Brothers in Arms? Vigilantism and Ambivalent State Responses in West Africa

Contents: Part I Introduction and Sources: Non-state actors in the international system of states, Bob Reinalda The Yearbook of International Organizations and quantitative non-state actor research, Elizabeth Bloodgood Researching transnational history: the example of peace activism, Thomas Richard Davies The United Nations Intellectual History Project and the role of ideas, Francis Baert. Part II Actors Other than Governments:Transnational religious actors, John T.S. Madeley and Jeffrey Haynes Transnational corporations and the regulation of business at the global level, Karsten Ronit Unravelling the political role of experts and expertise in the professional services industry, Angela Wigger Parliaments and parliamentarians as international actors, AndrA(c)s Malamud and Stelios Stavridis Autonomous agencies of the European Union as non-state actors, Martijn Groenleer. Part III Perceptions and Understanding: Liberal political philosophy: the role of non-state actors and considerations of global justice, Geoff Gordon and Roland Pierik Non-governmental organizations and non-state actors in international law, Anna-Karin Lindblom Intergovernmental organizations in international relations theory and as actors in world politics, Joel E. Oestreich Inter-organizational relations: an emerging research programme, Rafael Biermann Civil society and NGO: far from unproblematic concepts, Norbert GA tz Non-state and state actors in global governance, Martin Koch Limitations of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, Dennis Dijkzeul and William E. DeMars. Part IV Nature and Impact: Non-state actors and the transformation of diplomacy, Brian Hocking Dynamism and resilience of intergovernmental organizations in a world of persisting state power and rising non-state actors, Yves Schemeil International bureaucracies: organizing world politics, Steffen Bauer and Silke Weinlich Interest representation and advocacy within the European Union: the making of democracy?, Sabine Saurugger From agenda setting to decision making: opening the black box of non-governmental organizations, Liesbet Heyse Non-governmental organizations and decision making in the United Nations, Jutta Joachim The ongoing organizational reform of the United Nations, Yves Beigbeder Reporting and peer review in the implementation of international rules: what role for non-state actors?, Thomas Conzelmann Accountability of public and private international organizations, Steve Charnovitz Non-state actors and the proliferation and individualization of international dispute settlement, Eric De Brabandere. Part V Separate Worlds: Politics and the world of humanitarian aid, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein Non-governmental organizations in the human rights world, Anja Mihr Non-state actors in the global security world, Carolyn M. Stephenson Non-state actors in the development aid world as seen from the South, Moushumi Basu Cities for citizens in the global South: approaches of non-governmental organizations working in urban development, Diana Mitlin Non-state actors in the global health world, Peter Hough Non-state actors in multilateral trade governance, Dirk De BiAvre and Marcel Hanegraaff Non-state actors and environmental governance: comparing multinational, supranational and transnational rule making, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Steinar Andresen and Jon Birger SkjA|rseth Bibliography Index.

