Bonaventurian Ways to God through Reason

Abstract

BONAVENTURIAN WAYS TO GOD THROUGH REASON* III. THE FIRST OR EMPIRICAL AND COSMOLOGICAL WAY A. Material Being as Perceived Through Sense Experience The human mind is by nature directed to know.1 But because man's understanding is integrally united with his body, it is almost material and, as such, has need of creatures if it is to reach knowledge of the immaterial.2 In this respect, it is not unlike the eye of an owl in that it is blind to light itself except insofar as it is reflected in or filtered through creatures.3 Knowledge above the physical is rendered possible by the senses, through whose five portals the macrocosm of the exterior world enters the microcosm of the understanding.4 The senses themselves perceive only that which is corporeal;5 they know only bodily forms and are therefore incapable of knowing incorporeal forms.6 Sensibles, however, are the means of knowing intelligibles, and since sensibles are finite creatures or things, it is through them that the understanding acquires knowledge of intelligibles.7 Material things then, are perceived by the senses and comprehended by the understanding.8 The latter is made possible first by the generation of intelligible species through the act of apprehending,9 and thereafter by a judgment in respect of the object, which is by its very nature an * Continued from Franciscan Studies, 36 (1976), 192-232. 1 De Scientia Christi, IV, fund. 31. 2 I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, Concl. [§ 2]. 8 Assis 186, 41ra. 4 Hin., II, 2. 5 Assist 186, 4iva.« Ibid. 7 I Sent-, d. 3, p. i, a. 1, q. 2, contra c; Itin., I, 10 8 Assisi 186, 41va. ' Itin., II, 4 and 5. 154THOMAS R. MATHIAS immaterial act, since it prescinds from place, time and motion.10 Intelligible species thus constitute that by which things are understood . Because things are perceived by the senses and known by the understanding,11 it is through the avenue of existing corporeals that the understanding first derives metaphysical knowledge of being.12 From this it is clear that the role of the creature or thing is that of guide, taking the mind by the hand, as it were, at the base of a mountain yet to be climbed, at which stage the understanding cannot yet foresee what lies in store on reaching the summit, where the light of the sun can more readily be seen both as it is reflected by the worldly panorama below and as it illumines the clouds which now lie close at hand.13 At the base of the climb to the pinnacle of the metaphysical are creatures and things, an investigation of whose makeup motivates the understanding to reflect upon the implications therein contained. In that setting, Bonaventure presents his proofs of a First Principle from a consideration of exterior creatures and things, or from the beings of experience. In De Mysterio Trinitatis, he introduces each of ten arguments with the hypothetical "if", as for example: "if there is being from another, there is being not from another."14 In this regard, two preliminary observations are of utmost significance . In the first place, there is nothing suppositional as to the de facto existence of dependent beings in the universe along with their various properties, as Bonaventure's subsequent elaboration of the proposition clearly reveals. He could have completed the proof by expressly stating that of course the existence of beings from another in the universe is evident from experience. A statement of the obvious, however, was not only unnecessary but also painfully prosaic if continually repeated, and yet to avoid confusion that would have been necessary to avert ambiguity had he done so even once. To those for whom the thesis was written, there was no such urgency; to those who would deny the obvious, all discussion would be foreclosed in limine in any event. What Bonaventure implicitly intended by the 10Ibid., 6. 11Assisi i86, 4iva. 12De Septem Donis, IV, 9; I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, Concl. 18 I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2; Hexa., II, 27; Assisi 186, 4iva; cf...