Abstract
In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance. Using a large sample of 16,516 M&As in the United States between 1999 and 2015, we find that long-tenured CEOs tend to create more shareholder value than short-tenured CEOs in M&A deals. We also find that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to acquire private target firms and to make acquisitions in the same industries and the domestic market. Finally, we find that long-tenured CEOs receive higher compensation compared to the pre-acquisition period if they make better acquisitions.
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