Following the Beslan2 school hostage crisis in September 2004, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Public Chamber, which was intended to function as a public oversight committee with consultation powers. This body, which was established in 2005 with 126 members, analyses draft legis lation and monitors the activities of parliament, government and other governmental bodies of Russia and its Federal Subjects. At the same time new laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been adopted on the federal3 and regional level,4 in order to restructure the interaction between state and nonstate actors. According to the government, the new NGO legislation created the legal basis for NGOs as a new type of actor in the policy arena, enabling them to participate in politics.5 The Public Chamber, in addition, provides a negotiation platform that involves NGOs in problem solving and in bargaining compromises with state actors. Many observers, however, criticized the legislation as it seemed to tighten the control of the state over NGOs and to create obstacles for negotiations between the state and NGOs (Nusberger and Schmidt 2007). These controversial interpretations raise the question whether state actors really involve NGOs in problem solving and bargaining compromises and why state actors negotiate with NGOs. Analyses of authoritarian corporatism showed that economically and socially complex states cannot be governed only by technocratic-authoritarian means (Stepan 1978) and that under these conditions authoritarian regimes negotiate politics with societal actors. The literature on governance explains in detail that hierarchical steering causes information problems. This means that decision makers often do not have the required information about the object of theirdecision. Thus, the capacity of the state to effectively steer and coordinate society is seriously challenged. Negotiations between stakeholders can provide information and knowledge and can thus enhance the state capacity to solve problems (Scharpf 2000). Nowadays the combination of traditional hierarchical governance and network governance with non-state actors becomes ever more necessary in order to provide state functions, because in modern societies the need for sophisticated information and knowledge is growing constantly (Mayntz 1993). According to Linz, relations between state and non-state actors in authoritarian states differ, however, from those in democratic ones in that they are limited pluralistic (Linz 2000). Thus, the existence and the leeway of political and societal actors in authoritarian states depend on the authoritarian regime. The state dictates the institutions and procedures for negotiations with non-state actors. This forced institutionalized model of solving conflicts allows for the representation of societal interests while at the same time limiting conflicts. Although the theory of authoritarian corporatism seems to be of great use in understanding why and how state actors involve non-state actors in negotiations in Russian politics, we propose that it does not sufficiently correspond to and explain reality. We claim that NGOs in Russia are nowadays sufficiently powerful to influence whether and how state actors involve them in negotiations. In order to address the question why and how state actors in Russia involve non-state actors in negotiated governance, we analyse and compare interactions between state and non-state actors in five regions and three policy fields. The chosen cases differ in two ways. First, the interest of state actors to cooperate with NGOs differs depending on the policy field. Second, each policy field is analysed in two regions with different resource distributions among involved actors. The cases are ethnic policy in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, social policy in the Perm and Nižnij Novgorod regions and environmental policy in the Krasnodar and Irkutsk regions. The cases were chosen in a way that allows for testing whether the theory of authoritarian corporatism sufficiently explains why and how state actors negotiate with NGOs or whether the resources of NGOs to force the state to involve them in negotiations is a necessary additional contributing cause. The non-state actors we consider are private business actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The term ‘non-governmental organization’ describes organizations, linked to civil society. The crucial characteristic is that they are independent of the government, which means autonomous from the state and not oriented to profit-making. They can be differentiated from citizen initiatives and social movements, which often follow close or similar interests by their concrete organizational structure (Nohlen 2002: 324ff.). In our analyses we include NGOs that have an independent articulation of interests, possess differentiated financing, are not profit oriented and have concrete organizational structures. The following section of the chapter will first introduce the issues at stake in the various cases as well as the interests and resources of the main actors. In thesecond section the interactions between state and non-state actors will be analysed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets; there will be no sanctuary for terrorists; we will defend our people, our interests and our values; we will help people of all faiths in all parts of the world who want to live free of fear and violence; we will persist and we will prevail. President William J. Clinton1 Ironically, while the rest of the world is greatly concerned and annoyed about American military hegemony,2 some Americans believe U.S. military force is impotent in its fight against international terrorism.3 It seems as though America's benevolent role as the world's sole superpower should serve as a stabilizing force for international peace and security and a deterrent to terrorists. Instead, its formidable military dominance has antagonized other states and has made America the world's sole super-target of terrorists. In 1997, for example, Americans were the targets of over one-third of all international terrorist attacks.4 The United States defines as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience, and international as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. ,5 Defined as such, international is a criminal act committed by non-state actors-and the appropriate response of a victim state to defend against such is law enforcement. All non-state actors, however, operate within the sovereign territory of at least one state, and when a territorial state is unwilling or unable to cooperate in the suppression of international terrorism, or when it is covertly supporting international terrorism, then the law enforcement option fails. Furthermore, some states openly engage in, or support acts of violence that fall within the U.S. definition of international terrorism,6 and when a state attacks another state by resorting to or supporting international terrorism, an appropriate response of the victim state may be the use of armed force. Accordingly, international legal authority for a state to respond to acts of international is actor-dependent. If it is known that a non-state actor has committed an act of against the United States, then American law enforcement has the right to apprehend and prosecute the terrorist. However, when the location of a terrorist or a terrorist base camp is known and the territorial state refuses to cooperate with American law enforcement, the law enforcement response is completely ineffective in defending Americans and American interests abroad. In contrast, if it is known that a state actor has committed or supported an act of international terrorism, then American national security organizations have the lead in responding to the use of armed force by another state. Depending upon the severity of the terrorist attack and other circumstances, such a response may range from a diplomatic protest to seeking Security Council condemnation to the use of armed force in self-defense. In practice, however, the identity of the actor and a determination of state-sponsorship can be very difficult to establish. This Article briefly outlines the legal regimes which principally govern U.S. responses to international when it is established that the terrorist is either a non-state or state actor, and it explores international legal authorities' use of armed force against non-state actors when law enforcement options fail to protect Americans and American interests abroad. No state, including the United States, should take a heavy-handed approach toward the use of armed force under any circumstances. All states, however, must be able to exercise their inherent right under international law to defend themselves against all actors-non-state and state alike. Effective deterrence demands that terrorists do not have safe havens and that terrorists must fear that they ultimately will pay a price for their criminal mayhem. …

