Book Review: Schwarze, T. Space, Urban Politics, and Everyday Life: Henri Lefebvre and the U.S. City SchwarzeT. Space, Urban Politics, and Everyday Life: Henri Lefebvre and the U.S. City. Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, 2023$159.99 (PBK).

Comparative analysis of the impact of religion on liberal political development is hampered by the presumption of secularization in canonical works of historical institutionalism. The prevailing arguments about the origins of liberal political institutions either omit religion completely as a significant factor in political and social life, or presume unique compatibility between Protestant Christianity and liberal democracy. This project challenges both the assumption of secular modernity and Christian exceptionalism as preconditions of liberal political development by examining the debates about religious toleration in early modern England. The toleration debates provide a record of the ideas generated in response to state expansion, and demonstrate the critical role of religion in establishing the modern state as the primary frame of political power. They further illustrate the importance of religious narratives in justifying liberal political principles such as popular sovereignty and accountable government, as well as the fundamental rights to freedom of speech, the press, association and conscience. Drawing upon original readings of pamphlets, newspapers and political tracts from the seventeenth century, I argue that religion promoted political transformation in early modern England not because of the specifics of doctrine or decline in its relevance to social and political life, but because it was the locus of individual experience of state power. The monarchy radically extended its scope and capacity by appropriating the institutional and symbolic resources of the church. It used the church to promote institutional and cultural regularity across the realm. The common experience of civil power through state regulation of religious practice led to the development of a collective interest in securing the right to religious worship that extended across class and regional divisions. The Protestant political identity cultivated by the monarchy in its campaign for religious uniformity created cultural opportunities for political resistance to the state’s encroachment upon communal and individual autonomy. Competing interpretations of the meaning and requirements of this Protestant identity for individuals on one hand, and the requisites of political order and stability on the other, led to a public reconceptualization of the role of government and the rights and responsibilities of political membership.%%%%

Journalism researchers have tended to study journalistic roles from within a Western framework oriented toward the media’s contribution to democracy and citizenship. In so doing, journalism scholarship often failed to account for the realities in non-democratic and non-Western contexts, as well as for forms of journalism beyond political news. Based on the framework of discursive institutionalism, we conceptualize journalistic roles as discursive constructions of journalism’s identity and place in society. These roles have sedimented in journalism’s institutional norms and practices and are subject to discursive (re)creation, (re)interpretation, appropriation, and contestation. We argue that journalists exercise important roles in two domains: political life and everyday life. For the domain of political life, we identify 18 roles addressing six essential needs of political life: informational-instructive, analytical-deliberative, critical-monitorial, advocative-radical, developmental-educative, and collaborative-facilitative. In the domain of everyday life, journalists carry out roles that map onto three areas: consumption, identity, and emotion.

Reviewed by: Friendship without Borders: Women's Stories of Power, Politics, and Everyday Life across East and West Germany by Phil Leask Kara Ritzheimer Friendship without Borders: Women's Stories of Power, Politics, and Everyday Life across East and West Germany. By Phil Leask. New York: Berghahn Books, 2020. Pp. ix + 326. Cloth $149.00. ISBN 9781789206555. On September 1, 1940, a group of teenage girls who were classmates in Schönebeck, a small town in central Germany, "made a solemn promise" to meet ten years hence at the Cathedral Square in nearby Magdeburg. And so, on September 1, 1950, fourteen of these girls, now young women, "gathered in the square, in the shadow of the damaged cathedral" (1). They made two important decisions. First, they would meet annually. Second, they would start and circulate a Rundbrief (circular). From 1950 to 2000, as many as thirty women contributed approximately a thousand letters to this Rundbrief. Nearly half of these former classmates migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) while the other half remained in what became the German Democratic Republic (GDR). These letters form the basis of Phil Leask's 2020 monograph Friendship without Borders: Women's Stories of Power, Politics, and Everyday Life across East and West Germany, alongside interviews the author [End Page 600] conducted with a handful of these women between 2012 and 2016 and photos these women pasted into the Rundbrief. Friendship Without Borders consists of three interwoven histories. The first is a history of these individual women. Contributors shared updates about their children, spouses, parents, homes and gardens, jobs, careers, health, travels, and everyday experiences. The second is a history of women, gender policy, and family policy in both the FRG and the GDR. And the third, which Leask uses to frame each chapter, is the political, social, and economic history of the two Germanies. The book is organized chronologically. It begins in the 1930s and ends in the early 2000s, and each chapter examines a different decade. Leask traces several themes over the course of these fifty years. The first of these is power and agency. Leask is interested in these "nonpolitical" (3) women's sense of agency, their ability and efforts to exercise agency, and the social and political restraints they encountered. He observes that as teenagers, most of these women belonged to the League of German Girls (BDM), an organization the Nazi regime used to "give power at a very local level to hundreds of thousands of young women who were group leaders" (6). It was this sense of power and their ability to build community, he suggests, that led these women to believe they could "build and sustain their own group long after the end of the Nazi regime" (6). The second theme is the shifting position of women in both Germanies and how these particular women understood, at different moments, "what their place was and should be in society" (3). The third theme is that of continuities and ruptures. Leask interestingly observes that women living in the GDR experienced reunification as a larger rupture than Nazi Germany's defeat. In 1945, they had been young and felt capable of starting anew; in 1990, many feared they were too old and financially insecure to start over. Another theme is that of unity. Leask argues that these women hoped that the unity of their group meant that Germany and its people "remained united" despite its—what they hoped was only temporary—division. And finally, Leask explains in the book's introduction that he is eager to identify moments when these women experienced humiliation. Leask uses the Rundbrief skillfully to write an everyday history of the two Germanies, one seen through the eyes of women passing through various life stages. And these women address details that political histories frequently neglect, such as the occupational challenges women encountered in both Germanies, the quality of education and childcare, and the pain of being separated from family members living on the other side of a political boundary. Leask does a fine job of underscoring key factors that increasingly differentiated the experiences of women living in the FRG from those who remained in the GDR. One...

