Abstract

ABSTRACT R&D investment is necessary for firms to pursue innovation. However, few studies have simultaneously investigated the different tenure effects of founder CEOs and agent CEOs on R&D investment. Furthermore, scholars have been increasingly calling for a study of the effects of CEO-board interactions on firm strategy. Accordingly, this study examines the differing effects of founder CEO tenure and agent CEO tenure and the moderating influence of independent directors’ human and social capital on R&D investment. Regarding the tenure effect on R&D investment, an inverted U-shaped relationship is observed for agent CEOs whereas a negative relationship is noted for founder CEOs. Additionally, the results show that independent directors’ industry-specific experience (board human capital) and external directorships (board social capital) positively moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment.

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