Abstract
Logical idealism, as it was defended by Ernst Cassirer, is obviously something different from logical empiricism, as it was defended by the members of the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group. However, both philosophical traditions were closer to each other than the mere contraposition of two “isms” might suggest. This pertains primarily to the rejection of any form of metaphysics and to the common aim of establishing a “scientific” philosophy. Further commonalities can be identified in relation to certain Kantian elements in their respective analytical methods, to the privileged status of the logic of relations, and to the rather marginal treatment of ethical issues. In short, Cassirer and the logical empiricists shared a lot of ground. In order to demonstrate this, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the commonalities of Cassirer with Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap, Frank, and Kaila.
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