This paper, 'The tree, the Tower and the Shaman', is a bricolage of comment, analysis, critique, oral testimony and myth, the 'subject' of which is the material culture of one specific urban landscape - Claremont Road. My text explores the ways in which a study of material culture offers us an insight into the cultures of resistance that inhabited this particular space in protest against the British National Roads Programme, and similarly, the impli cations of these findings for subsequent critiques of museology, space and 'everyday life'. Claremont Road, whilst functioning as a critique of the 'auto'-(mobile) culture, also functioned as an auto-critique of both the domi nant museum culture and of 'traditional' definitions of material culture. I posit that the culture of resistance created at Claremont, the people who inhabited the space and the rituals performed here functioned as an 'auto' critic of everyday life, and that the art, the artefacts and the landscape itself were purposefully (re)-created to 'display' and to confront this potential. Thus the Claremont Road experience offers an insight, a clarity: a parody, an inversion and a subversion of 'ordinary' perspectives; with this co existed/co-exists alternative visions. What emerges from this study are the various, often competing, ways of seeing and experiencing the urban environment, materiality, democracy, partisan politics, social identities, ritual performance, time, place and everyday life. The 'common ground' or praxis is located in the transforming potential of 'contact'.

The impact of citizen journalism on the established journalism industry, and its role in the future news media mix, remain key topics in current journalism studies research, not least in the context of the current crisis facing many news organisations around the globe. The centrality of this issue is also reflected in the substantial number of ‘citizen journalism’ monographs and collections published across the last few years (see for example Paterson & Domingo, 2008; Boler, 2008; Allan & Thorsen, 2009; Neuberger, Nuernbergk, & Rischke, 2009; Gordon, 2009; Russell & Echchaibi, 2009; Meikle & Redden, forthcoming). With relatively few notable exceptions, much of the research and wider public discussion surrounding the citizen journalism phenomenon has employed a relatively narrow definition of the term, with many researchers focussing on citizen journalism projects which provide mainly political news and commentary, and on their role in influencing the political process especially in countries like the U.S.

