Book review: T. Usewicz (2023), Morskie aspekty bezpieczeństwa i obrony UE (The Maritime Aspects of EU Security and Defence), Łódź, 289 pages

This book set out to provide a comprehensive understanding of EU maritime foreign and security policies, asking to what extent, how, and why the EU is a maritime power in the making. The studies confirm that the EU indeed is becoming a maritime global power. The EU amongst other things now has its own Maritime Security Strategy with a functioning and comprehensive action plan, two major ongoing military naval operations, to a large degree acts with one voice at the international scene, and it has taken important in steps in the development of an Arctic policy. In the maritime domain, the EU is no longer only a soft power but increasingly uses military means to respond to new security threats and challenges, also known as ‘soft threats’ such as piracy and migration. The high number of planned actions agreed in the EUMSS and action plan as well as the maritime focus in the EU’s new Global Strategy suggests that we can expect maritime integration and cooperation, including in the military domain, to continue to grow in the years to come. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the US’ more reluctant tone towards guaranteeing Europe’s defence will only serve to push this development further. After all, EU leaders have already agreed to deepen cooperation on security and defence in the face of these events (European Council 2017). The findings in this book are thus important also for our understanding of the EU as such. Being the only remaining intergovernmental policy area in the EU and the one most strongly linked to member states’ sovereignty, EU foreign and security policies have been referred as a sine qua non in order to achieve full European integration. And EU maritime foreign and security policy indeed takes collective European security policies a substantial step forward. In times where some commentators have questioned the EU’s very survival, the findings in this book in other words lead to the opposite prediction—of more rather than less EU integration in the face of new security threats and challenges. This chapter sums up the book’s main finding and discusses their broader empirical and analytical implications.

This article identifies previously ignored determinants of public support for the European Union's security and defence ambitions. In contrast to public opinion vis‐à‐vis the EU in general, the literature on attitudes towards a putative European army or the existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) suggests that the explanatory power of sociodemographic and economic variables is weak, and focuses instead on national identity as the main determinant of one's support. This article explores the possible impact of strategic culture, and argues that preferences vis‐à‐vis the EU's security and defence ambitions are formed in part through pre‐existing social representations of security. To test this proposition, ‘national’ strategic cultures are disaggregated and a typology is produced that contains four strategic postures: pacifism, traditionalism, humanitarianism and globalism. Applying regression analysis on individual‐level Eurobarometer survey data, it is found that strategic postures help explain both the general level of support for CSDP and support for specific Petersberg tasks.

The EU has no strategic culture and has only recently begun to develop something which is termed a general strategy but which is a policy document devoid of analysis of strategic interaction. The EU now wants a European army and a defence union, and the Commission President Juncker even states that soft power—the hallmark of the EU as a ‘different policy actor’—is not enough. Yet the policy behind these words is meagre: the EU has various policies that will enhance military cooperation and funding for such, but it is all on a voluntary basis. This ‘bottom-up’ method will not result in a strategic culture which is premised on ‘top-down’ unitary action. However, France remains a joker in the deck: it wants the EU to be able to act strategically with hard power. On the migration case, the EU was utterly unable to act according to the Dublin rules and a common distribution-of-refugees policy, but was the chosen locus for German-initiated outsourcing of border closures and controls. On Russia, the EU is the seat of sanctions, but these were imposed by the US.

Indo-Pacific has been among the most contested regions in the past decade. After China demonstrated its ambitious goal in reviving maritime silk road with its military and economic presence, United States, India, Japan, and Australia formed a new coalition to counter this strategy. This paper aims to examine the position of Indonesia as a traditional regional maritime power in the context of this changing maritime landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, this paper develops the concept of “the three faces of maritime power” which distinguishes maritime power into hard, soft, and normative maritime power. The findings of this paper indicates that Indonesia demonstrates less of its hard and soft power, but it capitalizes on its normative power to demonstrate its presence in the new maritime landscape of the Indo Pacific

Alliances can contribute to the partners’ capability development either by allowing them to learn from each other, resulting in the partner capabilities becoming more similar, or by facilitating th...

The aim of the paper is to study the European Union’s geoeconomics policy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent times, the Indo-Pacific has been gaining attention of the global economic powers. On this issue, the EU has launched a cooperation policy in the IndoPacific. This study examines the EU’s comprehensive strategy for the expansion of its presence in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The EU wants economic and security partnerships among the Indo-Pacific countries. Among the EU member states, the French government is much enthusiastic about strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The European Union’s policy has been operating in the regions as an instrument of soft and hard power. The research highlighted that the EU implies the construction of structural strategic networks to intensify the high capacities in the projection of power. The EU uses the key approaches of hard and soft power to achieve transatlantic goals. The comparative case study method is useful to know the objectives and results of the research. In conclusion, the EU needs to establish a much stronger relationship among the pacific countries to counter the Chinese aggression and expansion in maritime diplomacy.

