Abstract
Abstract : Advances in science and engineering have put sophisticated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) detection devices onto the battlefield. While it is tempting to allow new technology to replace older forms of CBRNE surveillance, detectors have inherent weaknesses that can be exploited by opponents. The Department of Defense should review its strategy for CBRNE agent surveillance, beginning with control of the confirmatory process in the acquisition and development of new technology, in the development of doctrine, and in deployable laboratory operations.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