The rise of non-state (international, private, and transnational) actors in global politics has far-reaching consequences for foreign policy theory and practice. In order to be able to explain foreign policy in the 21st century, foreign policy research needs to take into account the growing importance of nonstate actorss. A good way to do this would be to engage the literature on globalization and global governance. Both fields would benefit from such an exchange of ideas because their respective strengths could cancel out each other’s weaknesses. Foreign policy research, on the one hand, has a strong track record explaining foreign policy outcomes, using a broad range of theoretical concepts, but almost completely ignores non-state actors. This is highly problematic for at least two reasons: first, foreign policy is increasingly made in international organizations and intergovernmental and transnational governance networks instead of national institutions like foreign ministries. Second, the latter increasingly open up to, and involve, non-state actors in their policymaking procedures. Thus, if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized in the future, it needs to take into account this change. However, systemic approaches like neorealism or constructivism have difficulties adapting to the new reality of foreign policy. They stress the importance of states at the expense of non-state actors, which are only of marginal interest to them, as is global governance. Moreover, they also conceptualize states as unitary actors, which forecloses the possibility of examining the involvement of non-state actors in states’ decision-making processes. Agency-based approaches such as foreign policy analysis (FPA) fare much better, at least in principle. FPA scholars stress the importance of disaggregating the state and looking at the individuals and group dynamics that influence their decision-making. However, while this commitment to opening up the state allows for a great deal more flexibility vis-à-vis different types of actors, FPA research has so far remained state-centric and only very recently turned to non-state actors. On the other hand, non-state actors’ involvement in policymaking is the strong suit of the literature on globalization and global governance, which has spent a lot of time and effort analyzing various forms of “hybrid” governance. At the same time, however, this literature has been rather descriptive, so far mainly systematizing different governance arrangements and the conditions under which non-state actors are included in governance arrangements. This literature could profit from foreign policy research’s rich theoretical knowledge in explaining policy outcomes in hybrid governance networks and international organizations (IOs). Foreign policy researchers should take non-state actors seriously. In this regard, three avenues in particular are relevant for future research: (1) comparative empirical research to establish the extent of non-state actors’ participation in foreign policymaking across different countries and governance arrangements; (2) explanatory studies that analyze the conditions under which non-state actors are involved in states’ foreign policymaking processes; and (3) the normative implications of increased hybrid foreign policymaking for democratic legitimacy.

