BOOK REVIEWS

IN THE ARMS OF AFRICA: THE LIFE OF COLIN M. TURNBULL. Roy Richard Grinker. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, xiv + 354pp., $27.95. Reviewed by R. A. Horne. HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICS. James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Reissued in paperback 2001. x + 212 pp. Reviewed by Ralph Wedgwood. CREATIVITY: WHERE THE DIVINE AND HUMAN MEET. Fr. Matthew Fox. Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, pb, 2002, $21.95. Reviewed by R. A. Horne.

Review article: Discourses on law in policing David Dixon (1997) Law in Policing. Legal Regulation and Police Practices, Oxford: Oxford University Press, xviii + 365pp. hb, £40.00. Harry Avis (1999) Drugs and Life, Fourth Edition, WCB/McGraw‐Hill. 260 pages. £34.99. Nicholas Dorn (Ed.) (1999) Regulating European Drug Problems, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 302 pages. Karim Murji (1998) Policing Drugs, Aldershot Ashgate. 195 pages. £35.00. Nigel South (Ed.) (1999) Drugs Cultures, Controls and Everyday Life, London: Sage. 164 pages. £45.00/£14.99. Hate crime controversy: Opposing views on hate crime legislation and enforcement practices Violent Racism: Victimisation, Policing and Social Context. Benjamin Bowling (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1998, XL+ £35 hbk/E14.95 pbk, 377 pp. Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics. James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter (New York: Oxford University Press). 1998, £35 hbk, 212 pp.

<i>Hate Crimes: New Social Movements and the Politics of Violence</i>. Valerie Jenness , Kendal Broad<i>Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics</i>. James Jacobs , Kimberly Potter

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW By JANET DINE, JAMES GOBERT, & WILLIAM WILSON [Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2006 xxx + 680pp., £29.99 (paperback)] ELLIOTT & WOOD'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW By MICHAEL J. ALLEN and SIMON COOPER [Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed., 2006, lxv + 897pp., £28.95 (paperback)] SMITH & HOGAN'S CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS By DAVID ORMEROD [Oxford University Press, 2006, 9th ed., 1v + 979pp., £26.99 (paperback)] ALCOHOL AND CRIME By GAVIN DINGWALL [Willan Publishing, 2006, viii +216pp., £35.00 (hardback)] MURDER By SHANI D'CRUZE, SANDRA WALKLATE and SAMANTHA PEGG [Willan Publishing, 2006, x + 178pp., (including references and index), £40.00 (hardback) £17.99 (paperback)] JACOBS & WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS By CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C. A. WHITE [Oxford University Press, 2006, 4th ed., 591 pp., £32.99 (paperback)] CHESHIRE AND BURN'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY By E. H. BURN and J. CARTWRIGHT [Oxford University Press, 2006, 17th ed., 1091 pp., £39.99 (paperback)] PLANNING LAW & PRACTICE By J. CAMERON BLACKHALL [Cavendish Publishing, 2005, 3rd ed., 448 pp., £28.95 (paperback)] UNDERSTANDING THE LAW By GEOFFREY RIVLIN, [Oxford University Press, 2006, 4th ed., 362pp., £14.99 (paperback)] KEY CONCEPTS IN LAW By IAN MCLEOD [Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 260pp., £11.99 (paperback)] OSBORN'S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY EDITED By MICK WOODLEY [Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, 10th edn, 492pp., £9.95 (paperback)]

