Abstract

Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non‐exceptionless special science generalizations, I distinguish (what I will call) minutis rectis (mr) generalizations from the more familiar category of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations. I argue that the challenges involved in showing that mr generalizations can play the law role are underappreciated, and quite different from those involved in showing that cp generalizations can do so. I outline a strategy for meeting the challenges posed by mr generalizations.

Highlights

  • IntroductionMany philosophers of science talk as though, if there are any non-exceptionless scientific generalizations that play at least some aspects of the law role (counterfactual support, inductive confirmation, predictive/explanatory import) tolerably well, they belong to the class of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations or cp laws

  • Many philosophers of science talk as though, if there are any non-exceptionless scientific generalizations that play at least some aspects of the law role tolerably well, they belong to the class of ceteris paribus generalizations or cp laws

  • The following are representative quotations: “A nonstrict law is a generalization that contains a ceteris paribus qualifier that specifies that the law holds under ‘normal or ideal conditions’, . . . . The generalizations one finds in the special sciences are mostly of this kind

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Summary

Introduction

Many philosophers of science talk as though, if there are any non-exceptionless scientific generalizations that play at least some aspects of the law role (counterfactual support, inductive confirmation, predictive/explanatory import) tolerably well, they belong to the class of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations or cp laws. Lepore and Loewer 1987; Fodor 1989, 1991; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003a,b; Woodward 2005) to explain how generalizations like LE can support counterfactuals and sustain predictions and causal-explanatory relationships, despite the fact that there are possible background conditions under which they are violated If successful, these attempts show that such generalizations play the law role to a non-negligible degree. In virtue of the fact that LE supports these interventionist counterfactuals (when it comes to the populations that it models well) it follows directly, on the account of Woodward and Hitchcock (2003a,b), that the variables on the right-hand side of LE causally explain the actual growth rate of the population ddnt On their account, the fact that there are possible background conditions under which LE fails to hold doesn’t stand in the way of its playing important aspects of the law role.. If the geographical distribution is ‘right’ will LE approximately hold

Why It Matters
Potential Solutions
Derivation of a Probabilistic Approximation to LE
Best System Analyses
Conclusion

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