Cartels in the European Union, antitrust action, and public attention

Abstract

This study compiles an original dataset to investigate whether the timing of actions by the European Commission in cartel proceedings is affected by the overall news agenda. Our results indicate that certain actions are more likely to coincide with large predictable news events (e.g., the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics), the more EU firms involved in a cartel – compared to cartels with few EU companies or many non-EU firms. Studying the implications of the differential timing, we find that the occurrence of unrelated newsworthy events lowers public attention to the actions, as measured by news agency and newspaper reports, as well as relevant Google searches. These findings do not constitute conclusive evidence of favoritism, that the Commission favors domestic companies by reducing the negative publicity associated with the proceedings. However, even a suspicion of a subtle form of protectionism undermines the Commission's role as an independent supranational regulator.