis. It should not be con-

This article provides a non-formal modification of the standard spatial model of party competition to make it more applicable to the study of opposition parties in dominant party systems in transition. Dominant parties' virtual monopoly over resources forces challengers to rely on activist-based strategies. Challengers then face the problem of balancing programmatically radical activists against the moderate preference of the median voter. The article shows that opposition parties' programmatic locations depend on the number of competing parties. Contrary to standard expectations, it finds that two-party competition between the incumbent and one challenger produces a center-fleeing strategy by the challenger, whereas three-party competition between the incumbent and two challengers yields center-seeking strategies by both challengers. The second half of the article applies this modified model to the case of Mexico. Data come from in-depth interviews, electoral returns, public opinion polls, and original sample surveys of national party leaders and activists.

How does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.

Monetary Constraints, Spending, and Autocratic Survival in Party-Based Regimes

This study examines why regime survival rates vary across young democracies. The author argues that there is a relationship between the type of authoritarian regime and the survival of subsequent democracies. Old regime elites inherit valuable resources from former dominant party regimes that may increase the likelihood of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) performing well under democracy. This, in turn, for one thing, reduces the fragmentation of the new ruling parties, which inoculates young democracies against political instability that could lead to regime collapse. For another, it can effectively check the government’s power, thus preventing a new ruling party from crossing the line from democracy to authoritarianism. This study considers the hypothesis that dominant party regimes have a positive impact on the electoral performance of ASPs under democracy, thus contributing to the longevity of democracies, and tests that hypothesis by combining quantitative and qualitative analysis.

A country's health expenditure significantly improves its population health status. This study aims to examine the determinants of health expenditure in dictatorships. We designed a mixed methods research approach. First, we used panel data from 1995 to 2014 covering 99 countries (n = 1488). Fixed effects regression models were fitted to determine how different types of authoritarianism relate to health expenditure. Second, we chose Ivory Coast to apply the synthetic control methods for a case study. We constructed a synthetic Ivory Coast, combining other dominant party regimes to resemble the values of health expenditure predictors for Ivory Coast prior to a regime change from a dominant party system to personalist dictatorships in 2000. We found that dominant party autocracies, compared with non-dominant party regimes, increased health expenditure (% of GDP) (1.36 percentage point increase, CI = 0.59-2.12). The marginal effect, however, decreased when an autocrat in this type of regime held elections (0.86 percentage point decrease, CI = 0.20-1.52). Furthermore, we found the difference in health expenditure between the actual Ivory Coast and its synthetic version starts to grow following the regime change in 2000 (in 2000, actual: 6.00%, synthetic: 6.04%; in 2001, actual: 4.85%, synthetic: 5.99%), suggesting a pronounced negative effect of the government transition on Ivory Coast health expenditure. The findings suggest that different forms of dictatorship are associated with varying levels of health expenditure. Where dictatorships rely on popular support, as is the case with dominant party dictatorships, health expenditure is generally greater.

Analysis of the political history of Zambia through a study of Michael Sata. It shows the interaction between party politics and populism since the 1950s, the nature and competitiveness of electoral politics in single or dominant party regimes, and the importance of individual political leadership to the success of opposition parties in Africa. Javier Milei in Argentina, Donald Trump in the United States, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Narendra Modi in India, Julius Malema in South Africa - populist leaders are thriving in party politics across the world. Structural changes like the globalisation of the economy, rising inequality, and increased voter detachment from traditional parties have given rise to distinct social grievances on which the populist leader feeds. But how does such a leader emerge? This book uses the study of Michael Sata, former president of Zambia and one of the most intriguing political figures of modern African history, to provide insight into the origins and personality of the populist. It argues that three factors - the structural, the economic and, importantly, the personal - are needed to understand when and how populism develops. Based on exclusive interviews with Sata, as well as with his friends, allies, opponents, and journalists, and on newspapers, archives, personal correspondence, and participant observation, Sata's election to the Zambian presidency in 2011 is explained as the culmination of a political journey spanning the late colonial period (1953-1964), the years of one-party rule (1973-1991), and the era of multiparty democracy (since 1991). The book explores the nature and style of his political strategy, the grievances that he articulated and played on, the constituencies he targeted and mobilised, the policy appeals around which he rallied support, and the language with which he expressed those appeals. At the same time, it uses the prism of Sata's political life to examine the growth of populism in Zambia and its practice in party politics since the 1950s. As well as providing new insights into the long shadow of late colonialism on the country's contemporary politics, this book illustrates the evolution of political ideas and populist strategies.

