Caudillos invencibles: legitimación, coercióny cooptación como estrategias de reproducción de poder de los gobernadores. El caso de Gildo Insfrán (1995-2025)

The thesis aims at analysing the role of collective action as a viable alternative to the traditional forms of intervention in agriculture in order to encourage the provision of agri-environmental public goods. Which are the main benefits of collective action, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, compared to traditional market or public intervention policies? What are the drivers that encourage farmers to participate into collective action? To what extent it is possible to incorporate collective aspects into policies aimed at providing agri-environmental public goods? With the objective of addressing these research questions, the thesis is articulated in two levels: a theoretical analysis on the role of collective action in the provision of public goods and a specific investigation of two local initiative,s were an approach collective management of agro-environmental resources was successfully implemented. The first case study concerns a project named “Custodians of the Territory”, developed by the local agency in Tuscany “Comunita Montana Media Valle del Serchio”, which settled for an agreement with local farmers for a collective provision of environmental services related to the hydro-geological management of the district. The second case study is related to the territorial agri-environmental agreement experimented in Valdaso (Marche), where local farmers have adopted integrated pest management practices collectively with the aim of reducing the environmental impact of their farming practices. The analysis of these initiatives, carried out through participatory methods (Rapid Rural Appraisal), allowed developing a theoretical discussion on the role of innovative tools (such as co-production and co-management) in the provision of agri-environmental public goods. The case studies also provided some recommendations on the government intervention and policies needed to promote successful collective action for the provision of agri-environmental public goods.

When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums

Nowadays, democracy discussions including a variety of different approaches are made due to the impact of globalization. In this respect, local press comes to the fore as a significant element in the development of participatory citizenship and democracy values from the periphery to the center in a way to reflect differences. This research aims at examining the relationship amongst democracy, citizenship and local press using the local media Boulder, a city in Colorado state of the USA, as a case study. The study is composed of two parts. In the first part, we are going to discuss theoretical frameworks that will help us to better understand the concept of democracy and citizenship, the impact and importance of participatory citizenship on democracy and democratization. The second part includes the historical development of Boulder city and Colorado state. Their sociological and economic features in order to understand the local background of the geography in which the newspaper we examine in our case study are located. The significance of local media and press in Boulder for the state in general and its historical development are analyzed also including examples including the flow of information rendering the participation of citizens possible. In this respect, the importance of local press for the participation of citizens and its impact on democratization are examined.

Through in-depth interviews and questionnaires, we take Mianyang City, Aba Prefecture, and Suining City in Sichuan Province as the study object, to analyze the relationship between the basic situation of farmers and the supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods. The research results show that the younger the farmers, the higher the educational level, the higher the annual household income, and the higher the enthusiasm in participating the discussion of the supply of rural public goods. And the correlation between farmers' annual household income and participation in the supply of public goods is the highest. Finally corresponding countermeasures and proposals are put forth based on farmers' educational level and annual household income, the two difficulties in supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods.

Cooperation and coordination are the basic problems of human society. The classical theory predicts that, as individuals with complex and different motivations, collective actions on the provision of the commons often fall into the social dilemma, in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Evidence from the long-term observation of an urbanizing village in transitional China suggests that heterogeneous groups can also achieve efficient cooperation and self-governance.We focus upon the problems that, in the case of different groups with heterogeneous individuals, from the formation of groups to collective actions taking place, how can internal monitoring and punishing strategies be selected to sustain collective actions by preventing free riding and other opportunistic behaviors?The main work of this paper is as follows: （1）It expands Lanchester’s Law to describe different behavioral motivations of individuals and investigate the conditions for the occurrence and maintenance of collective cooperation;（2）It introduces endogenous punishment as a credible threat and investigates its impact on the provision of public goods（non-market and non-government）, which provides a possible solution to the traditional dilemma of collective actions;（3）Based on the analysis of a real case from Shenzhen, it empirically examines the effect of endogenous punishment on the spontaneous formation of collective actions in the provision of public goods, which enriches the theory and practice of self-governance within the community.This paper makes the following contributions to the literature: First, we employ the general classification and measurement of individual heterogeneity from a laboratory experiment（Fischbacher and Gacheter, 2010）, which reflects implicit preferences through explicit behavior. According to different motivations, groups are divided into cooperators, free-riders and punishers, and individual types can be revealed by their strategies. Our evolutionary model based on Lanchester’s Law, depicts how individuals in a group take punitive measures against free riding. Then we investigate the influence of endogenous punishment system on collective actions in a long-term repeated game. This paper also provides a new perspective to understand the emergence of cooperation in collective actions and gives a case study as empirical evidence.The results show the conditions for the success of collective actions among individuals with different behavioral motivations, that is, the equilibrium satisfies both of the individual and collective rationality. After initiating collective actions and completing the supply of the system, the maintenance stage of collective actions is equally important. First, in absence of effective supervision and credible punishment, it is difficult for the population who are non-kinship or non-geographical relationship to promote collective actions, and then public goods will be out of provision. Second, in the presence of effective supervision and credible punishment, individuals within the group form the behavioral expectation that “once betrayed, they will be punished and pay the price”, and the collective actions of cooperation on the provision of public goods can be sustained.

