Abstract
Managing adequately the exploitation of commercial species subject to technical interactions is a key step towards the ecosystem approach to fisheries. We evaluate here, using a bio-economic modelling approach building on the ISIS-Fish simulation platform, the relative impact of total allowable commercial catches (TACC) and of taxes appli- cable to over-quota landings (deemed value) on the sustainability of a selection of species exploited by the New Zealand hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae) fishery. We investigate some aspects of the hoki mixed fisheries, consisting of four fleets and nineteen metiers, by considering the technical interactions between hoki and Southern hake (Merluccius aus- tralis). The dynamics of effort allocation were modelled using gravity model, using value per unit of effort (VPUE) as attractivity coefficient. Several management scenarios, based on different levels of TACC, effort limits and deemed value have been defined. The impact of these strategies on spawning biomass and catches has been investigated. The results confirm that the deemed value may, in combination with TACC, be an efficient management tool. By increasing the hoki deemed value, we could somehow limit the decrease in the hoki TACC needed to harvest Western hoki sustain- ably. Constraining hoki fishing also restricts Southern hake fishing in the Chatham Rise and in the West Coast South Island, but leads to increased targeting of this species in the Sub-Antarctic area. The relative costs of renting/buying quota or paying the deemed value are most constraining when the hoki TACC is at relatively low level and when the hoki deemed value is more than 1.5 times the current value.
Highlights
Managing fisheries through individual property rights finds its roots in the early 1970s (Arnason 2007)
We evaluate here, using a bio-economic modelling approach building on the ISIS-Fish simulation platform, the relative impact of total allowable commercial catches (TACC) and of taxes applicable to over-quota landings on the sustainability of a selection of species exploited by the New Zealand hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae) fishery
The results presented in this paper may be of use for fisheries managers and scientists, in a context of spawning stock biomass (SSB) / BMSY Catch / TACC
Summary
Managing fisheries through individual property rights finds its roots in the early 1970s (Arnason 2007). Three main instruments have been envisaged: territorial user rights in fisheries (TURF), individual transferable efforts (ITE) and individual transferable quotas (ITQ). Of these three management instruments, the ITQ have had the broadest applicability, and have been broadly implemented, including in 10 major fishing nations, to regulate around 15% of the global marine fish catch (12 million tonnes) (Arnason 2007). ITQ create incentives for fishers to maximize the value of their catch and minimize harvest costs (Hentrich and Salomon 2006; Arnason 2007). A technical fix is needed to correct that mismatch, that may take different forms depending on the country where the ITQ are implemented (Sanchirico et al 2006)
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