The study investigated the role of Non-State Peace Actors in promoting international peace and stability within the context of the Peace Actors Forum in Nairobi. Specifically, the study objectives sought to: Assess the effectiveness of the non-state peace actors’ Forum initiatives; examine how the Peace Actors Forum's work in Nairobi contributes to broader international peace and stabilization; and lastly analyze the challenges and opportunities faced by non-state peace actors in advancing international peace and stability. The significance of this study includes providing practical implications for peace and diplomacy practitioners, as well as stakeholders. It also contributes to scholarly research. The study was framed by Liberalism, Constructivism, and Track II Diplomacy. Descriptive research design was employed, with a case study on Nairobi PAF platform population. The study administered interviews, survey and Focus Group Discussion., targeting 120 members of the platform. Questionnaires were administered to 93 members, 7 key informant interview informants and two FGDs targeting 15 participants, a response rate of 91.83% was secured. The results were analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques; quantitative data is presented through frequency distribution tables, pie charts, and bar graphs, while qualitative data is presented in verbatim quotes to provide a nuanced understanding of the findings From the findings, a significant majority of respondents reported positive outcomes of the initiatives by Nairobi non-state peace actors’ forum, particularly in interventions like the Sondu conflict. Non-state peace actors had more international collaborations than state actors, facilitating access to resources and knowledge sharing. Nonetheless, non-state peace actors commanded higher legitimacy and trust from the local communities. Among the key points of departure between Non-State Peace Actors and State Peace Actors was that the state actors had government authority unlike the non-state peace actors who lacked powers to enforce peace policies or any agreement. The major challenge experienced by non-state peace actors was reducing donor funding; divisive politics and ethnic mobilization that instigated conflicts; and security risks among the non-state peace actors. The State Peace Actors relied on public funds from the government, which is always available through national budgets and donors, to fund their operation unlike non-state peace actors who relied on donations to fund their operations and given the diminishing availability of donors. The study concludes by confirming that non-state actors provide distinct advantages that are crucial to establishing sustainable peace, despite having fewer resources and institutional power. Finally, the study recommended that stakeholders in peace and conflict resolution should strengthen coordination among non-state actors and State Actors; Strengthen local capacity building; engage in research; and advocate for supportive legal and policy framework.

How can we explain the varying participation of non-state actors in UN cybersecurity governance? While research often underlines the importance of non-state actors in governing cybersecurity, research on international non-state actors’ activities also shows that shrinking spaces reduce opportunities for these actors. So far, we do not know how these two seemingly opposing developments impact UN cybersecurity governance. In this article, we analyze how state interests, ideas on representation, and institutional context affect non-state actor participation in three UN forums for cybersecurity, namely the IGF, OEWG, and AHC. Based on qualitative data and a quantitative participation analysis, we find that institutional mandates of forums remain open to non-state actors but to varying degrees. Conflicts among states affect non-state actors strongly, but often indirectly, because their participation becomes politicized, and states increasingly contest ideas on their participation. These effects concern all groups of non-state actors. All in all, our results suggest that UN cybersecurity governance is still open to non-state actors, but despite functional arguments, their participation is facing growing resistance over time. At the same time, reasons why non-state actors choose to participate or not require more consideration.

While multilateral approaches and national policies have been unable to halt the unprecedented loss of biodiversity, responses from non-state and subnational initiatives are increasing. The successful implementation of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework (GBF), to be agreed upon under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), ultimately depends on commitments and action by state and non-state actors, including subnational actors. However, non-state and subnational actors have so far received little attention in academic analysis of global biodiversity governance. In order to better understand and harness the potential of non-state and subnational involvement, this paper addresses the ways in which non-state initiatives contribute to global biodiversity governance and how productive linkages can be built between state and non-state actors in the post-2020 GBF. This paper applies an explorative case study approach and analyses six international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) that highlight novel approaches in international biodiversity governance. We analyse the qualities of ICIs for biodiversity governance in terms of strengths and potential, the governance functions that they fulfil, and how they are engaging with the CBD and the post-2020 GBF. Based on this analysis, we discuss challenges and opportunities related to non-state and subnational actors involvement in global biodiversity governance and identify possible steps forward. We emphasise the importance of a collaborative framework for non-state action within the CBD that builds on existing and emerging activities of non-state actors, organises monitoring and review as part of an accountability framework of state and non-state actors, and provides for learning, capacity building and follow-up action.

