Abstract

540 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 above itself,with each layer consisting of a superior(in effect, a dictator)and their subordinates. Hence, the system was populated by hundreds, possibly thousands, of 'smaller Stalins'. Endemic to such a system is the principalagent problem, based on the information imbalance between dictator and subordinates.According to Gregory, an important reason for the survivalof the Stalinist system after his death was that his successors could not find a solution to this problem. The result was that the system operated at a lowlevel equilibrium,characterizedby 'planningfromthe achieved level'. Among otherinnovationsin the book, GregoryadaptsAkerloff'sfairwageeffort model to try to explain the investment cycle paradox: that whilst the Soviet system was dedicated to industrialcapital accumulation, periodically investment plans were cut back and, in effect, investment was sacrificedfor consumption. The model predictsthat workerswill reduce their effortif they feel that they are being paid a wage below the fair wage. Thus 'the Soviet leadership chose optimal investment by weighing investment against the loss of workereffort'(p. iIo). He also emphasizes that among the many different forms of rent that opportunisticagents could extract in the systemwere rents derived from illegal, or unauthorized, horizontal transactions.Such transactions were common but they threatened the system by removing the control of transactionsfrom the hands of the planner and by encouraging enterprises to createtheirown unofficialmoney, in theformof surrogatesand commercial credit,which fuelledinflation. This is an importantbook as it presents the firstsystematicaccount of the Soviet economic system using these unpublished sources, drawing together the new researchby Gregory and others, in a form that is easily accessible to the wider academic community and students.It presentsitsmaterialin a clear and concise manner that both deepens and broadens our knowledge. It does so by relating the new archive material to the debates that have dominated the Soviet literaturefor many decades, with Gregory providing a refreshing insightof his own to many of those debates. Department ofEconomic History PETERHOWLETT London School ofEconomics Baron, Samuel H. BloodySaturdayin the SovietUnion.Novocherkassk, I962. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2001. XViii+ 241 PP. Map. Illustrations.Appendices. Notes. Bibliography.Index. $49.50. ON IJune I962, in responseto a governmentannouncement of a steeprisein the price of meat and butter, workersin the city of Novocherkasskcame out on strike.They placed a barricadeover a nearbyrailwayline, blockingtraffic on one of Russia'smajorsouthernlines, an act intended to publicizewhat was happening in the city. On the next day, a column of demonstratorsmarched from the Locomotive Construction Factory,which was central to the strike, throughNovocherkassk'sindustrialzone six miles north of the city to the city centre. The demonstration was peaceful and troops offered no resistance. High-level negotiators, including Anastas Mikoyan, were sent down from Moscow, but they were not preparedto listen to the strikers'demands. In the REVIEWS 54I city's central square, a group of demonstratorsbroke into the gorkom (party headquarters),and about fiftylaunched an assaulton the police stationwhere two strikershad been detained the day before. In the ensuing struggle, five strikerswere killed and two onlookers died of their wounds. Soldiers were ordered to clear the gorkom and just after midday a warning volley was fired into the crowd. Bursts of gunfire followed and men and women were hit, falling in the square and in the garden beyond. Twenty-four people were killed, several of whom were bystanders, and there were a great many wounded. A total of 114 people were brought to trial. Seven of the leaders were sentenced to death and many others to long terms of hard labour. The bodies of the dead were buried secretlyand only recently have relativesbeen able to discovertheirwhereabouts. These events were never reported in the Soviet press. Aleksandr Solzhenitsynwas the firstto write about Novocherkasskin his Gulag Archipelago (I973-75), describing themassacre asa significant momentin thehistoryof the Soviet Union. Samuel Baron, during his time as a student in Russia in I963-64, heard talk of the massacre, and has spent the last decade piecing togethera complete pictureof events. Baron has produced a meticulous study of the available evidence which details the discrepancies between the different accounts of i June I962. In addition to being enthralling on its own account, Baron's analysis raises broader questions concerning its consequences on Soviet domestic policy. Following...

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