Causal Decision Theory and the Fixity of the Past

Abstract

Causal decision theory (CDT) cares only about the effects of a contemplated act, not its causes. The article constructs a case in which CDT consequently recommends a bet that the agent is certain to lose, rather than a bet that she is certain to win. CDT is plainly giving wrong advice in this case. It therefore stands refuted. 1 The Argument2 The Argument in More Detail 2.1 The betting mechanism 2.2 Soft determinism 2.3 The content of P 2.4 The argument again3 The Descriptive Premise 3.1 Causal decision theory 3.2 Causal decision theory prefers A14 The Normative Premise5 Objections 5.1 Table 1 and Table 2 are misleading 5.2 The agency theory of causation 5.3 The payment mechanism 5.4 Newcomb’s problem 5.5 Against the normative premise 5.6 Drop soft determinism