Central Asia in an Era of Disruptive Changes: Prospects for Cooperation

In this article, we argue that Central Asian (CA) states' approach to the Ukrainian crisis should be defined as strategic silence. Such foreign policy reflects how CA's ideological and geographic factors and a shared information space, largely dominated by Russian and Russian-language media, facilitate the understanding of historical continuity among Russian and CA leaders. However, we also demonstrate that CA public officials' and general public's uses of strategic silence reflect the complicated reality of CA states. Their leaders and populations are cognizant of both their dependence on educational and labor opportunities in Russia and their necessity for postwar coexistence with Russia, China, and other states that are not sympathetic to the intentions of the European Union/USA in CA. Therefore, strategic silence is an approach for CA states to voice their disagreement with Russia's approach to Ukraine while avoiding being victimized by Russia and its allies for an openly anti-war stance.

Few of the countries examined (India, Japan, Iran, Turkey and South Korea on the one hand, the five Central Asian countries on the other) have included one another in their national strategy papers, with the exception of Turkey. Ankara features prominently in the foreign policy strategies of all five of the Central Asian states. With deep historical ties, since their independence, Central Asian states have relied on Turkey’s assistance to enter international economic, financial and political multilateral organisations. The majority of Central Asian states have also supported Japan in its bid for a UN Security Council seat and vote alongside South Korea in UN votes. Even where strategic alliances have not been outlined in overarching foreign policy, these countries have signed extensive bilateral political agreements with one another covering a variety of fields of cooperation. These have often followed periods of high levels of activity in bilateral relations and high-level (including heads of state) meetings and visits. Bilateral relations are further solidified by reciprocal diplomatic representation in each state and a variety of visa free regimes. Political ties are also underscored by shared security threats and challenges. The continued instability in Afghanistan, in particular, is a concern for countries in this region given that drug trafficking as well as the potential risks around radicalisation and terrorism remain a considerable challenge. Afghanistan is a particular driver of activity for India, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, Central Asian republics and South Korea have a similar understanding of responsibility for international security and stability in Asia. Central Asian states and the other Asian states covered in this paper have had few disputes. There has in the past been political tension between Turkey and several Central Asian states for a variety of reasons. Iran has had a variety of disputes over territorial boundaries and natural resources, as well as Iran’s nuclear programme and the resulting restrictions placed on Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement between the EU and Iran on curtailing Iran’s nuclear programme. Indeed, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty also ensured that the support for a country’s nuclear weapons programme was limited. Despite this, Iran has, by some countries, been used as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Central Asia. More recently, there have been growing tensions between Iran and Tajikistan, which reflects a concern across the region about the Islamic Republic’s negative influence. Of all the Asian states examined in this paper, India and South Korea are the most involved in the sphere of defence and security relations. They have engaged in military training, exercises, as well as arms sales and military modernisation, and India has sought the lease of an airbase in Tajikistan. Turkey has limited, but growing, potential in this area for greater cooperation.

Central Asia consists of five states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and rich with natural reserves. Pakistan has an important place in the South Asian region and occupies an important strategic location. Pakistan and Central Asian republics always keen to develop cordial relations. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CEPC) is a game-changer project of the region. China has injected over 70$ billion under CPEC in various projects in Pakistan and wants to invest more. Central Asian states are willing to join CPEC and wish to get benefits from this vital project. Central Asian republics can capture a large-scale market beyond South Asia and Pakistan, with its prime location can provide an accessible route. Gawadar Port is fully functional now and provides a transit route to the Central Asian republics and can significantly enhance ties among Pakistan and CARs. Now Pakistan considers the Central Asian region an essential pillar in its foreign policy. Islamabad tried its best to connect with the Central Asian region but could not get the desired results due to the various regional issues. Afghanistan is a constant hurdle in the way of a prosperous region. Afghanistan has been in war for the last four decades, and peace looks like a dream in the country. Islamabad has hosted Tajik President in June and the Uzbek President at the virtual meeting in April this year. Pakistan has signed various MoUs with both Central Asian states and it shows the importance of relations among Pakistan Central Asian republics. This paper analyzes Pakistan's foreign policy towards Central Asia in the context of CPEC. The researcher uses a qualitative technique to complete his research paper and this research paper enables readers to understand the significance of CPEC and Pakistan's relations with Central Asian states.

