Border Perceptions: Security and Immigration in the South Texas Borderlands

Recently, there has been a surge of national attention toward the U.S.-Mexican border in South Texas, known as the Rio Grande Valley (RGV). Despite the attention and potential impact, which the wall would directly have on the RGV community, there has been no systemic attention paid to the opinions of the RGV residents regarding the proposed wall and other related immigration policies. This article, therefore, aims to fill this gap by comparing immigration policy attitudes in the borderland communities to both the national Hispanic and the general national populations. By utilizing original data from an RGV public opinion survey we conducted in 2018, our analysis shows that RGV residents hold more lenient immigration attitudes than do both the national Hispanic and the general populations. We utilize logistic regression analysis to further our understanding of the correlates of these attitudes across different samples. Our findings provide important policy and political implications.

How does the threat of deportation affect Latinos’ political engagement and participation? Little scholarship systematically analyzes deportation effects upon Latino political engagement. This article explores how the threat of deportation raised under the Trump administration affects cognitive and electoral behaviour in politics among Latinos in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV). By utilizing original data from an RGV public opinion survey conducted in 2018, we examine how deportation threat, measured as knowing a deportee or detainee as well as worrying about deportability affects democratic engagement and political activism of Latinos in the RGV. We find the fear of being deported depresses the level of attention to politics, but increases the frequency of discussion. Also, it discourages voting. Our findings identify a potential hurdle of political behaviour among Latinos in the U.S.-Mexico border region which has been directly affected by immigration policy threat under the Trump administration.

The violent conclusion of Trump's 2017–21 presidency has produced sobering reassessments of American democracy. Elected officials' actions necessarily implicate public opinion, but to what extent did Trump's presidency and its anti-democratic efforts reflect shifts in public opinion in prior years? Were there attitudinal changes that served as early-warning signs? We answer those questions via a fifteen-wave, population-based panel spanning 2007 to 2020. Specifically, we track attitudes on system legitimacy and election fairness, assessments of Trump and other politicians, and open-ended explanations of vote choice and party perceptions. Across measures, there was little movement in public opinion foreshadowing Trump's norm-upending presidency, though levels of out-party animus were consistently high. Recent shifts in public opinion were thus not a primary engine of the Trump presidency's anti-democratic efforts or their violent culmination. Such stability suggests that understanding the precipitating causes of those efforts requires attention to other actors, including activists and elites.

Criminal prosecutions of political leaders have become salient election issues in the United States and globally, yet few studies have examined how such prosecutions affect public opinion. Donald Trump’s criminal prosecution and ultimate victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election offer a valuable case to evaluate these effects. How did elite rhetoric about the accused leader’s prosecution—from Donald Trump himself and from his federal prosecutor—shape public opinion? Using a pre-registered survey experiment with 3,000 self-identified Republicans and independents, we test how alternative framings of Donald Trump’s federal criminal prosecution affect public support for the accused leader, his prosecution and prosecutor, and democratic norms. Against theoretical expectations, we find that Trump’s rhetoric attacking his prosecution does not increase support for him or for retaliatory violations of democratic norms. By contrast, legal rhetoric from his federal prosecutor reduces intention of voting for the prosecuted leader, but only among respondents who do not view the leader favorably pretreatment. Legal rhetoric also increases normative evaluations of the prosecution overall but causes sharp backlash against the prosecutor among the leader’s supporters. Finally, legal rhetoric increases support for democratic norms among some sub-groups. Overall, elite rhetoric about Donald Trump’s prosecution has strikingly limited effects on public opinion, as pretreatment favorability toward the prosecuted leader shapes whether or not citizens are receptive to rhetoric about legal accountability.

Criminal prosecutions of political leaders have become salient election issues in the United States and globally, yet few studies have examined how such prosecutions affect public opinion. Donald Trump's criminal prosecution and ultimate victory in the 2024 US presidential election offer a valuable case to evaluate these effects. How does elite rhetoric about the accused leader's prosecution—from Donald Trump himself and from his federal prosecutor—shape public opinion? Using a preregistered survey experiment with 3,000 self-identified Republicans and independents, we test how alternative framings of Donald Trump's federal criminal prosecution affect public support for the accused leader, his prosecution and prosecutor, and democratic norms. Against theoretical expectations, we find that Trump's rhetoric attacking his prosecution does not increase support for him or for retaliatory violations of democratic norms. By contrast, legal rhetoric from Trump's federal prosecutor reduces intention of voting for the prosecuted leader, but only among respondents who do not view the leader favorably pretreatment. Legal rhetoric also increases normative evaluations of the prosecution overall but causes sharp backlash against the prosecutor among the leader's supporters. Finally, legal rhetoric increases support for democratic norms among some subgroups. Overall, elite rhetoric about Donald Trump's prosecution has strikingly limited effects on public opinion, as pretreatment favorability toward the prosecuted leader shapes whether or not citizens are receptive to rhetoric about legal accountability.