media technologies [have] altered infrastructures and rhythms of everyday (Horst, 2012, p. 62) - this is true not only for technology-driven metropolitan areas in Eeast Asia or USA, but also, and particularly, for those Southeast Asian countries that hold some of largest numbers of social media users in world. Yet, contrary to popular expectations of an interconnected global network society (Castells, 1996), a number of ethnographic studies have exposed rather unorthodox ways in which digital technologies have become part of daily dynamics of social, cultural, and political life that depend largely on particular regional settings, infrastructures, offline relationships, and other aspects of locality (Hine, 2000, p. 27; Horst, 2013, pp. 149-151; Horst & Miller, 2006; Madianou & Miller, 2012; Miller, 2011; Miller & Slater, 2000; Postill, 2011; ,h Servaes, 2014; Slater, 2013). Focusing on New Media in Southeast Asia, this issue contributes to this project of provincializing (Coleman, 2010, p. 489) digital media, particularly social media, by following ways in which people go about organizing their social, cultural, and political lives in largely institutionalized and conflict-laden environments.Directing their focus toward political participation of urban middle classes ses in authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes, authors of this special issue explore ways in which different actors set parameters for participation in digital space, and seize digital media for their socio-political and cultural agendas. This approach allows them to avoid media-centric generalizations and various forms of technological determinism associated with early work of media theorist Marshall McLuhan and others (Baym, 2015, pp. 27-44). Without disregarding importance of external forces, such as political centralization, bureaucratization, and urbanization, as well as their regional particularities, contributions place a strong emphasis on agency of Internet users. Hence, digital media feed into, reflect, and shape symbolic struggles over perception of social world (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 20) by allowing for new types of exchange and socialities to emerge across gap between virtual and ® actual (Boellstorff, 2012, p.While contributions to this issue deploy terms digital and social media by addressing concrete, non-analog technologies and applications, such as Internet or Facebook, term new media is rarely discussed in detail. Inquiring what makes new media new, llana Gershon (2010, p. 10) goes well beyond factual innovations introduced by what we know today as Web 2.0 (O'Reilly, 2007; see also Ellison & boyd, 2013). Rather than technologies she argues, it is people's perceptions of and experiences with social media (e.g., Facebook or Instagram) that define them as new. Internet users, as Hine (2000) poses in her book Virtual Ethnography, are involved in construction of digital technology both practices by which they understand it and through content they produce (p. 38). Once embedded in everyday practices, new media and their accompanying infrastructures may appear mundane and transparent to users. Yet, emerging forms of social interaction through and with digital media do not go without a fair amount of anxieties related to these media (Baym, 2015, p. 22; Gershon, 2010, pp. 80-81), as they potentially challenge previously established technologies and patterns of exchange (Campbell, 2010, p. 9).Madianou and Miller (2011) encountered similar suspicion among Filipino domestic workers in London who today could be defined as the real vanguard troops in marching towards digital future (Miller & Horst, 2012, p. 10). Formulating their concept of polymedia, authors explore ways in which diverse media contribute to emotional repertoire of Filipino mothers in their communication with their children back in Philippines. …

Reviewed by: Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, and: China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society, and: Musing with Confucius and Paul: Toward a Chinese Christian Theology Franklin J. Woo (bio) Mayfair Yang , editor. Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. vii, 449 pp. Paperback $29.95, ISBN 978-0-520-09864-0. Daniel A. Bell . China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. xi, 240 pp. Hardcover $26.95, ISBN 978-0-691-13690-5. K. K. Yeo . Musing with Confucius and Paul: Toward a Chinese Christian Theology. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books. 508 pp. Softcover $55.00, ISBN 978-1-55635-488-5. In reviewing these three books, I look at religion (with the exception of extreme fundamentalism) in what Ninian Smart in his Gifford Lectures (1979-1980) termed the "critical age," in which he asserts that religion cannot escape the effects of the open society. It is no longer possible for religion to be dogmatic in an unqualified way, for even if I accept the authority of a guru or of the Pope it is I who do the accepting; we have ineluctably moved to an age of pluralism and individual choice. If there are new forms of tradition they are chosen forms, and such traditionalism is no longer quite traditional. Religion has thus moved from the dogmatic to the critical age (emphasis added).1 Selectivity is an important theme in "an age of pluralism and individual choice." The idea of "selective inheritance" came from Confucian scholar Julia Ching (1934-2001).2 Her work has had its influence on me, as can be seen in this review. Whether we think of China as a civilization or a nation state, there appears to be noticeable continuity in China's cultural behavior as it metamorphoses from the former to the latter. Despite more than a century of state formation (etatization) under the onslaught of the modern world, some things in China do not essentially change. Though itself imperceptibly changing, Chinese cultural tradition as a totality for millennia tends not to tolerate challenges to its time-tested way of life. Mayfair Yang Mayfair Yang is a professor of religious studies and East Asian languages and culture at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the director of Asian studies at the University of Sydney, Australia. Her book Chinese Religiosities: Affliction of Modernity and State Formation is a collection of a dozen complementary, perceptive essays from a 2005 scholarly conference she helped to coordinate. [End Page 349] These essays show how both imperial China and the modern Chinese state have consistently guarded against-or have used perceived heterodoxical views and practices that may, or actually do, threaten-the existing social order of the time. We can see that rather than a separation between state and religion, common in Western countries, in the Chinese context religion and state are regarded as integral parts along a continuum. In a volume by Julia Ching that highlights (as does Mayfair Yang) the popular religions of China and argues that while China never produced a Western-type religion, one can find in the Chinese tradition what is functionally the equivalent to religion or religions in the West, and that such Chinese religions, much less distinct from the rest of Chinese culture than Western religions and Western culture, have much to tell us about the uniqueness of the religious phenomenon itself (emphasis added).3 Not only is the religious phenomenon unique, both religion and culture are extremely complex and they seem inseparable. Though having somewhat of a pejorative connotation, "religiosities" is the term preferred in Mayfair Yang's book to describe the different manifestations of religious phenomena that affect or are affected by China's modernization process beginning in the late nineteenth century. The European notion of religio or religion, which sees religion as a separate and distinct entity from culture, is foreign to the Chinese, nondualistic continuum of a cultural way of life. It was introduced to China through the Japanese rendering of the term into zong jiao 宗教. (In the Chinese ideograms, 宗教 can...