Opposition parties are central actors in accounts of democracies (e.g. Dahl 1966). Prior research addressed issues such as institutional factors to gauge the power wielded by opposition parties, and how they affect opposition parties’ choices for engaging in conflictual behaviour vis-à-vis the government or opting for cooperative approaches. However, scant attention has been devoted to understanding citizens’ views of such opposition party behaviour. We aim to fill this gap by examining how opposition parties’ choices of conflict or cooperation with the government affect citizens’ evaluations of both opposition and government parties. Our study centres on the case of Germany, where the considerable institutional power vested in opposition parties provides a framework for genuine choice between cooperation and conflict. We use data from four large-scale survey experiments in which we systematically manipulated opposition party behaviour. These experiments were conducted between 2020 and 2022, allowing us to study the effects of opposition party behaviour in different contexts, including cases of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and in the realm of more everyday politics. Although mixed, the results suggest that cooperative opposition party behaviour provides a promising, often overlooked avenue for opposition parties to attract citizens.

The Austrian party system has entered a new phase since the controversial ÖVP-FPÖ coalition came into office in February 2000. The party system literature offers two contradicting expectations about party system mechanics in multi-party systems without relevant extremist parties: competition structured by party alliances and strictly competitive relations between government and opposition parties (as suggested by <citeref rid="b30">Sartori 1976</citeref>) versus competition structured by individual parties and some mix of competition and co-operation and perhaps even power-sharing in extra-governmental arenas between government and opposition parties (as suggested by <citeref rid="b3">Dahl 1966</citeref>). Our empirical analysis of party system competitiveness in the electoral, parliamentary and other arenas (in particular, the corporatist arena) between 2000 and 2003 shows that the relations between the government and opposition parties were strictly competitive (i.e. of a zero-sum character) in the electoral arena. Likewise, there was no trading between government and opposition in the parliamentary arena. Finally, the government substantially increased its impact on the official sites (i.e. arenas controlled by the government) and used fire and hire methods more than any of its predecessors to build up its positions in public sector institutions. The opposition parties, in turn, perceived the government parties as a bloc and were united in their goal of undermining the government parties' majority. Yet, while relations between the government and opposition parties remained highly competitive throughout the entire period, relations between the parties on each side of the government-opposition divide became more fluid, partly for tactical considerations and partly for reasons of genuine preferences. In sum, the post-2000 Austrian party system is a weak version of a two-bloc system.

There is a global trend of democratic retrenchment across the world, in both new and more established democracies. The African continent is part of the trend, although there are distinct regional variances on the continent. Yet, despite democratic gains in some states and along some dimensions of democratic rights, the overall trend is that the democratic gains won in the period after 1990 are now eroding. Democracy is challenged in ways that pose threats to freedom of speech, association, and information, the ability to choose political leaders, protection of personal integrity and private life, and the rule of law with recourse to independent courts. As part of a global trend of democratic backsliding, African states have adopted legal restrictions on key civil and political rights that form the basis of democratic rule in a range of countries, from dominant party regimes such as Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Tanzania to competitive electoral democracies like Zambia, Senegal, and Malawi. In South Africa, where democracy and rule of law appear deeply institutionalized, the succession battles and exposed levels of corruption under President Zuma, now removed from the leadership of the ANC party, suggest a weakening of the institutions intended to check executive powers. The September 2017 court annulment of the Kenyan elections suggests that the courts were able to perform an important accountability function and safeguard free and fair elections. Yet, the aftermath of the 2017 Kenyan elections culminated in early 2018 with President Uhuru Kenyatta closing down television and radio stations. Civil society actors, policy makers, and scholars warn against the democratic backlash and its negative implications for domestic and international politics. Internationally, the African democratic backlash challenges global actors who have long pressured developing countries to politically liberalize. Yet, following what appears to be a global trend of democratic backsliding, space for international influence and the spread of liberal norms is closing rapidly. Domestically, the observed backlash against democracy may pose further social and political threats with wide-reaching implications for development. This may, in turn, challenge the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Whereas closing space for civil society impacts first and foremost on voice and participation, restrictions on civil society ultimately may curb even the most seemingly apolitical activities such as humanitarian relief. At present, there is limited understanding of possible response mechanisms to the conscious attempts at democratic rollback from political elites. How do activists come together to advocate for particular rights? When are activists more effective in generating mass citizen support for their campaigns? How can researchers, international actors, and domestic civil society organizations work together to disseminate and use knowledge about organizational resilience in these circumstances? These will be pressing questions for scholars and activists going forward.