For state actors, the sea constitutes a medium that allows projecting security beyond one’s own external boundary, for which the projection of power and forces is central (e.g. forward presence, carrier air strikes, and amphibious operations). However, projecting security through the sea goes beyond national security objectives to include human, societal, regional, and global security concerns, since naval operations are not restricted to interstate wars (e.g. humanitarian operations, naval diplomacy). In addition, projecting security is also about projecting norms into the maritime domain and onto the land.

As a powerful littoral state with important security interests in the Black Sea, Russia has the ability to use the maritime domain to advance and protect its interests, which will affect regional and international security. Using the currently available literature, this essay examines the three factors that shape and affect Russia’s maritime power in the Black Sea: quantitative factors such as the number and capability of maritime platforms as well as access to maritime infrastructure; qualitative factors such as the morale of maritime personnel; and the strategic context in which Russia exercises its maritime power. It argues that Russian maritime power is likely to decline significantly. Not only will Russia have significantly fewer maritime platforms in the future, but its ability to use the maritime domain will be compromised by qualitative problems and poor relations with the United States and littoral states such as Georgia and Romania.

This article examines how Indonesia’s strategic culture – shaped by its historical experience of military dominance and internal security priorities – has constrained the development of national cyber capabilities. Despite the country’s growing digital interdependence and rhetorical commitment to digital transformation, cyber defense remains under-resourced and reactive. Drawing on a review of primary materials, the article argues that enduring inward-looking threat perceptions continue to marginalize state-sponsored cyber threats in policy discourse. By situating Indonesia’s cyber posture in its post-authoritarian context, the article sheds light on how domestic legacies shape national responses to emerging digital security challenges.

If there has ever been time for comprehensive reassessment of Moscow's foreign policy, the time is now. Since 2014, Russia's annexation of Crimea and campaigns in Ukraine and Syria have highlighted the country's military resurgence and marked turning point in Russo-Western relations, necessitating ways of thinking about Russia's role in the world. Bobo Lo's Russia and the New World Disorder takes on an ambitious agenda of analyzing and positioning Russia's foreign policy in the context of global conditions where notions of power and international leadership are transformed. Lo's book makes threefold contribution: conceptualizing the world order, or rather, the new world disorder; analyzing the process and apparatus of foreign policymaking; and assessing Moscow's policies, capabilities, and prospects in this global context.Lo's world disorder is an effort to conceptualize the increasingly evident gap between the expectations of the early 1990s for unipolar world led by sole superpower, the United States, and the realities of the 2010s. China's rise, Russia's resurgence, and the United States' more constrained power and leadership in the global arena have raised discussions in some camps (particularly in Moscow) of world led by multiple great powers. Lo unpacks these myths of the decline of the West and multipolar demonstrating that these global conditions are less about multipolarity than conditions of constant change and instability where soft power and small nations matter more than ever before. Moreover, the so-called poles are underwhelming. China has not been willing to take on greater global leadership, while Russia's capabilities are significantly limited. In this world, Lo shows that an ability to perform under conditions and embrace change will matter more for foreign policymaking than Russia's perceived great-power status, sense of entitlement to sphere of influence, or even traditional military might.Lo also offers holistic look at foreign policymaking, examining Moscow's worldview, the different actors involved, and the political culture as well as structural factors, the role of events, and other changing conditions. The examination of the Kremlin's decision-making apparatus and highlighting of the areas of responsibility for key subordinates such as Igor Sechin or Sergei Lavrov are particularly useful. Too often analysts focus on the overwhelming power of Vladimir Putin, the personalization of the regime, and the opaqueness of the Kremlin's decision-making, leading to generic terms such as regime or Moscow. Lo emphasizes the role of deeper structural factors within foreign policymaking, such as geography and history, which contribute to the country's identity as an empire and civilization and are responsible for its national humiliation complex and sense of being wronged by lost status. The resulting political mindset is a strategic culture in which hard power is paramount (p. 19).In this comprehensive assessment of the main drivers, actors, and tools of foreign policy, it would have been useful to award more attention to the unique hallmarks of Putin's foreign policymaking-the use of energy influence; creation of transnational networks of commercial and ideological interest groups; soft-power efforts, particularly toward the Russian world; and information warfare campaigns.1 While Russia's soft power and status fall far short of its ambitions and those of the United States, the Kremlin has been largely successful in garnering gains by combining hard- and soft-power methods in the annexation of Crimea, the destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the Russo-Georgian war, ongoing efforts at subversion in Moldova and the Baltic states, and, among others, its recent information warfare campaign against Germany leveraging the European refugee crisis.One of the book's most valuable contributions is unpacking the dichotomy between Russia's rhetoric regarding the world and the reality of Moscow's Western-centric foreign policy. …