Armed conflict actors frequently target civilian populations. Thus, an improved understanding of such behaviour could pave the way to reducing it. We use the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) and a broad array of geo-referenced data to investigate the spatio-temporal and economic dynamics of civilian targeting by conflict actors in Africa. Two main insights are generated. First, the civilian targeting behaviour of African non-state conflict actors is strongly influenced by the behaviour of other proximate actors. In particular, non-state actors tend to increase their civilian targeting after nearby non-state actors have done so. Possible mechanisms to explain such spatial spillovers include emulation and retaliation. Second, a negative relationship between economic activity and civilian targeting exists and applies to both state and non-state actors. In addition, CTIs of non-state actors tend to increase with population density, the geographical spread of their conflict activity and conflict duration. State actors have higher average CTIs than non-state actors do, but the gap between the two actor types tends to close during long-duration conflicts.

Over the last five years, violent non-state actors have acquired armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have been using them extensively. This paper presents the main non-state actors involved and the areas in which they have used this tool, as well as how UAVs are used and procured. To date, armed UAVs have mainly been used by non-state actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. They have also been used in the conflict zones of Ukraine, Myanmar, Mexico, and Ecuador. While this is worrisome, limited evidence suggests that violent non-state actors use armed UAVs intentionally in areas where mostly civilians are present. The paper details the state of UAV usage by non-state actors and develops a thesis of cyclic adaptation between state and non-state actors. Not only do non-state actors learn from state actors, so does state and state-backed actors learn from non-state actors in conflict zones. This process have been visible on the battlefield in Ukraine, where state-backed actors on both sides have incorporated smaller consumer style UAVs into their repertoire. As the use of armed UAVs developed substantially following Hezbollah’s early UAV operations in 2004 and spread to many regions of the world, the adaptation of non-state cleverness and ingenuity can be harnessed by state actors in times of poor or limited access to weaponry and support systems.

This chapter offers a micro-level analysis of hybrid security governance in a riot-prone African metropolis. Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2015 and 2017 in the central Nigerian city of Jos, it examines complex patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors in engendering (in)security during episodes of deadly violence. Of particular interest are the multifarious interworkings of local populations, security forces, thugs, gangs, vigilantes and other informal security networks as they circumnavigate the torturous landscapes of ethnic riots. Large-grained analyses often portray hybrid security governance as a linear set of activities that involve state and non-state actors working together constructively. In contrast, this empirical analysis of neighbourhood-level dynamics reveals intricate and dynamic processes involving a wide array of actors, coalescing and conflicting interests, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions, vehement resistance and collaboration, and shifting loyalties, coalitions, and enmities that change over time and across proximate spaces. The conclusion underscores the practical and academic significance of appreciating complex repertoires of hybrid security governance in violent neighbourhoods.

