CANADA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON

This article analyses increasing the capability and number of Indonesian women's participation in the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) and the approaches and strategies women peacekeepers used while on duty at UNIFIL. Based on Presidential Regulation No. 18/2014 concerning the protection and empowerment of women and children in social conflicts, in contrast to the fact that women's involvement in carrying out UNIFIL's peacekeeping mission is still weak, even though women have great potential in soft power. Women have different approaches to seeking peace between the two parties involved in the conflict or keeping the peace from disappearing. This research is qualitative with a statutory approach, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, international law, and politics—data collection techniques through interviews and literature studies. These study findings are evidence of Indonesia's success in world peace missions. Women peacekeepers in the Indonesian National Armed Forces have a role that cannot be replaced by other elements, considering the conflict field prioritizes the unique skills of the Women's Indonesian National Armed Forces and Women's Police. Apart from that, the unique socio-religious-cultural characteristics in the South Lebanese Region have a reasonably complex composition, including interfaith and intra-faith sensitivity, Sunni-Shi'a dimensions, and the Druze sect. The readiness of Indonesian women peacekeepers is in good condition and continues to increase the skill and strategy to keep peace worldwide. The potential of Indonesian women peacekeepers is an integral part of the Indonesian National Armed Force's mission. Namely, the ability for territorial development is a distinctive characteristic of the Indonesian National Armed Forces as a national army born in conditions of struggle. Its operational capabilities are closely related to raising support from the community in its area of operation.

The aim of this article is to present the results of research on the transformations of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) in Lebanon, taking into account transformation of roles, tasks as well as types of personnel and equipment involved. The author presents organisational and functional differences with regard to activity of individual contingents designated from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (AFRP) for participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The analysis presented in the article was based on historical background, the causes of tensions in the area of responsibility of the operation and the transformation of the security situation, and thus the changing scale of needs with regard to peacekeeping force interventions. Based on a comparative analysis of the different stages of Poland’s involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, the differences in the use of individual types of armed forces are presented. Part of the information on the transformations, including their determinants, was obtained in the course of interviews with persons who used to perform staff functions within the structure of the PMC in UNIFIL. Results of the conducted research provided the basis for presentation in the article of changes occurring over the years in terms of purpose, structures and equipment of contingents designated from the AFRP to perform the analysed tasks. The obtained research results indicate numerous transformations of the structure and concept of functioning of the PMC in UNIFIL, as well as methods of differentiation in the scope of Poland’s involvement in operations under the aegis of the UN in the area of southern Lebanon.

In March 1998, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) noted the completion of two decades of its peacekeeping operation. While coping with unparalleled formidable problems, UNIFIL failed in its three mandatory missions: it did not induce peace, it did not stop the daily carnage of Israeli soldiers and Lebanese civilians, and it failed to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The Israeli‐Lebanese‐Syrian feud has been a major liability on the international community, posing a compounding threat to the stability and peace of the region and beyond. In 1982, Iran was drawn to the conflict, invoking Islamic fundamentalist terrorism manifested in suicide attacks on both Israeli and Western targets. Only an Israeli‐Syrian agreement which addresses the tangible and intangible security dilemmas of the three parties involved could bring the crisis to a positive ending.

Brazil’s involvement in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2011 has allowed for a direct participation as part of international peace and security efforts in the Middle East, strengthening the country’s credentials as it presents itself as a ‘peace provider’. Informed by academic contributions on issues of responsibility and recognition, the article discusses Brazil’s engagement with particular reference to UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force, and the implications of such participation for its broader foreign and defence policy agenda.Keywords: Brazil, UNIFIL, Middle East. Received: May 30, 2017Accepted: August 11, 2017 Introduction I n November 2011, Lebanese President Michel Sleiman visited the Brazilian frigate ‘Uniao’ stationed in the port of Beirut. The visit had a specific symbolic dimension; it was the first time that a Lebanese President was visiting a ship participating in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). President Sleiman did not only visit the ship, but also spoke with the Brazilian officers of Lebanese descent that were part of the ship’s crew