(1988). Political Socialization and the “Micromilieu”. International Journal of Sociology: Vol. 18, No. 3-4, pp. 59-73.

(2008). The 1990 Violent Disturbance In Trinidad & Tobago: Some Perceptions. Caribbean Quarterly: Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 129-139.

In the contemporary era, media spectacle organizes and mobilizes economic life, political conflict, social interactions, culture, and everyday life. My recently published book Media Spectacle explores a profusion of developments in hi-tech culture, media-driven society, and spectacle politics. Spectacle culture involves everything from film and broadcasting to Internet cyberculture and encompasses phenomena ranging from elections to terrorism and to the media dramas of the moment. For ‘Logo’, I am accordingly sketching out briefly a terrain I probe in detail in the book from which these examples are taken.1 During the past decades, every form of culture and significant forms of social life have become permeated by the logic of the spectacle. Movies are bigger and more spectacular than ever, with high-tech special effects expanding the range of cinematic spectacle. Television channels proliferate endlessly with all-day movies, news, sports, specialty niches, re-runs of the history of television, and whatever else can gain an audience. The rock spectacle reverberates through radio, television, CDs, computers networks, and extravagant concerts. The Internet encircles the world in the spectacle of an interactive and multimedia cyberculture. Media culture excels in creating megaspectacles of sports championships, political conflicts, entertainment, "breaking news" and media events, such as the O.J. Simpson trial, the Death of Princess Diana, or the sex or murder scandal of the moment. Megaspectacle comes as well to dominate party politics, as the political battles of the day, such as the Clinton sex scandals and impeachment, the 36 Day Battle for the White House after Election 2000, and the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent Terror War. These dramatic media passion plays define the politics of the time, and attract mass audiences to their programming, hour after hour, day after day. The concept of "spectacle" derives from French Situationist theorist Guy Debord's 1972 book Society of the Spectacle. "Spectacle," in Debord's terms, "unifies and explains a great diversity of apparent phenomena" (Debord 1970: #10). In one sense, it refers to a media and consumer society, organized around the consumption of images, commodities, and spectacles. Spectacles are those phenomena of media culture which embody contemporary society's basic values, and dreams and nightmares, putting on display dominant hopes and fears. They serve to enculturate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its conflicts and modes of conflict resolution. They include sports events, political campaigns and elections, and media extravaganzas like sensational murder trials, or the Bill Clinton sex scandals and impeachment spectacle (1998-1999). As we enter a new millennium, the media are becoming ever more technologically dazzling and are playing an increasingly central role in everyday life. Under the influence of a postmodern image culture, seductive spectacles fascinate the denizens of the media and consumer society and involve them in the semiotics of a new world of entertainment, information, a semiotics of a new world of entertainment, information, and drama, which deeply influence thought and action. For Debord: "When the real world changes into simple images, simple images become real beings and effective motivations of a hypnotic behavior. The spectacle as a tendency to make one see the world by means of various specialized mediations (it can no longer be grasped directly), naturally finds vision to be the privileged human sense which the sense of touch was for other epochs; the most abstract, the most mystifiable sense corresponds to the generalized abstraction of present day society" (#18). Today, however, I would maintain it is the multimedia spectacle of sight, sound, touch, and, coming to you soon, smell that constitutes the multidimensional sense experience of the new interactive spectacle. For Debord, the spectacle is a tool of pacification and depoliticization; it is a "permanent opium war" (#44) which stupefies social subjects and distracts them from the most urgent task of real life -- recovering the full range of their human powers through creative praxis. The concept of the spectacle is integrally connected to the concept of separation and passivity, for in passively consuming spectacles, one is separated from actively producing one's life. Capitalist society separates workers from the products of their labor, art from life, and consumption from human needs and self-directing activity, as individuals passively observe the spectacles of social life from within the privacy of their homes (#25 and #26). The situationist project by contrast involved an overcoming of all forms of separation, in which individuals would