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I thank Dennis Patterson for comments on this manuscript.] 1 R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007). [Bracketed page numbers in the text refer to this volume.] 2 Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code (New York: Foundation Press, 2005), 5. 3 I thank Chris Emrich for this point. 4 17 So.2d 427 (1944). Duff discusses the British analogue [59]. 5 Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 6 Duff also discusses the mala in se/ mala prohibita distinction and gives a defense of how even mala prohibita offenses can constitute wrongs [166–74]. 7 This hostility is the normative assessment of the meaning of the action as opposed to an occurrent desire state [149–150]. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Holistic Culpability,” Cardozo Law Review 28 (2007): 2523–43. 8 Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 4th ed. (New York: Matthew Bender 2006): 133–34; Michael Moore, “Intentions and Mens Rea,” in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart, ed. Ruth Gavison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 245–70. 9 Cf. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (knowledge of an attendant circumstance suffices for acting purposefully toward that element). 10 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 11 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Beyond Intention,” Cardozo Law Review 29 (2008): 1147–91. 12 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen J. Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 13 Duff notes that “[a]ttacks typically endanger their objects” [150]. 14 See George P. Fletcher, “The Nature of Justification,” in Action and Value in Criminal Law, ed. Stephen Shute, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 175–186. 15 At one point, Duff argues against the conduct-cause harm model, stating “if we are to label offenses fairly, in ways that capture the wrongfulness in virtue of which they are criminalized, we must eschew the aetiolated language of harm and its causation in favour of a richer, morally laden language of thick concepts that captures the moral contours of the actions in question, reflecting not merely the harm that is caused, but the wrongful injury that is done, and the way, context and spirit in which it is done” [155]. 16 For support of my view, see quoted text in note 15. 17 John Gardner and Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th Series, ed. Jeremy Horder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 193–217. 18 Land v. Indiana, 802 N.E.2d 45 (Ind. Ct. Appeals 2004). 19 Lozano v. State, 860 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 20 Alexander and Ferzan, chapt. 8; see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Arson and the Special Part,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (2009): 97. 21 Duff admits that this is the way that offense definitions for endangerments would work [156]. Additional informationNotes on contributorsKimberly Kessler FerzanKimberly Kessler Ferzan is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law-Camden

The Name of Hate

Early in the 1980s, a new category of crime appeared in the criminal law lexicon. In response to what was said to be an epidemic of prejudice-motivated violence, Congress and many state legislatures passed a wave of “hate crime ” laws that required the collection of statistics and enhanced the punishment of crimes motivated by certain prejudices. This book places in socio-legal perspective both the hate crime problem and society’s response to it. From the outset, Jacobs and Potter adopt a sceptical if not critical stance. They argue that hate crime is a hopelessly muddled concept and that legal definitions of the term are riddled with ambiguity and subjectivity. Moreover, no matter how hate crime is defined, the authors find no evidence to support the claim that the US is experiencing a hate crime epidemic--nor that the number or rate of hate crimes is at an historic zenith. Furthermore, assert the authors, the federal effort to establish a hate crime accounting system has been a failure. The authors argue that hate crime as a socio-legal category represents the elaboration of an identity politics that manifests itself in many areas of the law. However, the attempt to apply the anti-discrimination paradigm to criminal law generates a number of problems and anomalies. The underlying conduct that hate crime law prohibits is already subject to criminal punishment. Jacobs and Potter maintain that there is no persuasive rationale for saying that hate crimes are “worse “ or “more serious “ than similar crimes attributable to other anti-social motivations. Also, they argue that the effort to single out hate crime for greater punishment, in effect, is an effort to punish some offenders more seriously because of their bad beliefs, opinions, or values, thus implicating the First Amendment. Jabobs and Potter show that the recriminalization of hate crime has little (if any) value with respect to law enforcement or criminal justice. Indeed, enforcement of such laws may in fact exacerbate intergroup tensions rather than eradicate prejudice.

