Abstract
ABSTRACTIn October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), formalising the victory of the North Caucasus insurgency’s Islamist wing over its nationalist-separatists. During Umarov’s time as leader, the North Caucasus experienced sustained violence and the IK claimed responsibility for multiple terrorist attacks in and beyond the region. However, despite the importance of ideology in understanding insurgent behaviour, the IK’s ideology and Umarov’s role in shaping it remain understudied. Using Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to analyse Umarov’s communiqués throughout his lengthy tenure (June 2006–September 2013), this article identifies three distinct phases in Umarov’s ideological positioning of the insurgency: nationalist-jihadist (June 2006–October 2007); Khattabist (October 2007–late 2010); and partially hybridised (late 2010–September 2013). The article contributes to debates over typologies of jihadist actors by highlighting the difficulties in applying them to the North Caucasus and provides a clearer understanding of the IK’s ideological transformation and the limits to its engagement with external actors. The article also illustrates that weakness was a key factor in explaining that transformation and identifies several avenues for research that could further enhance our understanding of the IK’s ideology and the role it plays.
Highlights
In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), formalising the victory of the North Caucasus insurgency’s Islamist wing over its nationalist-separatists
In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov abolished the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), a self-proclaimed state in southern Russia that he had led since June 2006, and replaced it with the more explicitly jihadist[1] Caucasus Emirate (IK)
The article contributes to existing typologies of jihadist ideologies by highlighting the problems that arise in applying to the North Caucasus concepts drawn from the study of predominantly Arabic-speaking groups in Muslim-majority countries, provides a clearer understanding of the limits of the IK’s ideological transformation and its engagement with external actors, and illustrates the ways in which leaders such as Umarov—who do not necessarily enjoy strong ideological credentials—justify the conflicts they are engaged in
Summary
In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov abolished the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), a self-proclaimed state in southern Russia that he had led since June 2006, and replaced it with the more explicitly jihadist[1] Caucasus Emirate (IK). In order to further strengthen the legitimacy of the frame transformation, Umarov was at pains to stress historical continuity, claiming that, regardless of the slogans used, “every leader of the jihad spoke and acted in accordance with how he understood religion and the situation.”[84] Significantly—given Russia is widely perceived as having taken advantage of the 9/11 attacks to reframe the North Caucasus conflict as part of the War on Terror and those attacks “reshuffled the jihadist universe”85—Umarov explicitly linked his disillusionment with the West to the U.S reaction to those attacks, claiming “after 2001, the infidel fully revealed its true face.”[86] An expanded session of the ChRI’s State Defence Council Majlis Shura held the following year—at which Maskhadov integrated foreign fighter units into the ChRI armed forces and aligned the constitution with sharia87—formed the cornerstone of Umarov’s efforts to portray the IK as the ChRI’s legitimate heir, with Umarov claiming he was implementing its decisions.[88] This focus on historical continuity involved some rewriting of Umarov’s personal history, since prior to assuming the leadership he dismissed as an “FSB fantasy” an interviewer’s question implying everyone had joined the insurgency to establish sharia; instead, he said he joined the war as a “patriot” and “did not know how to pray.”[89]
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