directly produce their own life and modes of self-activity and collective practice. Since Debord's theorization of the society of the spectacle in the 1960s and 1970s, spectacle culture has expanded in every area of life. In the culture of the spectacle, commercial enterprises have to be entertaining to prosper and as Michael J. Wolf (1999) argues, in an "entertainment economy," business and fun fuse, so that the E-factor is becoming major aspect of business.2 Via the "entertainmentization" of the economy, television, film, theme parks, video games, casinos, and so forth become major sectors of the national economy. In the U.S., the entertainment industry is now a $480 billion industry, and consumers spend more on having fun than on clothes or health care (Wolf 1999: 4).3 In a competitive business world, the "fun factor" can give one business the edge over another. Hence, corporations seek to be more entertaining in their commercials, their business environment, their commercial spaces, and their web sites. Budweiser ads, for instance, feature talking frogs who tell us nothing about the beer, but who catch the viewers' attention, while Taco Bell deploys a talking dog, and Pepsi uses Star Wars characters. Buying, shopping, and dining out are coded as an "experience," as businesses adopt a theme-park style. Places like the Hard Rock Cafe and the House of Blues are not renowned for their food, after all; people go there for the ambience, to buy clothing, and to view music and media memorabilia. It is no longer good enough just to have a web site, it has to be an interactive spectacle, featuring not only products to buy, but music and videos to download, games to play, prizes to win, travel information, and "links to other cool sites." To succeed in the ultracompetitive global marketplace, corporations need to circulate their image and brand name so business and advertising combine in the promotion of corporations as media spectacles. Endless promotion circulates the McDonald’s Golden Arches, Nike’s Swoosh, or the logos of Apple, Intel, or Microsoft. In the brand wars between commodities, corporations need to make their logos or “trademarks” a familiar signpost in contemporary culture. Corporations place their logos on their products, in ads, in the spaces of everyday life, and in the midst of media spectacles like important sports events, TV shows, movie product placement, and wherever they can catch consumer eyeballs, to impress their brand name on a potential buyer. Consequently, advertising, marketing, public relations and promotion are an essential part of commodity spectacle in the global marketplace. Celebrity too is manufactured and managed in the world of media spectacle. Celebrities are the icons of media culture, the gods and goddesses of everyday life. To become a celebrity requires recognition as a star player in the field of media spectacle, be it sports, entertainment, or politics. Celebrities have their handlers and image managers to make sure that their celebrities continue to be seen and positively perceived by publics. Just as with corporate brand names, celebrities become brands to sell their Madonna, Michael Jordan, Tom Cruise, or Jennifer Lopez product and image. In a media culture, however, celebrities are always prey to scandal and thus must have at their disposal an entire public relations apparatus to manage their spectacle fortunes, to make sure their clients not only maintain high visibility but keep projecting a positive image. Of course, within limits, “bad” and transgressions can also sell and so media spectacle contains celebrity dramas that attract public attention and can even define an entire period, as when the O.J. Simpson murder trials and Bill Clinton sex scandals dominated the media in the mid and late 1990s. Entertainment has always been a prime field of the spectacle, but in today's infotainment society, entertainment and spectacle have entered into the domains of the economy, politics, society, and everyday life in important new ways. Building on the tradition of spectacle, contemporary forms of entertainment from television to the stage are incorporating spectacle culture into their enterprises, transforming film, television, music, drama, and other domains of culture, as well as producing spectacular new forms of culture such as cyberspace, multimedia, and virtual reality. For Neil Gabler, in an era of media spectacle, life itself is becoming like a movie and we create our own lives as a genre like film, or television, in which we become "at once performance artists in and audiences for a grand, ongoing show" (1998: 4). On Gabler’s view, we star in our own "lifies," making our lives into entertainment acted out for audiences of our peers, following the scripts of media culture, adopting its role models and fashion types, its style and look. Seeing our lives in cinematic terms, entertainment becomes for Gabler "arguably the most pervasive, powerful and ineluctable force of our time--a force so overwhelming that it has metastasized into life" to such an ext

