British Policy towards Northern Ireland 1969–2000: Continuity, Tactical Adjustment and Consistent ‘Inconsistencies’

Abstract

This article argues that British power in Northern Ireland has been subject to considerable constraints throughout the conflict and its policy has been marked more by continuity than is usually acknowledged. The survival of bipartisanship is an indication that such constraints affect governments of both major parties and result in a tendency towards continuity in government policy between the parties. There have been changes and short-term shifts in policy, or ‘tactical adjustments’, but the trajectory of British policy has been relatively consistent since at least 1972. Since the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974, the thrust of British policy towards Northern Ireland has been directed at reconstructing that settlement. The continuity of British policy is also apparent in the consistency of its apparent ‘inconsistencies and contradictions’. These ‘contradictions' arise, first, out of the recognition of Northern Ireland's exceptional position in British politics and, secondly, out of the perceived requirements of the ‘propaganda war’ that has been waged over the conflict.