This article examines whether the Asia-Pacific region’s geopolitical vicissitudes are causing Japan to ‘hedge’ against deepening uncertainty and risk through major strategic realignments or diversification of security and economic ties, as the original hedging literature would expect. It examines trends since 2009 in three domains fundamental to identifying whether shifts are underway in Japan’s strategic orientation vis-à-vis China: security policy (primary), trade/investment, and public opinion. Despite deepening uncertainty (and volatility), especially in ‘the Trump era’, this study finds negligible evidence of hedging behavior: e.g., realigning toward Beijing or adopting a ‘middle position’, much less developing any meaningful security ties with China. Rather, contemporary trends point in the opposite direction: Japan’s China strategy primarily centers on strengthening indigenous deterrence capabilities, bolstering the US–Japan alliance, and diversifying regional security ties beyond Beijing. Even the latter, somewhat paradoxically, aims to deepen ties with Washington and to keep it actively engaged in regional affairs.

Finland's decision to apply for membership in NATO is a case of bottom‐up driven foreign policy. Public opinion had been rather stable for more than 25 years in the NATO issue with less than 30 per cent of the people supporting Finland's membership in NATO but almost overnight during the week when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, a majority of Finns were in favour of it. Only after that shift in public opinion did the decision‐makers support the idea of joining NATO. How was the bottom‐up driven change possible? First, the resistance to NATO membership in Finland was common but not deep. Second, in the run‐up to the war, Russia had demanded that NATO put a stop to its open door policy not only with regard to Ukraine but also for Finland. Third, Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine constituted a particular frame in Finland, because the 1939 Winter War analogy was a key part of the collective memory. Finally, due to a strong tradition of national consensus in foreign and security policy, the shift in the public opinion became overwhelming: when the tide had turned, only very few resisted. In sum, four factors enabled the public opinion change: a rational basis for opinion change, a sense of urgency, an emotional push and the consensus effect. Although public opinion is often seen as stabilising and retardant force particularly in foreign and security policy, it can also be a driver for change when suitable conditions such as those in Finland exist.