KEY CASES: CONTRACT LAW By CHRIS TURNER (141pp.) KEY CASES: CRIMINAL LAW By JACQUELINE MARTIN (168pp.) KEY CASES: THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM By JACQUELINE MARTIN (112pp.) KEY CASES: EQUITY AND TRUSTS By JUDITH BRAY (188pp.) KEY CASES: EU LAW By CHRIS TURNER (141pp.) KEY CASES: LAND LAW By JUDITH BRAY (148pp.) KEY CASES: TORT LAW By CHRIS TURNER (144pp.) [Hodder Arnold, all 2006, £6.99 each (paperback)] GCSE LAW By JACQUELINE MARTIN [Hodder Arnold, 2005, 3rd ed., xv + 320pp., £14.99 (paperback)] AQA LAW FOR AS By JACQUELINE MARTIN [Hodder Arnold, 2005, 2nd ed., xvi + 272pp., £14.99 (paperback)] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS By IAN LOVELAND [Oxford University Press, 2006, 4th ed., xxxv + 832pp., £28.99 (paperback)] CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW By A. W. BRADLEY AND K. D. EWING [Pearson Education, 2006, 14th ed., lxxiv + 872pp., £33.99 (paperback)] TEXTBOOK ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS By RICHARD STONE [Oxford University Press, 2006, 6th ed., xl + 528pp., £25.99 (paperback)] CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS By ALISTAIR MOWBRAY [Oxford University Press, 2007, 2nd ed., xxxviii + 1058pp., £31.99 (paperback)] TEXTBOOK ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW By GINA CLAYTON [Oxford University Press, 2006, 2nd ed., 664pp., £26.99 (paperback)] EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS By DAMIAN CHALMERS, CHRISTOS HADJIEMMANUIL, GIORGIO MONTI AND ADAM TOMKINS [Cambridge University Press, 2006, 1362pp., £35.00 (paperback)] EUROPEAN UNION LAM By M. HORSPOOL AND M. HUMPHREYS [Oxford University Press, 2006, 4th ed., cii + 527pp., £19.99 (paperback)] LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY By D. J. GALLIGAN [Oxford University Press, 2007, xi + 380pp., £45.00 (hardback) £18.99 (paperback)] SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND THE LAW By SIMON OLIVER (Jordans, 2007, 2nd ed., 366pp., £35.00 (paperback)] EMPLOYMENT LAW By GWYNETH PITT [Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, 6th ed., 468pp., £24.95 (paperback)] CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW By WILLIAM CORNISH [Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, 5th ed., 744pp., £36.95 (paperback)] AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW By SIMON GARDNER [Hart Publishing, 2007, xxxv + 343pp., £16.95 (paperback)] LEX AQUILIA, GIORNALE DIDATTICO E SELEZIONE DI GIURISPRUDENZA SULL'ILLECITO EXTRACONTRATTUALE, By GIOVANNI PASCUZZI (ed.), [Zanichelli, Bologna, 96pp., €14.80, (softback)] WINFIELD AND JOIDWICZ ON TORT By W. V H. ROGERS [Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, 2006, 17th ed., ciii + 1143pp., £32.00 (paperback)] HEALTH CARE LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS By JEAN MCHALE, MARIE FOX AND MICHAEL GUNN AND STEPHEN WILKINSON [Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, 2nd ed., 1204pp., £35.95 (paperback)] MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS By JONATHAN HERRING [Oxford University Press, 2006, 720pp., £24.99 (paperback)] INVENTING FEAR OF CRIME: CRIMINOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF ANXIETY By MURRAY LEE [Willan Publishing, 2007, 237pp., £45.00 (hardback) £22.00 (paperback)] YOUTH JUSTICE: IDEAS, POLICY, PRACTICE By ROGER SMITH [Willan Publishing, 2007, 2nd ed., 258pp., £19.50 (paperback)] HANDBOOK ON PRISONS EDITED By YVONNE JEWKES [Willan Publishing, 2007, xxx + 778pp., £67.50 (hardback); £31.50 (Paperback)]