To determine and compare the level of implementation of policies for healthy food environments in Thailand with reference to international best practice by state and non-state actors. Data on the current level of implementation of food environment policies were assessed independently using the adapted Healthy Food Environment Policy Index (Food-EPI) by two groups of actors. Concrete actions were proposed for Thai Government. A joint meeting between both groups was subsequently held to reach consensus on priority actions. Thailand. Thirty state actors and twenty-seven non-state actors. Level of policy implementation varied across different domains and actor groups. State actors rated implementation levels higher than non-state actors. Both state and non-state actors rated level of implementation of monitoring of BMI highest. Level of implementation of policies promoting in-store availability of healthy foods and policies increasing tax on unhealthy foods were rated lowest by state and non-state actors, respectively. Both groups reached consensus on eleven priority actions for implementation, focusing on food provision in public-sector settings, food composition, food promotion, leadership, monitoring and intelligence, and food trade. Although the implementation gaps identified and priority actions proposed varied between state and non-state actors, both groups achieved consensus on a comprehensive food policy package to be implemented by the Thai Government to improve the healthiness of food environments. This consensus is a platform for continued policy dialogue towards cross-sectoral policy coherence and effective actions to address the growing burden of non-communicable diseases and obesity in Thailand.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasise the importance of partnerships in achieving targets like Universal Health Coverage. But how can partnerships between non-state and state actors be established, and what development and political ramifications might they have, within protracted conflict situations? In Myanmar’s Kayah State and Kayin State, decades-long conflict resulted in parallel health systems operating under Ethnic Armed Organisations. In recent years, non-state and state health workers in both areas have forged partnerships to implement an Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI). These endeavours demonstrate that partnerships are permeated with power relations and development programmes can become the site of political struggles in contested states. Linking national development plans with the SDGs can enhance non-state actors’ positions in contexts where state and international actors have limited implementation capacity. Comparing Kayah State and Kayin State EPI activities demonstrates the importance of recognising political dynamics of partnerships in conflict situations. In Kayah State, when non-state actors were not recognised as leaders of development in their areas, EPI activities had negative impacts, fuelling local grievances. Conversely, in Kayin State, when state and international actors acknowledged political sensitivities and empowered non-state actors, EPI activities built a ‘working encounter’ with positive development and peacebuilding outcomes.

The prohibition against torture is one of the most universally accepted principles of international law. Yet, the world is experiencing a global restructuring that poses a serious threat to international efforts to prevent and protect against torture. The rise of powerful transnational non-State actors such as gangs, drug cartels, militias, and terrorist organizations is challenging States’ authority to control and govern their territory. Many of these non-State actors commit torture with alarming impunity. This global power restructuring is testing the ability of U.S. laws to protect those fleeing torture, especially in light of the fact that State actors (as opposed to private or non-State actors) are the primary subject of most of our international and domestic torture jurisprudence. In the U.S., those seeking protection against deportation under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) must establish a likelihood of torture at the instigation of or by consent or acquiescence of a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity. For example, if an individual faces torture by a police officer or other government official for non-lawful purposes, this person must not be returned to that particular country. CAT protection is still warranted even if a private actor (such as a gang member) will likely torture the individual as long as the torture is done with the actual knowledge, consent or acquiescence of a state actor, such as a police officer. However, what is meant by “other person acting in an official capacity” such that torturous acts by non-State actors fall under Torture Convention protection remains unclear under U.S. CAT jurisprudence. In other words, to what extent might actions by non-State actors become “State-like” such that the CAT should apply. What if private actors are de facto controlling certain areas of a country untouchable by State actors? Or, what if non-State actors’ authority and presence are so significant and intertwined with State authority such that torture is occurring with impunity? Indeed, for the latter scenario, the applicant may establish CAT eligibility by showing a State actor’s acquiescence or consent. However, such cases are difficult to prove if the State excuses its inaction on its inability to protect victims from harm perpetrated by private actors. This is particularly true under current U.S. jurisprudence on government acquiescence, in which some federal courts have found that a mere inability to protect victims is not enough to meet acquiescence to the torture. This article identifies a major chasm in U.S. CAT jurisprudence that allows individuals to be deported back to countries where they face likely torture. This article argues that resolving failures in U.S. CAT acquiescence jurisprudence addresses part of the problem as it relates to torture by private actors. However, this is only half of the bridge across the chasm. The other half requires a look at when non-State actors are acting State-like such that they should fall within the separate CAT provision of “other person acting in an official capacity.” While many aspects of the CAT has been litigated, clarified, and developed through case law since the U.S. ratified the CAT, the question of whether and when a non-State actor can be deemed an “other person acting in an official capacity” under the CAT within the United States jurisprudence lacks scholarship or case law. We make the novel argument that courts and agencies should apply factors employed in civil rights claims (also known as 1983 claims) to assess whether a non-State actor can act in an official capacity or under color of law. Doing so will help fill a critical gap in U.S. CAT protections, and thereby prevent the refoulement of individuals facing likely torture.