If one morning I walked on top of the water across the Potomac River, the headline that afternoon would read: "President Can't Swim". —Lyndon B. Johnson Introduction The term “spin” implies manipulating the truth, and this concept, along with “spin doctoring,” is now common in media and public discourse. The prevalence of “spin zones” in American politics is undeniable; media outlets themselves, such as Bill O’Reilly’s “No Spin Zone” on Fox News, now run segments on the topic. Despite this apparent media certainty about what constitutes “spin” there is a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the term among those who study media and politics. This article will draw on previous literature to identify two competing yet overlapping spin zones in American politics: the media’s spin zone and the President’s spin zone. Highlighting examples from the two most recent American presidential election campaigns, the article will evaluate the interplay of these zones and the consequences for future campaigns. Spin Zones In the United States, the press and the President are engaged in a struggle over providing information. Ever since the Watergate Scandal, the media is increasingly expected to be a “watchdog” that informs citizens and keeps the Executive accountable (Coronel 13) The President, conversely, may attempt to use the power of his position to set the discursive agenda or frame the political debate in his favor. Furthermore, with the rise of multi-media access and information provision, the lines between the spin doctoring of the Executive and the media have become even more blurred. Because of the complexities of these overlapping spin zones, many scholars disagree on how to define and/or precisely measure these effects. The following section briefly describes the ‘spin zone’ tools of agenda setting, framing, and priming, and then considers the example of a candidate who failed to prime his negative evaluation and a President who primes his image and successfully counterattacks his negative evaluation. The literature recognises two separate, yet interrelated zones that are integral to understanding these media/presidential relations: what we term the presidential spin zone and the media spin zone. The interplay between these zones comes together around three key concepts—agenda setting, framing, and priming. A key difficulty for scholars is that the President, his electoral challengers, and the press are engaged in agenda setting, framing and priming, sometimes simultaneously. Agenda setting is a broad concept and refers to focusing on certain issues to the exclusion of others. Framing is defined as the decision by the news media to “emphasise certain elements to define the ‘public’s belief’ about social and political issues” (Van Gorp 488). Other scholars describe priming as “a disproportionate amount of public comments with the hope . . . of causing voters to base their selection among the candidates on [that] issue” (Druckman et al. 1181; see also Druckman “Framing Effects”; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley; Van Gorp). Candidates may also undertake “image priming,” which is proposed by James Druckman et al., as a tool that can be used to counteract negative candidate evaluations (1182–1183). The definition of the media spin zone is, in most instances, synonymous with priming. Defining the presidential spin zone is more complex. Clearly the presidential spin zone involves both the previously-discussed “issue framing abilities of the president” and how he “set[s] the agenda” (Miller and Krosnick 301; see also, Gamson and Modigliano, Baumgardner and Jones; Druckman, “Framing Effects”). Mark Rozell, for instance, found that the Ford and Carter administrations had difficulty controlling the public agenda since many issues were either beyond their control, or because the president and his advisors lacked the strategy or skill to affect media coverage. The Reagan White House however was able to use his “image” to control the media (85–86). Similarly, George W. Bush’s administration was able to implement policies concerning the invasion of Iraq after the 9-11 through “issue framing” scare tactics, which were constantly reinforced by media outlets (Kellner 643). However, the President can also be engaged in priming at any given time. In other words, the President (or candidate) may attempt to prime what the media has already spun about him/her. A problem, of course, is that the President or candidate, in attempting to prime an issue that has already been spun in a sense tacitly admits they have lost the opportunity to set the agenda in the first place. However, this is when he can seize the aforementioned opportunity to use “image priming” to counterattack the media. In the examples that follow we examine whether the President or candidate can use priming to effectively counterattack the media spin zone, with a focus on two political tools that have been historically reserved for the President or candidates, namely, holding the base and wedge issues. Holding the Base and the Media Spin Zone Holding the base has been defined as a way in which candidates or Presidents can use the media to strengthen support among voters who already identify with their political party (Iyengar and McGrady 246). A classic example of this is the 1984 Reagan/Bush re-election campaign, the “The Bear.” This featured a bear in the woods that “some” could “see” and others didn’t “see at all” which was an implicit threat regarding Soviet communism and a reminder that Reagan was tough on foreign policy (“The Bear”). However, the evidence indicates that the media has increasingly begun “holding the base” on its own to facilitate its partisan framing and priming of candidates or Presidents. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth attack advertisements on 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry is a key example of a media attempt to “hold the base.” In these advertisements, former “Swift Boat Veterans attack[ed] his [Kerry’s] military record” (Muravchik A17). While this initiative began as a means to collect Republican donations, Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer McGrady maintain that the amount was “trivial” and that the real impact came with “the torrent of news reports across the country” (150). Indeed, Kathleen Jamieson and Joseph Capella found that by August 2004, “viewers of Fox News were more likely than other network viewers to say that candidate John Kerry did not earn his Vietnam medals” (279). Their evaluation of this data demonstrated the power of the media spin zone: “He (Limbaugh) employs intense language, disparaging information and negative framing to distance perceptions of the Democratic candidate from those of the anointed Republican candidate” (Jamieson and Capella 228). The coverage of disputes surrounding Kerry’s military record was augmented by the media’s simultaneous coverage of the threat of terrorism. This priming “in the media continued, reaching a high peak of 55 threat messages in August 2004, a month later 25% of the public was very concerned about another major terrorist attack in the US—two months before the presidential election” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro 120). Both President Bush and Candidate Kerry acknowledged that their respective win/loss could be attributed in some measure to the press coverage of the “war on terror” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro 124). While questions loomed about his military experience against the backdrop of the war on terror, Senator Kerry won the first two Presidential debates by significant margins. Alec Gallup and Frank Newport suggested that the Kerry camp had “won the spin contest … to characterize their own candidate as the winner” (406). So, what happened to Kerry? The media spin zone stopped him. The presidential debate wins were 30 September 2004 and 8 October 2004, respectively. Iyengar and McGrady demonstrate that before the debates even began the number of Swift Boat veteran stories primed in the national and international press went from under 100 to over 500 (151). According to Kim Fridkin et al. the media’s spin was a significant factor in the third debate. They found that media coverage concerning Senator Kerry’s response to one question on whether homosexuality was a choice affected citizens’ evaluations of the candidate. In the post debate coverage, the tone “in newspapers, on the Internet, and on television was uniformly negative in its assessment of Senator Kerry’s comments” (Fridkin et al. 30). The impact of this negative framing was sufficiently strong to override positive evaluations of Kerry held by those who watched the debate. In sum, the “perfect storm of media coverage lessened the bounce that Senator Kerry received from the actual debate and led people to develop negative impressions of Kerry a mere three weeks before Election Day” (Fridkin 43). Despite these liabilities, Kerry should have counterattacked the media spin zone. He should have “counterpunched,” as noted by Drew Westen, priming the media that he was “a different kind of Democrat”—“one who knows when it’s time to take off the gloves” (337). Westen’s advice is echoed in Druckman’s call for further research in this area as well as by his own research findings. The media’s framing and priming led to negative evaluations of Kerry, which afforded him the opportunity to prime his “image” in a counterattack, as Druckman suggests (1183). Overcoming the Wedge Issues of the Media Spin Zone President Obama, however, orchestrates a different outcome in dealing with the media spin zone attack against him which centered on a “wedge” or “us verses them” issue. Iyengar and McGrady note that “wedge issues are designed to pit groups against each other, to appeal to voters’ sense of group identity” (145). However, they define wedge issues within the context of presidential spin zones; thus, the candidate or the president would be framing the “us versus them” topic. In this instance,