This paper began life as part of a longer paper, versions of which were read at MIT (May, 1997), Stanford (October, 1997), the University of Michigan (December, 1997), and the Classical Seminar in Corpus Christi College, Oxford (June, 1998). A version of the present paper was presented at Cornell's Society for the Humanities (March, 1999), and at the Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, held at University College, London (November, 1999). I thank the audiences on these occasions for helpful comments, especially Jean-Marie Beyssade, Chris Bobonich, Justin Broackes, Lesley Brown, David Charles, Ed Curley, Stephen Everson, Dan Garber, Louis Loeb, Gisela Striker, and Ralph Wedgwood. Thanks are also due to Carl Ginet, who saved me from a mistake and suggested a way to repair it; to Michael Ayers, Al-Quassim Cassam, and Zoltdn Szab6 for stimulating discussion; to Julia Annas, both for stimulating discussion and for showing me her as yet unpublished paper Hume and Ancient Scepticism, which has influenced my paper a lot; to Charles Brittain for stimulating discussion and helpful written comments; to an anonymous referee for, and the then editors of, the Philosophical Revieur, and to Christopher Taylor, my commentator at the Keeling Colloquium. Marjorie Grene's paper, Descartes and Ancient Skepticism, Review of Metaphysics 52 (1999): 553-71, reached me only after my paper had been completed; I regret that I was not able to take account of it. 1See (to take only a few of many examples) M. F. Burnyeat, Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism? in Skeptical Tradition, ed. M. F. Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 117-48, at 118-19 (originally published in Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1980), 2053);J. Annas andJ. Barnes, Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 7-8; B. Mates, Pyrrhonism and Modern Scepticism: Similarities and Differences, in Philosophie, Psycholoanalyse, Emigration, ed. P. Muhr, P. Feyeraband, C. Wegeler (Vienna: WUV-Universitatsverlag, 1992), 210-28, at 219-21; R. Hankinson, Sceptics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1995), 21-23; S. Gaukroger, The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Myth of Ancient Scepticism, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 371-87, and his Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1995), 310ff. However, the claim is often qualified. Annas and Barnes, for example, say

Lord, Errol. <i>The Importance of Being Rational</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 288. $60.00 (cloth).

In the UK and USA ‘Hate crime’ has become a topic of public controversy and social mobilization around issues of violence and harassment. This has largely but not exclusively addressed racism, homophobia and gender based violence. This article has three objectives. First, to situate hate crime legislation within a broad theory of modernity;secondly to examine the politics of its emergence as a public issue; thirdly to use data from the authors' recent research in Greater Manchester to illuminate the complexity of the concept of ‘hate crime’. The centrality of ‘hate crime’ to current debates derives from the importance of rights-based regulation of complex societies and the juridical management of emotional life. Hatred and violence have become problematic behaviour thrown into relief by a long term civilizing process. Hate crimes have thus acquired powerful rhetorical focus for mobilization of victim and identity politics. With reference to racist violence in Oldham and elsewhere in Greater Manchester, we argue that in its application and construction, however, ‘hate crime’ is a complex phenomenon that might dramatize rather than regulate the problems it seeks to address.

The first person to be found guilty of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was Jean-Paul Akayesu, the bourgmestre 1 of Taba Commune in Gitarama.2 The prefecture of Git...

Changes in the international situation during the last decades have become the reason for new conflicts and aggravations at the national level. The 2015 European migrant crisis (Refugee crisis), 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine have become a catalyst for increase in hate crimes. In order to recognize the criminal offense as a hate crime in the sense of the Latvian regulatory framework, it is necessary to establish two criteria: (a) the composition of the criminal offence is included in the Criminal Law; (b) a motive of hatred against a particular protected group of society can be stated in the criminal offence. It is the motive – hate or prejudice – that distinguishes hate crimes from other types of crimes.Prejudice is a negative assessment of a social group and its members. These are objectively unfounded assumptions and erroneous generalizations that, in the opinion of the offender, separate the representatives of this group from the rest of society. Persistent prejudices are called stereotypes. Unlike prejudice, stereotypes are not necessarily negative in nature. However, stereotypes are not based on objective truth either. It follows from court practice that hate crimes were directed against several groups of Latvian society: against ethnic groups (Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Gypsies or Roma, etc.), against representatives of various religious denominations, against asylum seekers, against people from other countries, against sexual minorities as well as against other groups. Stereotypes are often based on personal or negative cultural experiences of previous generations.In this context, it can be mentioned that it is specifically culture that is the basic factor according to which it is possible to understand, identify and reduce hate speech. Professor Aleksandrs Krugļevskis believed that with a change in cultural understanding, expanding public participation in cultural processes, the level of legal awareness will rise and tendencies, intentions to commit a criminal offense will disappear. Criminal law as a cultural factor creates a system that corresponds to the level of education and culture of the people. The above also corresponds to the vision of Latvia’s cohesive society policy “Guidelines for Cohesive and Active Civil Society 2021–2027”: mutual trust, participation, and cooperation between different social groups have improved among Latvian residents, and the level of tolerance has increased, stereotypes and prejudices against different social group representatives have decreased.Statistical data show that since the start of the war in Ukraine, the number of registered hate crimes in Latvia has increased. These show the relevance of the chosen topic. The authors of the article offer their vision of the problem of hate crimes, studying hate crimes as a cultural phenomenon, paying special attention to the experience of Latvian society in this area.