This research article examines the state and prospects of economic cooperation among the countries of Central Asia (CA). As history would have it, economic cooperation within the CA region was previously limited, and investments in Central Asia were mainly concentrated in the mining sector of the economy. Demographic and economic trends in the region have led to an expansion of the internal market; most Central Asian states have implemented wide-ranging reforms, which have improved the overall investment climate; and the CA states have stepped up the development of multilateral trade and economic relations, laying the groundwork for broader cooperation. The article also covers recent problems related to the economic situation in the region. For example, the current situation associated with COVID-19 has had an impact on economic relations between the CA countries. In the view of international experts, this crisis has not provided any new reasons for integration in the region. The quarantine measures taken in various Central Asian countries have had a negative effect on their foreign trade and thus on intra-regional trade and economic cooperation in general. The authors also examine other problems, such as those caused by the CA countries’ economic dependence on other countries, namely their dependence on imports from outside the region. These problems also affect the prospects of economic cooperation in Central Asia. All countries, including those rich in natural resources, want to produce and export finished goods with high value added. The production of high value added products and services enables a country to earn more revenue and reduce its dependence on primary commodity exports. The Central Asian countries are no exception. But for many reasons their finished products are often insufficiently competitive in countries outside the region. Despite the existence of economic problems connected with the need to improve the economic aspects of cooperation, there is a clear trend towards diversification of the economy of the CA countries caused by a desire to develop various specializations. These include agricultural processing, production of consumer goods for the population, development of the service sector, and other areas. Thus, the choice of a new model for the development of multilateral relations and the emerging trend towards economic growth in the region have made it possible to lay the foundation for long-term cooperation among the Central Asian states. Keywords: regional cooperation, Central Asia region, diversification of the economy, trade regimes, external economic policy, region, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan.

In anticipating the United States' ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Obama administration has sought to enlist Afghanistan's northern neighbors within Central Asia in an effort to stabilize and invigorate the region politically and economically. In 2011 the administration proposed a Silk initiative linking the world to Afghanistan. The strategy is to enlist the country's Central Asian neighbors in a win-win scenario that will spur trade, energy exports, investment, and peace. The former Soviet stan countries, proposes the administration, will be the drivers of the new Silk Road and thereby enrich themselves while uplifting Afghanistan and ensuring regional stability. This vision is a hopeful one, yet the Central Asian states remain unpersuaded. Instead, they have preferred to paint a dark scenario of a coming Afghan spillover-of conflict and refugees, Islamist extremism and terrorism, and drugs-spreading not just to Pakistan and Iran but also northward to the former Soviet sphere and undermining the fragile stability of the post-Soviet stans.The new Silk Road initiative is presaged on multiple faulty assumptions about Central Asian interests: first, that Afghanistan and Central Asia constitute a natural region sharing a common ethnic, religious, and historical identity, and that this identity will undergird a strong regional relationship; second, that the Central Asian states will not primarily treat Afghanistan as a security threat after the U.S. withdrawal; third, that they have shared economic interests in cooperation in Afghanistan; and fourth, that such economic opportunities in Afghanistan will trump the actions and interests of Russia and China. Each of the above assumptions is extremely problematic. The post-Soviet stans are unlikely to be reliable partners in the U.S. plan for Afghanistan after the withdrawal in 2014. In reality, regime survival, border security, and concrete economic incentives-coming from China, not Afghanistan-will determine the foreign policies of the Central Asian states.In this essay, I first provide a realistic assessment of security threats from Afghanistan. Then I shift to an explanation of how Central Asian states' insecurities will nonetheless undermine a new Silk Road by increasing their cooperation with Russia and decreasing integration with Afghanistan. Next, I demonstrate that economic incentives from Russia and China are directing the Central Asian states to the north and east, undercutting trade and energy routes through Afghanistan. Finally, I discuss the political and religious crackdowns likely to be justified in terms of the Afghan threat.Afghanistan as Threat: Rhetoric and RealityThe Central Asian and Afghan populations do not share an identity despite their Silk Road roots and common religion. Soviet modernization policies set most Central Asian Muslims on a very different path, making them accepting of secular government and suspicious of the Islamic-leaning regimes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise, being Muslim and Central Asian, and sharing a Soviet legacy of both colonization and development, has not facilitated a sense of shared identity, much less cooperation, among the Central Asian states themselves. Since 1991, multiple external attempts at regional integration have either failed or remained hollow shells of international agreements.1 Mistrust among Central Asian leaders has often led these countries to the brink of armed conflict on their interstate borders and rarely fostered cooperation. The Central Asian republics-with the exception of the enigmatic Turkmenistan-view Afghanistan primarily as a source of instability, refugees, Islamist militancy, and narco-trafficking. Their fears for their security are not unfounded; the U.S. withdrawal is very likely to lead to an escalation of conflict within Afghanistan and potentially even to the collapse of the Karzai regime. Yet although there will be some spillover effects, the anticipated descent into chaos, to borrow Ahmed Rashid's term for the Afghanistan-Pakistan trajectory, is unlikely to dramatically affect the post-Soviet stans. …