Despite the burgeoning comparative literature on electoral authoritarian regimes, fewer studies have accounted for the emergence of hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes at the subnational level. This article examines the variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism with data from the Russian Federation. First, the article shows that by using a comparative regime classification most Russian subnational cases can be classified as electoral authoritarian between 1991 and 2005. Yet, there are considerable differences in competitiveness between the electoral authoritarian regimes. The article accounts for this variation by drawing on both comparative electoral authoritarianism literature as well as more context-specific explanations. Statistical analysis on 192 subnational electoral authoritarian cases shows that the determinants of Russian subnational authoritarian stability are rather similar to those found in cross-national studies. Subnational (non)competitiveness in Russia appears to be related to the structure of the regional economy and natural resource rents, and to a lesser degree to the specific Russian federal context. Authoritarian “know how” also plays a role in authoritarian regime building. The findings of the article contribute to the literature on electoral authoritarianism, subnational democratization and Russian subnational politics.

The state spending structure – correlation on pure and mixed public goods reflects the making of fundamental choices about state functions. Are pure public good defense normal quality provision compatible in Long Run with heavy spending on social sector (i.e. compatible with mixed public goods provision)? The main hypotheses tested: elected politicians and bureaucrats' have strong incentives to choose wrong strategies in foreign and military policies if the state extends its responsibility far from the pure public goods provision limits. The case study (Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, to the Geneva Convention of 1949) shows, how punishment for military success strategy undermines incentives of army officers, making the military machine virtually inoperative. Artificially abridged Army capability provides the argument for the notion war is no solution. The set of the governments credibly ready to obey ratified Convention, are clearly segmented on two subsets. The 1st one includes the Governments bearing military responsibilities, military umbrella-givers, which abstained to impose all Protocol caused risks on the army officers (non-ratified – USA, Israel; ratified with strong reservations – UK, France, Germany) and the rest democratic countries – which are military umbrella takers, ratified the Protocol without significant reservations. Statistical analysis of Great Powers military spending historical trends used to test the main hypothesis. Preliminary statistical analysis fails to reject it. We believe bureaucratic competition for the responsibilities, staff and the budget provides satisfactory explanation of this phenomena.

Russian Abstract: Государство – ночной сторож в эпоху классического либерального капитализма демонстрировало способность выигрывать войны, сдерживать преступность и повышать качество правосудия. Современные демократии всеобщего избирательного права, взяв на себя обязательства заботиться о каждом от колыбели до могилы, выглядят куда менее грозными оппонентами. Даже их бесспорное военно-техническое превосходство не обеспечивает прежней защищенности их граждан. В данной статье мы проверяем гипотезу о способности государства выполнять качественно классические функции и одновременно тратить львиную долю бюджета на новые функции. То есть одновременно защищать, обеспечивая безопасность и правосудие, и заботиться. Рассматривая ряд примеров заведомо неэффективно выбора стратегий в сфере обороны, а также новые тенденции в сфере военной юстиции мы ставим под сомнение не только способность, но и политическую волю современных демократий защищать своих граждан. Статистический анализ дает основания для следующего объяснения столь радикальной смены приоритетов государства. Введение всеобщего избирательного права создало мощную электоральную базу для сторонников неограниченной экспансии государства. Новые группы бюрократов также заинтересованы в расширении бюджета и полномочий. Логика политической и бюрократической конкуренции создает спрос на выбор стратегий и законодательства исключающий эффективные оборонительные решения. Ключевые слова: чистые общественные блага, смешанные общественные блага; динамика военных расходов; качество чистого общественного блага оборона; электоральный спрос на общественные блага; всеобщее избирательное право. English Abstract: The correlation of state spending on pure and mixed public goods reflects the making of fundamental choices about state functions. Are pure public good defense normal quality provision compatible in Long Run with heavy spending on social sector (i.e. compatible with mixed public goods provision)? The main hypotheses tested: elected politicians and bureaucrats’ have strong incentives to choose wrong strategies in foreign and military policies if the state extends its responsibility far from the pure public goods provision limits. The case study (Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, to the Geneva Convention of 1949) shows, how punishment for military success strategy undermines incentives of army officers, making the military machine virtually inoperative. Artificially abridged Army capability provides the argument for the notion war is no solution. The set of the governments credibly ready to obey ratified Convention, are clearly segmented on two subsets. The 1st one includes the Governments bearing military responsibilities, military umbrella -givers, which abstained to impose all Protocol caused risks on the army officers (non-ratified – USA, Israel; ratified with strong reservations – UK, France, Germany) and the rest democratic countries – which are military umbrella takers, ratified the Protocol without significant reservations. Statistical analysis of Great Powers military spending historical trends used to test the main hypothesis. Preliminary statistical analysis fails to reject it. We believe bureaucratic competition for the responsibilities, staff and the budget provides satisfactory explanation of this phenomena.