The Trump administration, following the Obama administration, criticized previous administrations' security policies toward China, heralding the emergence of a groundbreaking strategy. Biden also criticized the Trump administration's security policy toward China from the time of his presidential nomination, implying the emergence of various containment policies. In this study, the Trump and Biden administration's China security policies were examined and compared with an emphasis on the integrated deterrence declared by the Biden government. The Trump and Biden administrations simultaneously pointed to China as a country that would undermine US interests. Accordingly, the two governments pursued a containment policy against China to maintain a US-centered international order. The Trump administration pursued a reckless alliance strategy based on the US-first principle as its integration policy and maintained multilateral security cooperation centered on the Indo-Pacific strategy as its deterrence policy. The Biden government maintained an ideological alliance strategy based on alliance priority as an integration policy and sought multilateral security cooperation by adding the NATO alliance to the Indo-Pacific strategy as a deterrence policy. The US anti-China policy can be divided into integration and suppression, and the detailed strategies applied at this time covered nonmilitary and military areas. Therefore, this study investigated the possibility of applying the entire military or nonmilitary domain to the scope of the analysis of the theory of integration and deterrence within the framework of international relations.

The transition from resistance to acceptance of birth control in the US can be characterized as a 3 stage process with each period facing its own issues and choices. The 1st stage -- the fight over birth control in the early 20th century -- has been documented by historians like James Reed Linda Gordon and David Kennedy. A 2nd stage approximately the years from 1936-60 has not been fully explored although the period was crucial in shaping the current system of contraceptive health care. This discussion focuses on this transitional period particularly its 1st decade 1936-47. Physicians attitudes as revealed through American Medical Association (AMA) policy and a national survey conducted in 1947 are considered in relation to reported data on clinic and private practice. This evidence reveals that despite the liberalization of laws and public opinion in the mid-1930s contraception did not become widely available until after 1960 -- the beginning of the 3rd stage in the history of American contraception -- and that the restriction of birth control information during the period was traceble in large part to the medical profession. Analysis of the 1936-47 decade particularly with regard to the concerns of doctors provides a framework for understanding the forces that affected contraceptive health care in the mid 20th century and suggests conditions that continue to shape the politics of birth control. In 1936 when the AMAs committee on contraception submitted its 1st report it was clear that legal and public opinion had moved decisively toward more liberal attitudes concerning birth control. In 1937 the AMA passed a qualified endorsement of birth control indicating that the organized medical profession as represented by the AMA held views on birth control at the beginning of the 2nd stage that were more conservative than those of most middle-class Americans. Its conservatism was challenged by lay groups who threatened to circumvent standard office practice if physicians failed to modify their views. Public opinion and behavior thus had a demonstrable effect on medical attitudes. 10 years after the AMA resolution a suvey found that more than 2/3 of physicians approved of contraception for any married women who requested it. The 1937-47 period witnessed 2 important changes in medical attitudes toward contraception: the professions public though cautious endorsement of birth control; and the apparent adoption of liberalized standards for the prescription of contraceptive materials. The period also was a time of tremendous growth for the new birth control clinics that offered services to women who could not afford private care. Available evidence suggests that physicians attitudes toward contraception and particularly toward birth control clinics were more important than either laws or public opinion in limiting the availability of those contraceptives considered most efficient (and most compatible with sexual pleasure) between 1936-60.

