Abstract
We examine the moderating role of ownerships and CEO tenure on the relationship between long-term compensation and firm performance. The article introduces an alternative view on agency conflict discussing the conflict that stems from differences between the preferences of time horizon. With it, we argue that the inter-temporal agency conflict will undermine the positive consequence of long-term compensation on firm performance. In this study, we hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between the CEO’s long-term compensation and firm performance after the 2008 financial crisis. The hypothesis is that the more shareholders of family firms have more stocks, the more institutional investors have more stakes. Moreover, the longer the CEO stays in a firm, the stronger the relationship will be. Our result shows that after the 2008 financial crisis the effect of long-term compensation on firm performance has increased and that as institutional owners own more shares of the firm, the effect of long-term compensation on firm performance declines. A CEO’s firm tenure which is hypothesized to increase the effect of long-term compensation, was found to be not significant.
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