Part 1 Conceptualizing institutional capacity: collective action and social milieux transforming governance, institutionalist analysis and institutional capacity institutional capacity-building as an issue of collective action and institutionalization - some theoretical and methodological remarks assessing institutional capacity building in a city centre regeneration partnership - Newcastle's Grainger town. Part 2 Governance in action in complex social milieux: introduction - the challenge of building new institutional capacities transformational pathways and institutional capacity building - the case of the German-Polish twin-city Guben/Gubin the tangled web - neighbourhood governance in a post-Fordist era is partnership possible? searching for a new institutional settlement governance, institutional capacity and planning for growth. Part 3 Building new institutional capacities: introduction - creating milieux for collective action compliance and collaboration in urban governance a strategic approach to community planning - re-positioning the statutory development plan sustainable institutional capacity for planning - the West Midlands urban governance in complex societies - challenges of institutional adaptation.

Purpose: This study investigates the role of carbon accounting in Zimbabwe’s climate change mitigation strategy, focusing on how policy frameworks and institutional capacities affect measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV). It examines the integration of carbon accounting into national climate governance and its influence on achieving Zimbabwe’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. Methodology/approach: A qualitative approach was adopted, involving semi-structured interviews with policymakers, Environmental Management Agency regulators, and sustainability officers from key industries. National climate policies, environmental legislation, and carbon audit reports were also analyzed to assess institutional frameworks and reporting practices. Results/findings: Findings reveal that carbon accounting in Zimbabwe remains fragmented and underdeveloped. Limited institutional coordination, capacity gaps, and weak regulatory enforcement impede its effective integration into national planning. Nonetheless, some mining and energy sector entities have initiated voluntary carbon disclosures, motivated by investor and donor expectations. Conclusion: Enhancing coordination and institutional capacity is essential for strengthening carbon accounting practices. Aligning policy intentions with practical implementation is critical to achieving Zimbabwe’s climate objectives. Limitations: The study focused on policy and institutional analyses, excluding quantitative emissions data and project-specific carbon accounting practices. Contribution: This research advances understanding of environmental accountability in Africa by highlighting the policy–institutional link for effective carbon accounting. It provides recommendations for improved governance, standardized reporting, and incentives for carbon disclosures to support Zimbabwe’s climate goals.

In Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Laura Chappell offers a comprehensive comparative analysis of an old and a new EU Member State's perceptions of and contributions to EU security and defence at the beginning of the 21st Century. Utilising a distinct theoretical framework intertwining strategic culture and role theory, this book focuses on change and continuity in Poland and Germany's defence policies. It does this by connecting the political and the military through two case studies on the EU Battlegroup Concept and the European Security Strategy. By analysing these along with each country's general approach to security and defence it is possible to assess in which areas convergence has occurred, where divergences remain and the impact of this on the Common Security and Defence Policy including whether a European strategic culture is developing. This has important implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU as an international security actor

This article examines international collaboration in the Global South, with a focus on Nigerias engagement in multilateral partnerships, South South and triangular cooperation, and bilateral relations. Drawing on policy documents, public opinion surveys, and selected cooperative frameworks involving China, European Union member states, and international institutions, the study situates Nigeria as an active actor shaping development outcomes, institutional capacity, and global governance reforms. Using a qualitative, interpretive approach, the analysis engages broader debates on development cooperation, equity, and international relations. The findings highlight opportunities for knowledge exchange, capacity building, and inclusive development, alongside persistent challenges related to geopolitical asymmetries, domestic policy coherence, and structural inequalities characteristic of the Global South. The article concludes with policy recommendations to better align international collaboration with Nigerias national development objectives.

This chapter examines France’s ambivalent relationship with NATO through the analysis of its strategic culture, conception of multilateralism, and vision of European security. Although France is a founding member of NATO, the transatlantic Alliance has always been only one of the various components of France’s defence policy. The historically rooted goal of strategic autonomy has pushed successive French governments to develop national capabilities and to try and make Europeans more autonomous from the United States and therefore from NATO. At the same time, France has developed close military links with the United States and other allies through capability development or in NATO-led or other types of operations. France has also been active in the Alliance’s renewed commitment to Europe’s territorial defence after 2014. However, NATO has not been France’s preferred vehicle for tackling the most pressing security threats it faces, namely, terrorism or instability in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, France does not see NATO as the primary organization for dealing with the security challenges stemming from new technology or with the rise of China. Overall, France’s multitrack strategic culture and its lukewarm attitude vis-à-vis the Alliance have recurrently led to a sense of strategic loneliness. Domestically, France’s ambivalence is visible in the shaky public support for NATO as well as the outright anti-NATO discourses from many French political figures.