Informing a Nation: The Newspaper Presidency of Thomas Jefferson

Applying critical realism to the COVID-19 pandemic to improve management of future public health crises.

The article analyzes how the attitude of the Finnish population to Finland’s policy of military non-alignment correlates with the official foreign strategy. The question of public opinion can act as a possible sociocultural tool for its change is examined. The author explains the main reasons for the formation of stable public opinion in favor of neutrality, based on national and cultural identity. The role of public opinion in the Finnish internal debate on the «NATO option» is shown. The thesis that public opinion plays only an auxiliary role in comparison with external circumstances affecting the foreign policy of Finland, which is widespread in research circles, is considered. The author argues that public opinion on Finland’s possible entry into NATO is crucial in two key ways. First, at present, it’s a factor supporting the stable foreign policy decision, which is carried out by the state government. Secondly, in the future, public opinion may become a factor capable, under certain conditions of having a significant impact on the change of the Finnish course in foreign and security policy. The second option assumes that public opinion can play its own role by changing the pre-planned foreign policy scenario.

The peculiarities of Swiss security policy since the end of the Cold War are best explained not through Switzerland's structural position but through its unique strategic culture. Compared to other European neutrals, there are three particular idiosyncratic expressions of Switzerland's neutrality: strict adherence to institutional non-alignment in Swiss foreign and security policy; the Swiss army's militia principle; and the Swiss system of civil defence. Given their relative persistence despite radical changes in the strategic environment, these idiosyncrasies deserve more research attention and more theoretical scrutiny. This article argues that an examination of Swiss strategic culture, based on historical and identity narratives as well as public opinion, best explains the puzzle of distinctiveness. The article highlights the importance of the vernacular in conceptualizations of strategic culture, and explores the explanatory utility of strategic culture compared to explanations based on realist or institutional factors derived from rationalist theories. Strategic culture reveals current constraints imposed upon policymakers as well as ideological resources available for new directions in security policy. This analysis shows there is little room within Swiss strategic culture for a transformation of security policy, but there are opportunities for a discursive transformation of Swiss identity and strategic culture that allow for a better use of strategic and military resources.

The global reaction to US President Donald Trump's executive order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” of January 27, 2017,1revealed great public sympathy for the fate of refugees and the principle of refugee protection. In the case of Europe, such sympathy has, however, been dismissed by politicians who have read concerns regarding security and integration as reason for introducing restrictive policies on asylum and humanitarian assistance. These policies are at odds with public sentiment. Drawing upon public opinion surveys conducted by Amnesty International, the European Social Survey (ESS), and Pew Global Attitudes Survey across the European Union and neighboring states, this article records a marked divide between public attitudes towards the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and official policies regarding asylum and humanitarian assistance, and seeks to understand why this is the case.The article suggests that post-9/11 there has been a reconfiguration of refugee policy and a reconnecting of humanitarian and security interests which has enabled a discourse antithetical to the universal right to asylum. It offers five possible explanations for this trend: i) fears over cultural antagonism in host countries; ii) the conflation of refugees and immigrants, both those deemed economically advantageous as well as those labelled as “illegal”; iii) dominance of human capital thinking; iv) foreign policy justification; and v) the normalization of border controls. The main conclusion is that in a post-post-Cold War era characterized in part by the reconnecting of security and humanitarian policy, European governments have developed restrictive policies despite public sympathy. Support for the admission of refugees is not, however, unqualified, and most states and European populations prefer skilled populations that can be easily assimilated. In order to achieve greater protection and more open policies, this article recommends human rights actors work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners to challenge the above discourse through media campaigns and grassroots messaging. Further recommendations include:• Challenging efforts to normalize and drawing attention to the extreme and unprecedented activities of illegal and inhumane practices, e.g., detention, offshore processing, and the separation of families through the courts as part of a coordinated information campaign to present a counter moral argument.• Identifying how restrictive asylum policies fail to advance foreign policy interests and are contrary to international law.• Evidencing persecution by sharing information with the press and government agencies on the nature of claims by those currently considered ineligible for refugee protection as part of a wider campaign of information and inclusion.• Engaging with minority, and in particular Muslim, communities to redress public concerns regarding the possibility of cultural integration in the host country.• Clarifying the rights of refugees and migrants in line with the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) guidelines and European and national law in order to hold governments to account and to ensure that all — irrespective of their skills, status, nationality or religion — are given the opportunity to seek asylum.• Identifying and promoting leadership among states and regional bodies to advance the rights of refugees.