The development of the international political changes in Central and South Asia is analyzed in the article in connection with the consequences of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s second rise to power (the first one was in 1996). It is shown that the peaceful transformation of Afghanistan is impeded by such persistent threats as religious extremism, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking. The complex mosaic of regional relations, in which Afghanistan is becoming an important element due to the changes that have happened in this country, is determined in Asia by the growing rivalry and competitive struggle of major economic states of the region, as well as global players, and by the efforts of all of them to build various international coalitions (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, RIC – Russia, India, China; Quadripartite Security Dialogue – QUAD, C5+1, Organization of Turkic States, etc.). Of particular interest in this regard is the position of the neighboring states – the three Central Asian nations (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), as well as China, Pakistan, India and Iran. Apart from that, this study also outlines the most important challenges for the national security interests of Afghanistan’s Asian neighbors. An optimal scenario for both Afghanistan’s Asian neighbors and Russia would imply achieving a stable consensus in this country. Afghanistan becoming a full member of such an influential international bloc as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia, Central Asian states and major Asian economic powers are already represented, can have positive consequences for the stabilization of the situation in the country and the whole Asian region. This would create favorable conditions for successful economic and political interaction between the Central and South Asian states. In conclusion the author emphasizes that the transformations in Afghanistan have complicated regional challenges, prompting neighboring states to focus on the military-political component of their security. Aiming to prevent a negative scenario in Afghanistan, they also multiplied diplomatic contacts with the current leadership of the country. The new international political configuration that is emerging in modern Asia dictates new approaches in the security sphere for the Asian states.

The article examines the features of the US foreign policy towards the Central Asian states in the post-bipolar period. The imperatives and constants, as well as the transformation of Washington’s Central Asian policy, have been characterized. It is shown that five Central Asian states have been in the focus of American foreign policy over the past thirty years. In the process of shaping the US foreign policy in Central Asia, the presence of significant reserves of energy and mineral resources in the region was of great importance. Therefore, rivalry for Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes came to the fore. In addition to diversifying transport and logistics flows and supporting American companies, the US energy policy in Central Asia was aimed at preventing the restoration of Russia’s economic and political influence, as well as countering the penetration of China, which is interested in economic cooperation with the countries of the region. During the period under review, the following transformation of mechanisms and means of Washington’s policy in the Central Asian direction was observed: the policy of “exporting democracy”; attempts to “nurture” the pro-American elite; striving to divide states into separate groups with permanent “appointment” of leaders; involvement in a unified military system to combat terrorism; impact on the consciousness of the population in order to destabilize geopolitical rivals; building cooperation on a pragmatic basis due to internal difficulties and external constraints. Central Asian states sympathized with the American course because of their interest in technology and investment. At the same time, these states in every possible way distanced themselves from the impulses of “democratization” from Washington. Kazakhstan was a permanent regional ally of the United States, to which Uzbekistan was striving to join. The second echelon in relations with the American side was occupied by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A feature of the positions of the Central Asian countries is the maximum benefit from cooperation with Washington while building good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, which is in dissonance with the regional imperatives of the United States. In the future, the American strategy in Central Asia will presumably proceed from the expediency of attracting regional allies and stimulating contradictions in order to contain geopolitical rivals in the region.