When, in the late 1980s and early 1990, social and political theorists turned their attention to the issue of non-humans, they focused mainly on the question of whether these beings qualified as actors (Harbers, 2005; Latour, 1992; Callon, 1986b; Cussins, 1996); whether non-human entities deserved more recognition as constituent elements of social and political life was, briefly put, made to hinge on their capacities for action. This approach has been criticized for its latent anthropomorphistic assumptions, that is, for unfairly suggesting that non-humans must be like humans if they are to be accorded political capacities.1 But the device-centred perspective on material participation that I am developing here suggests a somewhat different take on the matter: it proposes that we examine how material entities become invested with specific capacities, like powers of engagement, in particular settings and at certain times. From this vantage point, there is another problem with the debate about non-human agency besides anthropomorphism: it can too easily be mistaken to suggest that the crucial issue is whether non-humans are ‘naturally’ endowed with capacities for socially or politically significant action. This is why I think we need a more radically performative take on the question: instead of seeking to resolve once and for all whether non-humans qualify as participants in social and political life, we must ask how these entities acquire and lose such powers in specific circumstances. In this chapter, I will discuss the implications of such an approach for our approach to material democracy, and argue that it invites an experimental understanding of it.

Populists are often excluded from political life on the basis that they are too emotional. Both social movements as well as political parties who are labelled as populist are accused of using demagoguery and manipulation in order to attract support and new membership. Often, these critiques emanate from the political establishment, creating a division between emotional and rational actors in politics. In this article, I argue that instead of seeing populism as a nominal or ordinal category, we should look at how the term itself has performative properties. The article is interested in how populism as a concept is used as a tool for exclusion, and how being ‘too emotional’ is used as justification for excluding certain actors. This article first contends that this perspective is endemic to political and social theory, and has long been utilised to marginalise women, non-Europeans, or young people. Second, the article demonstrates how this perspective also pervades much of contemporary studies on populism, which do not sufficiently recognise the political implications of employing a strict divide between emotion and reason. Third, the article further contends that by using a Laclauian framework which sees politics as equal to hegemony as equal to populism, one can conclude that populist actors are no different from other political actors; emotions and affects are always central to any political identity. Instead, the division between emotional and rational in politics serves to sediments exclusionary practices against newcomers and challengers of the status quo. I conclude by using the Laclauian framework, focus can be turned to the performative function of populism, and its political implications.

A review of the book The Spaces of the Modern City: Imaginaries, Politics & Everyday LIfe, edited by Gyan Prakash and Kevin M. Kruse is presented.

The realization of the good citizens (good citizen) is a citizen of political savvy, political awareness, and participation in political life is the ultimate goal of education politik.Dalam this political education in Indonesia is directed to improve and develop the awareness of national and state corresponding with the philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution granted Indonesian political education in primary schools is through the subject matter of Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKn). The political education aims to gain knowledge of the politics of every citizen to go through the learning process simultaneously and continuously. A citizen can be directed to be sensitive to social and political problems that occur in the vicinity, until at last they can appear as a solver of these problems. In Decission making this process was not only necessary knowledge (civic knowledge), but needed also their virtue citizens (beliefs: civic virtues) and participation skills (skills: civic participation). This is the role of Citizenship at the elementary level. Keywords : Political Literacy, Political Education, Primary School

Kwan investigates the nexus between liberalism, Jewish emancipation, Austrian state patriotism, German culture and everyday Jewish life in the specific context of Vienna from the 1860s to 1890s. The focus is the liberal Jewish politician Heinrich Jaques, who experienced the optimism and hope of the 1860s, then the disappointment of the 1880s, when liberalism was declining and anti-Semitism on the rise. Kwan highlights the dislocating effect of persistent anti-Semitism on Jewish liberals. In the second half of the article, there is a case study of Jaques’s contact with the Christian Social leader Karl Lueger. While the focus is on politics and public life, the social milieu of educated, wealthy Viennese Jews is discussed as well as the associated issues of assimilation, integration and private contacts.