Britain and the question of Mountainous Karabagh

Abstract

Mutual suspicion, rivalry and intermittent wars bedeviled the relations of the short-lived Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Conflicting territorial claims supplied the dynamite for an explosive situation which could not be defused by negotiation and compromise because of the rabid nationalism and fanaticism of the republics' leadership. The most serious dispute, one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, broke out over conflicting claims to Mountainous Karabagh-a region comprising the mountainous parts of Jebrail, Shushi, Jevanshir and Elisavetpol counties (uezdy) of the Elisavetpol province (guberniia). Britain, which occupied Transcaucasia after World War I, played a leading role in the struggle for Karabagh and for a resolution favouring Azerbaijan. The settlement reached in the summer of 1919 remained basically unchanged after the Red Army took control of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920. The 'Karabagh Question', however, continues to exacerbate the relations of Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan and poses the problem of nationalist claims to the Soviet government. The motives governing British policy regarding Transcaucasian territorial disputes in general, and the Karabagh conflict in particular, seem too complex to be explained by several recently advanced theories. ' Richard H. Ullman argues that British officers favoured Christian Georgia and Armenia if they had previously served in Europe, whereas those British officers who had been in India supported Moslem Azerbaijan. Such an interpretation cannot account for every British decision on territorial conflicts in Transcaucasia. However, the pro-Moslem sympathies of British officers formerly serving in India did influence their arbitration of the Karabagh dispute. This view is stressed but not documented by Richard G. Hovannisian. By contrast, Briton C. Busch argues that the background of British officers played no significant role in shaping British policy. The Karabagh case weakens his argument. Moreover, historians have failed to emphasize the fact that the British officers entrusted with the task of imposing law and order in Transcaucasia had insufficient troops to control a hostile Azerb5aijan. Thus, expediency played a very important role in the shaping of policy towards Karabagh, for nothing could have proved more ruinous to British efforts to keep Azerbaijan quiet than a decision in favour of Armenia.