The states of the Central Asian region obtained their independence in 1991 and have been undergoing a turbulent transition process, such as civil war, cross-border conflicts, revolution and socio-political reforms. Japan has been furthering its cooperation with the Central Asian countries since the day diplomatic relations were established. Despite only a 25-year history of cooperation, Japan has developed numerous and diverse patterns of involvement in the Central Asian region. There is a positive attitude towards Japan and Japanese people among the population of Central Asian countries. This work explores the features of Japanese soft power policy and its development in Central Asia. The core of the multilateral collaboration format in Japanese Central Asian Policy is “Central Asia + Japan,” which aims to promote inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation among the Central Asian states.

Throughout history, Central Asia was seen as a vital region by the great powers that struggled for the influence in this region in the past. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, new independent states have emerged in Central Asia. This article provides an analysis of China’s implementation of foreign policy towards Central Asian states through soft power. China recently implemented the idea of soft power as a crucial foreign policy instrument. The study focuses on the fact that soft diplomacy can be essential in forming an attractive image of China in the international arena. Furthermore, it argues that China’s ambition to become more authoritative in the region is associated with the activation of efforts in its soft power policy. Employment of soft power is entirely determined by China’s national interests. It is in China’s national interests to establish a secure and peaceful climate for its economic advance, to adjust its vast and growing energy needs, and to curtail the domination of other powerful actors. Thus, this article offers an analysis of China’s soft power and its application within the Central Asian region in pursuit of its foreign policy tasks. The paper aims to solve the following problem: What is China’s soft power and how does it use it in the Central Asian states? To address the problem, we compare Chinese soft power to the policy of other regional actors. The goal is to study China’s foreign policy in Central Asia, with the purpose of highlighting Chinese political strategy in the region. The article begins with the discussion of China’s foreign policy chief aims and objectives to understand the meaning of good neighborhood diplomacy, which forms the basis of China’s soft power diplomacy in Central Asia.

After gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian states, which had no experience in conducting independent foreign policy activities, began to build their own foreign policy coordinate system and develop its conceptual framework. Given their unique geopolitical position and diverse resource potential, the regional states preferred to pursue an open and multi-vector foreign policy, which allowed them to realize their national interests. With regard to the transformational processes in global politics and economy, as well as the geopolitical characteristics of their states, the political elites of the regional states have developed their own approaches to foreign policy. The article analyzes the doctrinal foundations of the Central Asian countries’ foreign policy, and the influence of global factors on the foreign policy formation of the regional states and intraregional cooperation.

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1991s Central Asian nations and Japan established diplomatic relations and partnerships began to increase steadily as manifested by the level of official contacts. In 1997 the “Silk Road” Diplomacy concept was formulated for Japan’s policy toward Central Asia. At the beginning of the 21st century, we see the activation of new actors including India, Korea, and Japan in Central Asia, which were mainly welcomed in the region. Tokyo recognized the growing strategic importance of Central Asia in the context of international security and sought to play a more active role as an Asian nation in Eurasia. During two decades Central Asian nations and Japan began to increase steadily. Japan is one of the largest assistants to Central Asia in structural reforms and Japanese investments in the different aspects of the region's economy and transport communication add up to several billion. There are several areas of special interest to Japan in its relations with Central Asia, including cooperation in education, economic development of the region, political reforms, as well as energy resources. Japan’s effort in creating the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialog is part of its multilateral diplomacy. At the same time, there are some challenges and problems in Central Asia–Japan relations. However, there are potentialities for future bilateral and multilateral relations. Japan like Korea, India, and other countries has a strong positive image in Central Asia, which could be regarded as an additional factor for fostering partnerships between Central and East Asia as well as interregional relations with the vast Asian continent and beyond. This article explores the interests of the Central Asian states as members of the SCO, and their compatibility with the SCO goals. This study shows that the SCO is compatible with the Central Asian states' security and economic interests, regional cooperation, and the need for balanced relations with the great powers— China, Russia, and the United States.