During 1982 the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was conspicuous largely for a lack of any effective role. Paradoxically, however, Fiji had earned a measure of distinction for its contribution to international peace through UNIFIL, and was in consequence asked to participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force in 1982. At the same time, Fiji's first experience in international peacekeeping also exposed it to many of the constraints and frustrations of such ventures. As has been shown elsewhere, UNIFIL's experiences are in keeping with the history of UN peacekeeping. The argument in this paper is that the experiences of the Fijian component of UNIFIL are equally at one with the experiences of national contingents generally in UN forces; that in certain areas the Fijian involvement displays unique features that are partly a function of its ministate characteristics; and that Fiji's contributions to peacekeeping is an effective answer to old doubts about UN membership for ministates.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia carries out a free and active foreign policy, therefore the Government of Indonesia has always actively participated in efforts to maintain world peace under the banner of the United Nations. This study aims to analyze about: a) how Indonesia’s Participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Mission; b) Approach Program Through Cross-Cultural Competence for Peacekeepers in UNIFIL’s Mission; and c) Resilience Improvement Program for Peacekeepers and Their Families in UNIFIL Mission. The research method used is qualitative with data collection techniques through interviews with informants and literature studies. The results of the study prove that (1) Indonesia has actively participated in maintaining world peace which is the embodiment of the 4th Paragraph of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945). (2) These obstacles and challenges are caused by differences in Cross-Cultural Competence and Cultural Intelligence, both of which are closely related. Cultural Intelligence (Cultural Intelligence) consists of Mental Ability and Behavioral Ability. Mental abilities include metacognitive intelligence, cognitive intelligence, and motivational intelligence. Meanwhile, Behavioral Ability is behavioral intelligence. Cross-Cultural Competence can be improved through experience (experience), training (training), education (education), self-development (self-development); and (3) To increase the peacekeeper’s resilience, there are 4 (four) efforts, namely practical handling of stressors, cognitive or internal strategies, stress reduction supported by the situation and environment, and personal approach. There must be additional Cross-Cultural Competence training by the United Nations for peacekeepers (civil and military) in every UN peacekeeping mission around the world. The importance of creating a Family Resilience program for peacekeeper families, such as FOCUS in the United States, which can reduce stress levels and other problems so that the performance of peacekeepers in carrying out their duties becomes more qualified and effective in order to maintain international peace and security.

Despite Former External Affairs Minister Donald Jamieson’s claim that Canada had “been the Number One peace-keeping country in the world,” Canadian participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (U.N.I.F.I.L.) in 1978 was limited to the initial period of six months and solely for logistic support. The cautious position taken by the Liberal government is understandable in view of the volatile situation prevailing in Lebanon for a number of years and the many uncertainties confronting U.N.I.F.I.L., which since its inception has been called “the most difficult peace-keeping operation ever launched by the Organization.”

summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war demonstrated that Israel views the problem of Hezbollah geostrategically, as a proxy military challenge supported by its long-term enemies Syria and Iran.This view led the government of Israel to attempt the eradication of Hezbollah through the application of overwhelming military force, an effort that was flawed in design and failed in execution.Similarly, the United Nations has viewed the problem as a conflict between two warring military entities, a problem it has unsuccessfully sought to mitigate since 1978 with the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).Colored through the lens of the global war on terrorism, the United States also views the threat created by Hezbollah geostrategically, the influence of a top-tier terrorist organization financed by Iran and supported by Syria.Together, these views led to the delayed implementation of a ceasefire in 2006 and the misguided belief that Israel would be successful in its efforts against Hezbollah.After 34 days of air and ground engagements the Hezbollah continued to fight, delivering what some have termed a strategic victory.Meanwhile, the state of Lebanon was once again decimated, with more than 1,200 civilians killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and damage to the economy and infrastructure totaling over $7 billion. 1 The post-war response of the United Nations and the United States continues to focus on the symptom (Hezbollah), rather than the root cause that allows such an organization to exist; the weakness of the Lebanese government.This conflict should be seen in the context of a series of conflicts that have afflicted Lebanon during its history.In striking similarity to the current Autumn 2007 29

Lebanon has more than 6.9 million square metres of confirmed mined area within the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) area of operations, including the "Blue Line" which is a demarcation line between Lebanon and Israel. According to the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), contamination along the Blue line negatively affects more than 200,00 people. It also endangers humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel. Minefields in proximity to the Blue Line, UNIFIL bases, and patrol routes endanger peacekeepers and limit UNIFIL in its mandate delivery.

The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) at the request of the Lebanese Government due to Israeli aggression in 1978 in accordance to mandate of Resolutions 425 and 426. In the period 2024–2025, UNIFIL’s effectiveness is again in the spotlight as escalation of the conflict increases, including the violation of the 60-day ceasefire by Israel, which has caused new tensions in the border area. This article examines the mechanisms, roles and effectiveness of UNIFIL as an international organization in efforts to realize peace in the Blue Line Region. Using the three realistic approaches to peace with the use of qualitative approach based on the latest articles, journals, and news articles. The study shows that limited geopolitical pressure and inability to directly engage in the conflict have hampered UNIFIL's performance, although its presence continues to play a role in preventing large-scale conflict. So the UNSC emphasizes the fulfillment of the 1701 mandate through communication and negotiation between UNIFIL and Lebanon-Israel for peace on both sides.