This article explores how bias crimes differ from parallel crimes and why this distinction makes a crucial difference in our criminal law. Bias crimes differ from parallel crimes as a matter of both the resulting harm and the mental state of the offender. The nature of the injury sustained by the immediate victim of a bias crime exceeds the harm caused by a parallel crime. Moreover, bias crimes inflict a palpable harm on the broader target community of the crime as well as on society at large. The distinction between bias crimes and parallel crimes also concerns the perpetrator's state of mind and, specifically, his bias motivation toward his victim. Bias motivation is an essential element of criminal liability and the greater level of harm caused warrants their enhanced punishment. The punishment of an individual offender for the commission of a bias crime, however, is warranted by the state of mind with which he acts. Part I of this article discusses the differences between bias crimes and parallel crimes and explores the distinctiveness of perpetrators and victims of bias crimes along with the impact of bias crimes beyond that on the immediate victim. After establishing a typology of positive bias crime law, the author discusses the outward manifestations of these crimes. Part II demonstrates that bias crimes ought to be punished more severely than parallel crimes. Part III considers the aspects of bias crimes that are relevant in the punishment of an individual offender. Whereas the harm caused by bias crimes generally justifies the enhanced punishment of these crimes, the resulting harm to a particular victim does not, in and of itself, warrant the enhanced punishment of the perpetrator. Bias motivation of the perpetrator, and not necessarily the resulting harm to the victim, is the critical factor in determining an individual's guilt for a bias crime. The author concludes that the discriminatory selection model of bias crimes is an insufficient theory of bias crime, whereas the racial animus model offers a far richer theory. Discriminatory selection of a victim may often provide important evidence of racial animus, and in some instances even fully persuasive evidence. But selection ought to play the role of proof for animus and not the greater role of element for guilt.

The report provides an overview and comparison of key developments in two areas of hate crime policy in Poland: data collection and criminal law. By doing so, it seeks to shed light on the role of international organizations in developing national hate crime measures. It is the first report of its kind with a particular focus on the role of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) – the most specialized of all international institutions dealing with hate crime. The purpose of this report is to develop concrete policy recommendations, based on an analysis of ongoing efforts, to key stakeholders involved in the work on advancing the response to hate crime in Poland.Key findings include: - International organizations, through periodic reviews and other mechanisms, have a significant influence on Poland’s response to hate crimes.- This influence is visible in the area of hate crime data collection. While a number of actors have been active in this domain, creating an effect of synergy, the influence of supranational bodies seems instrumental.- Despite on-going debates, the legal framework on hate crimes has not changed.- The lack of progress in this area can be linked with the fact that the bulk of the efforts was on the shoulders of civil society organizations, which lack the leverage that supranational bodies have.- Cooperation between Polish civil society organizations and supranational bodies, aimed at amplifying civil society demands with regard to hate crime, seems to be an effective strategy.- ODIHR had an instrumental role in improving Poland’s data collection mechanisms, but was absent from the debate on the amendment of the Criminal Code. Civil society organizations were not aware of ODIHR’s mandate in this area and the possible role it could play.The report suggests that through active cooperation with civil society, not limited to hate crime reporting only, ODIHR may be able to identify possible new ways to support the state in countering hate crime. For the moment, civil society organizations in Poland and ODIHR, while cooperating in some areas, “forget” about each other in other areas. For ODIHR, strengthening the cooperation may open channels of communication with political decision makers who are not aware of ODIHR’s mandate, for example in the area of legislative support. For civil society, this could mean receiving tangible support in the area where support is most needed.