The correlation of state spending on pure and mixed public goods reflects the making of fundamental choices about state functions. Are pure public good defense normal quality provision compatible in Long Run with heavy spending on social sector (i.e. compatible with mixed public goods provision)? The main hypotheses tested: elected politicians and bureaucrats’ have strong incentives to choose wrong strategies in foreign and military policies if the state extends its responsibility far from the pure public goods provision limits. The case study (Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, to the Geneva Convention of 1949) shows, how punishment for military success strategy undermines incentives of army officers, making the military machine virtually inoperative. Artificially abridged Army capability provides the argument for the notion war is no solution. The set of the governments credibly ready to obey ratified Convention, are clearly segmented on two subsets. The 1st one includes the Governments bearing military responsibilities, military umbrella-givers, which abstained to impose all Protocol caused risks on the army officers (non-ratified – USA, Israel; ratified with strong reservations – UK, France, Germany) and the rest democratic countries – which are military umbrella-takers, ratified the Protocol without significant reservations. Statistical analysis of Great Powers military spending historical trends used to test the main hypothesis. Preliminary statistical analysis fails to reject it. We believe bureaucratic competition for the responsibilities, staff and the budget provides satisfactory explanation of this phenomena.

Violent Non-State Actors: The Politics of Territorial Governance is an original in-depth scholarly explanation of the impact of territorial penetration, control and governance on the effectiveness of the activities of violent non-state actors (VNSA). The theoretical framework operates with the assertion that a non-linear causal relationship mediated through the capacity for territorial control and governance exists between the effectiveness of objective achievement and territorial penetration. Using four case studies, Zdenek Ludvík links these interrelated concepts of territorial penetration, territorial control and territorial governance into an interrelated sequentially conceptualized causal framework. To this end, extensive and unique empirical material gathered to examine the activities of VNSA in considerable detail presents a wholly original and comprehensive method of measuring the degree of territorial capability of VNSA. Zdenek Ludvík demonstrates that there is no directly proportional relationship between territorial penetration and objective effectiveness, since neither territorial penetration nor territorial control alone are sufficient to achieve increased effectiveness. He shows that territorial penetration and territorial governance are necessary conditions for objective effectiveness, since only when territorial penetration and territorial control are followed by territorial governance at the level of advanced wartime social order can VNSA hope to achieve a higher degree of effectiveness.

Stimulating an effective provision of public goods and ecosystem services from Europe’s farmland and forests is a critical challenge for policy-makers. In this paper we focus on three aspects of this challenge. Firstly, we explore the different drivers that influence the provision of public goods and ecosystem services by farming and forestry. Secondly, we identify the key motivational, institutional and socio-economic factors that can encourage the provision of these benefits. And thirdly, we examine the role of governance arrangements, of new forms of cooperation and of institutional change in enhancing the provision of public goods and ecosystem services.The paper is based on a comparative analysis of 34 sectoral, multi-sectoral and territorial real-life case studies spread across 10 EU countries which were carried out as part of the EU-funded PEGASUS project. The analysis pays attention to the functional inter- and intra-relationships between farming and/or forestry, and the quantity and quality of public goods and ecosystem services that these activities provide. This analysis allowed us to identify the key factors that enhance the provision of social and environmental benefits. These include involving a wide range of actors in initiatives and actions, the establishment of appropriate governance arrangements in multi-actor partnerships, the key roles of coordination, cooperation and trust, and the importance of finding common interests and creating synergies and win–win situations. In most of the case studies, we found a complex interaction between different drivers, actors, motivations and interests. In general, we found that the provision of public goods and ecosystem services from farmland and forests is stimulated by policy interventions, planning and regulations that encourage, and support, the engagement of the private sector, and of civil society, in joint actions.