In this article, we review the dynamic role of state and nonstate actors in governance. We first discuss the main arguments for and against the state being the main actor in governance in recent literature. Then, we review some of the literature about the changing role of state and nonstate actors in response to the 2007–08 global financial crisis from 2011 to 2015. The two themes under examination are, first, more control over financial markets and second, austerity measures. They illustrate different trajectories of governance that go beyond the now well‐established New Public Management paradigm of public sector reforms. Our review shows that no single actor provides the best mode of governance for all circumstances. Instead, governance is hybrid and dynamic. The mode of governance is dependent on the circumstances under which an actor is more capable of interacting with other actors to provide public services.

Összefoglalás. A KDP keretén belül végzett kutatómunkám fókuszában a biztonság megteremtése és fenntartása állami és nem állami szereplői tevékenységének jelenkori állapotanalízise, a komplementer rendészeti szereplők rendészeti szerveket tehermentesítő, nemzetgazdasági szempontból is meghatározó jelentőségű vizsgálata áll. Jelen tanulmányomban az ezzel megegyező tartalmú PhD-kutatásom eredményeiről számolok be, kutatási jelentés formájában. Summary. The focus of my research within the framework of the KDP is the analysis of the current state of the activities of state and non-state actors in the creation and maintenance of security, and the analysis of the role of complementary law enforcement actors in relieving the burden on law enforcement agencies, which is of crucial importance from a national economic point of view. In this paper I report the results of my PhD research with the same content in the form of a research report. I will point out that law enforcement, and thus the state actors in the creation of our security, and in particular the activities of the police, have been and are being dealt with in many different ways. However, only a small number of police researchers have focused their attention on non-state actors in the field of security, on the specialised bodies and ‘peripheries’ of policing, and on the use of methods other than those that might be called traditional policing. The joint work of state and non-state actors, the complementary and mutually reinforcing role of the police in creating and maintaining our common security, and the possibility of rethinking the respective roles are also areas that have been little researched. My PhD research seeks to fill this gap, bearing in mind the fact that law enforcement practitioners expect the Doctoral School of Police Studies to provide recommendations for applied research that can be used in everyday practice. In my gap-filling research, I will explore my research questions and hypotheses in an unconventional way by drawing on what I consider to be relevant, almost half a thousand domestic and foreign source materials, personal interviews, study trips and the experience of an expert survey. I will reflect on the significance of private security research and then move back in time to examine the development of the concept of policing over time. I will juxtapose key ideas from works that are perhaps little known to many, but which are still of great scientific value today. In a comparative analysis of state and non-state actors in the field of security, I will present the actors of complementary policing, the ‘stepchildren of policing’, and I will focus on the experience of the domestic organisation of a major sporting event, EURO2020, which attracts large crowds. Internationally, I will look at the development of the public and private security sectors in Estonia, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Bulgaria, England and Canada, and the activities of private military companies. On the basis of all these research experiences, I will interpret the functioning of the security industry, the value added by private security and thus the new structure of policing in the light of the “Security Rethought” questionnaire survey. Based on my research, I will attempt to unpack and explain the mechanisms of the relationship between state and non-state actors in the creation and maintenance of security. By interpreting the path to date and suggesting a possible future, I try to combine an academic approach with the knowledge that emerges from the work of practitioners. Emphasising the scientific need for change and improvement, and the fusion of dogmatics and practice, I seek, in the framework of this research, to address some of the issues that I consider controversial and, as a result of this confrontation, to stimulate further research and the development of alternative solutions for those who are open to the development of the emerging science of policing, by setting out the legislative and theoretical problems of the subject.