Abstract
We examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Non-compliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates over-investment.
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