Courts can play a critical role in protecting the democratic participation of opposition parties. In this article, we examine the role of apex courts in South Africa and Zimbabwe as forums for democratic contestation by opposition parties. Specifically, we critically assess the courts’ records in enabling and protecting opposition parties’ ability to equally participate in democratic processes. Our analysis focuses on four themes in the courts’ jurisprudence: (i) the disenfranchisement of voters perceived to be aligned with the opposition, (ii) requirements for the registration of political parties and individual candidates seeking to participate in elections, (iii) the independence of electoral management bodies to ensure fair and equal participation for all parties, including the opposition, and (iv) the enforcement of electoral justice in cases of alleged unfair or unfree elections. Additionally, recognising the importance of political funding for opposition parties, the article examines the legislative framework governing political party funding. The article demonstrates that while South Africa and Zimbabwe share similar constitutional frameworks and commitments to political rights, their apex courts have taken divergent approaches toward protecting opposition parties. The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court has largely restricted political rights, curtailing the institutionalisation of opposition parties and hindering the development of multi-party democracy. In contrast, the South African Constitutional Court has generally served as an enabling force for institutionalising opposition parties and strengthening multi-party democracy. We attribute the difference in approach to the broader political context: while both countries formally commit to multi-party democracy, Zimbabwe’s ruling party has entrenched a system of competitive authoritarianism, which it maintains by, amongst other measures, undermining independence and relegating the courts to a rubber-stamping role for measures that curtail political freedoms. By contrast, South Africa’s judiciary has maintained its independence, supporting the protection of opposition rights even within a dominant-party system. We conclude our analysis with the observation that a dominant political party, including a liberation party, does not inevitably stifle opposition rights. Independent institutions – such as courts and electoral management bodies – serve as essential bulwarks against such attempts, ensuring the preservation of democratic principles and equitable political participation.

Following the election cycle of 2007–2008, Russia prepares to enter a phase marked by a change of presidents but continuity in the model of legislative-executive relations that was established under Vladimir Putin. During Putin’s presidency, Russia created an authoritarian dominant party regime. In such a system, patronage and coercion are used to ensure the dominant party’s control of elective offices. In Russia, United Russia’s commanding majority in parliament ensures that the president and government can enact their legislative agenda without opposition. The arrangement allows parliamentarians to enjoy substantial material benefits and patronage opportunities as champions of powerful commercial interests in return for conceding authoritarian powers to the president.

Democratic governance depends not only on periodic elections but also on continuous political contestation, institutional checks on power, and effective accountability mechanisms. Central to this process are opposition parties, which play a critical role in ensuring transparency, legislative scrutiny, and democratic pluralism. Drawing on democratic theory, party system analysis, and accountability frameworks, this study examines the role of opposition parties in the democratic governance of Odisha, a state characterised by prolonged dominance of a single political party. The study adopts a qualitative, descriptive–analytical research design. It relies exclusively on secondary sources, including legislative debates, government documents, academic literature, election reports, and media sources, covering the period from 2000 to 2024. The theoretical framework is informed by the works of Joseph Schumpeter, Robert A. Dahl, Giovanni Sartori, Arend Lijphart, and accountability theorists, enabling an integrated analysis of opposition politics in a dominant-party democratic context. The findings reveal that opposition parties in Odisha perform a vital watchdog role by questioning government actions, highlighting governance gaps, mobilising public opinion, and preserving democratic norms. However, their influence on governance remains indirect mainly due to numerical weakness in the legislature, limited access to institutional power, resource constraints, media marginalisation, and executive dominance. While opposition activities contribute to transparency, public debate, and symbolic accountability, their capacity to shape policy outcomes and exercise substantive legislative scrutiny remains constrained. The study concludes that the quality of democratic governance in Odisha is closely linked to the institutional strength and political space available to opposition parties. Strengthening legislative rights, ensuring fair media access, promoting issue-based politics, and enhancing political awareness and voter engagement are essential for deepening democracy and improving governance outcomes. The research contributes to broader debates on dominant-party democracy by demonstrating that, while electoral democracy may persist, substantive democratic accountability depends critically on a vibrant and empowered opposition.

This chapter interrogates the notion of government of national unity (GNU) as an emerging model for democratic and coalition governance in Africa. Considering Africa's dismal record of governance, coupled with socio-economic developmental challenges, coalition governance is imperative. African countries such as Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe were selected as case studies to demonstrate the opportunities and challenges of government of national unity or coalition governance. GNU is a co-governance mechanism often adopted over contested election results between the incumbent and opposition parties. Amongst the countries under study, only Kenya showcases a semi-successful story of how a coalition can be formed, maintained, and sustained to the next elections. Other governments of national unity, such as those in South Africa, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe, formed coalitions with opposition parties to unset the dominant parties. In the case of Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, and Lesotho, GNU was adopted as both a democratic governance and conflict resolution strategy to govern better and ensure peace and stability over contested election results and simmering political violence. This chapter argues that the dominance of the ruling parties and weak opposition parties undermines coalition formation to challenge the incumbent parties through electoral democracy. The chapter concludes that GNU in these countries not only showed dismal evidence of being notoriously tyrannical in creating pseudo-space but was also a pace-setter for bad and undemocratic governance in Africa. Data for this chapter was collected through secondary sources.