: Lebanon and the United Nations celebrated the 20th anniversary of the approval by the UN Security Council of Resolutions 425 and 426 on March 19, 1998. These two resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in March of 1978 in order to establish the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to insure: - The cessation of hostilities - The withdrawal of the Israeli forces - The restoration of Lebanese authority Although neither of these resolutions has yet been fully implemented, UNIFIL's presence in South Lebanon has nevertheless had some positive impact on the situation there, especially at the human and economic level. This paper examines two questions dealing with the past record of UNIFIL and with its future: What kind, and to what extent, has UNIFIL provided security and well-being to the indigenous population? What kind of successful approach should it be found in the region to the UNIFIL to accomplish its Mission?

A sample of 1,624 Norwegian veterans from the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) was investigated on average 6.6 years after service, completing a questionnaire focusing on stress exposure and posttraumatic stress reactions. The prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder (measured by the Posttraumatic Symptom Scale [PTSS-10]) was 5% overall, but 16% in the subgroup of personnel having been prematurely repatriated from UNIFIL. Multiple regression analyses showed that the following variables made separate and significant contributions to the explained variance of the PTSS-10: Service stress exposure, perceived lack of meaningfulness with respect to the military mission, and stressful life-events in life after service. These factors explained 25% (overall sample) and 37% (repatriated sample) of the variation in the posttraumatic symptom score.

The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah was followed by the ‘enhancement’ of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The UN peacekeepers in Lebanon, already present since 1978, were strengthened considerably in numbers in order to provide a more effective security buffer between the two conflict parties. This re-designing of UNIFIL in crisis mode was made possible as a result of the substantial participation of European nations, most notably Italy and France. For most of these European troop contributors, this marked a return to UN peacekeeping since the debacles in the former Yugoslavia. On at least two accounts, the UNIFIL enhancement therefore qualifies as a suitable second case study in this study of European crisis response operations. On the one hand, UNIFIL can be qualified as a contemporary example of European militaries undertaking a ‘classic’ peacekeeping operation, where a ceasefire agreement is followed by the insertion of a military buffer separating the conflict parties. On the other hand, UNIFIL arguably provides the best example of European states conducting a military operation under UN flag. The leadership role assumed by the European troop contributors turned UNIFIL into a genuine laboratory on how to plan peacekeeping operations in a challenging environment and displayed the conditions under which these states were willing to consider deploying their forces under UN command.KeywordsSecurity CouncilSecretary GeneralContingency PlanningIsraeli Defence ForceSecurity Sector ReformThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

After Israel's first invasion of Lebanon in 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The early struggle over the contested meanings and interpretations of UNSCR 425, and the differences of position regarding UNIFIL itself were never fully resolved due to the shifting nature of US policies and objectives in the region and the context of the force's deployment within two distinct, albeit related conflicts: the Lebanese civil war and Arab-Israeli conflict. UNIFIL found itself trapped between the competing demands of sovereignty and resistance, not knowing which war it was there to prevent and which peace it was meant to build. This confusion resurfaced with the passage of UNSCR 1701 following the 2006 war, when UNIFIL's mandate and scope was expanded, but the force continued to be a site of contested narratives and potential future conflicts.

This paper attempts to identify threats to the security environment of Lebanon and the prospects for their changes, affecting the activities of Polish military contingents and their personnel, taking into account historical aspects, internal and external threats and contemporary conditions of the security environment of the region and Lebanon. It uses the results of research conducted by the author in the years 2012-2020. Included in the study there are Polish military contingents operating as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between 1992 and 2009, such as: the Polish Military Medical Unit, the Polish Military Contingent in Lebanon (PMC Lebanon/PMC UNIFIL), and the “new” PMC in Lebanon, which began performing mandated tasks in November 2019. Polish contingent operations in Lebanon have been affected by the aftermath of the never-ending conflict with Israel since 1948, the civil war in Syria, the growth of terrorist organisations in the Levant region, Shiite Hezbollah, growing in terms of military strength and political influence, and nearly two million war refugees. These factors resulted in a significant increase in threats to peacekeepers and observers serving in Lebanon, and the primary source of these threats is the direct impact caused by the enemy using various heavy weapons, aviation and other arms in attacks on the bases, patrols and posts of the contingent’s subdivisions. UNIFIL forces, together with the PMC Lebanon, are likely to face the problem of “participation” in another armed conflict, whether small or large-scale. The PMC soldiers, due to their deployment and the nature of their tasks, are likely to be exposed to possible personnel loss and material damage.