Central Asia is strategically important for the security and stability of the EuroAtlantic region. The region’s energy resources are vital to global energy security and it is a major hub for oil and gas pipelines and trade corridors. This article provides an overview of Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the states of Central Asia since independence. The relevance of the article is due to the major political changes that are taking place in the states of Central Asia, and in the two largest of them, there is a change in political leadership. Despite the fact that the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey in Central Asia over the past thirty years has had its ups and downs, it is considered indisputable that the country has managed to become one of the significant geopolitical players in the region through the strengthening of bilateral relations, as well as in the framework of multilateral cooperation. As the largest Turkic-speaking state, Turkey is considering the new “Turkic” states of the CAR from the point of view of creating a Turkic union under the auspices of Turkey – the “Great Turan” project. The idea of a Turkic union is one of the main priorities of the Turkish foreign policy strategy, which would allow it to strengthen its position in the international arena. Historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity with the countries of the Central Asian region, as well as in the context of R. Erdogan’s new foreign policy and a more active role in international relations, Turkey is becoming a new participant in the “Great Game”. In this sense, when analyzing the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey in Central Asia in this article, this issue is studied both in bilateral and regional formats.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkiye attempted to build “special” relations with the new independent states of Central Asia, filling the power vacuum in the region. The results of these efforts were contradictory and generally disappointing for Ankara, ending not only in decline of its activity in the region, but also abandonment of its claims to leadership. Although Turkiye made significant progress in developing economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties with Central Asian states in the following decades, the region in general was not among the top priorities of its foreign policy. However, Turkiye’s activization in Central Asia in recent years gives grounds to talk about Ankara’s “return” to the region, the reasons for which are related both to the ongoing global and regional shifts and changes in Turkiye’s foreign policy and foreign policy identity. In a situation of intensifying great power competition and increasing conflict in international relations, the Central Asian states are seeking a new balance in their foreign policy. While maintaining close ties with Russia and China, the two dominant powers in the region, they are simultaneously trying to diversify their foreign policy. Perceived as a rising power by the leaders of Central Asian states, Ankara appears to them as an attractive partner capable of both strengthening the security of their states and giving a new impetus to the development of their economies. However, despite the strengthening of Turkiye’s position in Central Asia, facilitated in particular by the institutionalization of the integration processes of the Turkic states, Ankara’s attempt to become a “third force” in the region may face a number of constraints and challenges. One of them is that Central Asia is growing in importance not only for Turkiye but also for Russia and China, as well as other extra-regional powers.

: Central Asia consists of five newly independent states situated between Russia, China, and Iran halfway around the world from the United States. For the last eight years, the Central Asian States (CAS) have been the object of considerable attention from the United States. The focus of this research is to identify what national interests the United States has in Central Asia, how national interests link to U.S. foreign policy, and explain the benefits and implications of the U.S. pursuing engagement and development in the region. Although the political, economic, and military costs of U.S. engagement in Central Asia are high, so are the benefits. The long-term benefits to the U.S. will be having a more stable (less volatile) region and access to its significant natural resources. The 1999 version of A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS), states the U.S. national interests in Central Asia as: (1) supporting continued democratization in the five Central Asian States (CAS), (2) promoting prosperity, (3) enhancing security in the region, (4) pursuing arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and (5) integration in the larger community (a political and economic goal). This research paper organizes the U.S. national interests in Central Asia into three categories: political, economic, and military and a detailed discussion of the interests then flows from each of the three categories. Based on President Clinton s 1999 NSS, policy announcements made by The State Department, and legislation introduced in Congress, I believe the U.S. has identified that it has overall important national interests in Central Asia. Although the implications of the U.S. having important interests in Central Asia affect the world at large, the primarily affect is on Russia, who also has important and multiple national interests there.