The Lighthouse in Economics

The post-Cold War period has seen the rise of international liberal peacebuilding, as an overarching framework for international interventions in intrastate conflicts. In contrast, the current period is marked by decline of liberal peacebuilding, and a simultaneous rise of domestic illiberal peacebuilding. This has created a gap between the predominant theoretical and policy framework and the actual form of peacebuilding in many conflict-ridden societies. The present article addresses this challenge through a contextual case study of illiberal peacebuilding in Myanmar. The case study shows how a dominant state actor – the military (Tatmadaw) – has used both coercion and co-optation to contain armed resistance against militarized and centralized statebuilding and thereby strengthen the state's territorial control and authority. While the SLORC/SPDC military junta (1988–2011) sought to contain ethnic armed organizations through military offensives, ceasefire agreements and illiberal peacebuilding, the military based USDP-government (2011–2015) institutionalized a hybrid regime as a framework for political transformation of EAOs, and tolerated a degree of dual territorial, administrative and resource control at the local scale. These clientelist measures failed to address the substantive issues behind Myanmar's multiple and protracted conflicts. They were also combined with military offensives against non-ceasefire groups and war by other means in ceasefire areas. Moreover, the case study demonstrates that the Tatmadaw used its tutelary power to obstructs substantive conflict resolution through negotiated state reforms. Myanmar's peace initiatives during the last three decades should thus be understood as illiberal strategies for containing ethnic armed organizations rather than attempts at substantive conflict resolution.

1. Introduction Multifunctionality of agriculture is already noticed in the past and the scale of its occurrence is characterized by the utilization of labour resources and physical capital on farms and the scale of non-agricultural employment. In the Polish scientific literature there is a discussion of the multifunctionality of the country and the rural areas (multifunctionality of rural areas), which consists of rural economic diversification and thus increasing employment opportunities in non-agricultural activities in rural areas (Wilkin, 2008). According to the definition of pure public goods which are delivered to all citizens in the area without being able to exclude anyone from consumption and the marginal cost of supplying those goods is zero. In terms of tourist visiting the region of agro-tourism services can be a public good or club, depending on whether it is possible to exclude anyone from consumption. They can also be good in a club or private, depending on whether these goods are competitive. From the perspective of the inhabitants of the region carry out the tasks of a municipality within the rural tourism can be regarded as providing a pure public good. The premise of the present paper is the multifunctional development of the current issues of agriculture which is to include reinforcing elements increasing rural tourism values by enriching the attractiveness of the landscape and tourism development. Noticeable is the lack of definition in the literature that treated rural tourism as a public good provided by local or central government. Under the law the task of municipalities is to conduct and financing of tourism policy. Selection of paper topic and related issues has been conditioned by the need to supplement, to systematize and update knowledge of the relevant aspects and conditions for development of multifunctional agriculture (especially tourism), taking into an account the characteristics of natural, social and economic environment for local and regional levels. Against the background of the study there will be attempt to answer the following questions: * Whether the provision of public goods by agro tourism affects its profitability? * Whether agro-tourism services have an impact on the profitability of farms or if only by a purely market-based revenues, or through transfers from public funds? The development of tourism in rural areas is possible. More than half of rural communities meet the criteria for recreational space and has favourable conditions for development of tourism. However, it is noted that there are significant barriers concerning human capital. They influence the decision to be taken in shaping changes in rural areas and do not allow full use of the existing possibilities. 2. Material and research methods The research on the evaluation of agro tourism as a public good was carried out in the Western Pomerania communities. The questionnaire method was used to collect data. The source materials on the opinion of owners of agro tourism farms were the result of research carried out in 2011. The research involved 40 farm owners. In order to identify following questions: (a) whether the provision of public goods by agro tourism affects its profitability? (b) whether agro tourism services have an impact on the profitability of farms or if only by a purely market-based revenues, or through transfers from public funds? The [chi square] test of independence, which allows to determine the statistical significance of the relationship between both measurable and non-measurable variables, was used. The test involves comparing the number of responses received in a number of researches that can be expected under the assumption that there are no relationships between the analysed variables. The values of [chi square] and degrees of freedom (df) are working and are generally not assessed. The interpretation covers primarily the level of probability (p), on the basis of which the existence or lack of dependence are predicated. …

EVER since A. C. Pigou wrote his books on "welfare,"' a divergence between private and social costs has provided the main argument for instituting government action to correct allegedly inefficient market activities. The analysis in such cases has been designed less to aid our understanding of how the economic system operates than to find flaws in it to justify policy recommendations. Both to illustrate the argument and to demonstrate the nature of the actual situation, the quest has been for real-world examples of such defects.