Blockchain technology and corporate governance: A bibliometric and systematic literature review

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: We examine whether corporate governance plays a role in influencing a firm's choice of financing, i.e., equity versus debt. We hypothesize that the likelihood of equity financing increases with governance because of a reduction in agency costs between investors and managers in these firms. While the reduction in agency costs occurs for both equity and debt financing, we argue that there is a more significant effect on equity financing.Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of over 2,000 US equity and debt issuances over the period 1998 to 2006, we find that our measures of corporate governance effectiveness have a positive impact on the likelihood of choosing equity compared to debt. This association is more pronounced in small firms where information asymmetry is higher between managers and investors.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings refine and extend the pecking order hypothesis, which suggests that firms will issue equity as their last resort because of the high information asymmetry associated with equity financing. We provide some of the first evidence that the pecking order hypothesis can be mitigated by corporate governance. Specifically, we find that the likelihood of issuing equity increases as governance increases. Further, we find that where agency costs due to information asymmetry are greater, the positive impact of governance on the likelihood of equity financing is also greater. That is, in support of agency cost theory, we find that firms facing high agency costs benefit the most from investing in corporate governance mechanisms that lower the agency costs. We are not aware of any prior study, published or unpublished, that has documented this result.Practitioner/Policy Implications: From a practical perspective, our study suggests that firms wishing to access equity capital markets should pay attention to their corporate governance. Specifically, by investing in corporate governance systems, firms facing high agency costs may be able to obtain easier access to not just debt but also equity markets. From a practice standpoint, in the years prior to securing financing, firms should consider making improvements to their governance (e.g., changes to board structure and/or auditor), carefully weighing the costs of making these improvements against the benefits of securing better and cheaper access to equity markets.

Blockchain technology allows secured exchange (peer to peers) with the consensus-based algorithm. Corporate governance focuses on the governance of corporate data through a secure mechanism. This paper aims to interpret the possibility of a robust corporate governance mechanism through blockchain technology to eliminate the chances of corporate fraud. There are multiple uses of Blockchain in cooperate governance. Authors have discussed how shared information consensus prevents possible losses to fraud embezzlement. Boardroom practices to disclosures, blockchain technology, and distributed ledger technology hold a strong possibility of implementing it. Past studies have stressed the impact of technology on corporate governance and the positive relationship between blockchain technology and governance. Taking the lead from antecedents, the authors have elaborated on leveraging blockchain technology for improved corporate governance in the present study. The paper uniquely explores the application of blockchain technology for sound corporate governance which provides potential for direct application by organizations globally.

Background and Purpose: Company secretary roles are increasingly gaining attention and recognition globally. However, research on corporate governance and board effectiveness lacks a comprehensive and systematic review from the company secretary role. Most research to date has been focused on the role of other corporate governance actors, namely, CEOs, directors, and auditors. In this present systematic literature review, we address this deficiency.
 
 Methodology: This paper adopted a systematic literature review approach. We used two indexed databases, Scopus and Web of Science, to analyse the articles written on corporate governance, company secretary and board effectiveness. A total of 121 articles published in these fields were examined, and after rigorous analysis, only 18 articles from which met the inclusion criteria were included.
 
 Findings: Our findings reveal that only a few corporate governance research has investigated the role of company secretary in enhancing board effectiveness (board structure, board process and board practices). The thematic analysis conducted identified seven key roles of the company secretary. The roles are to: (1) support the chairman of the board; (2) provide advice and act as a confidant to the board of directors; (3) facilitate and manage the board of directors and board committee process; (4) liaise between the board and management; (5) manage information asymmetry and enhance transparency; (6) ensure compliance with laws, regulations, corporate governance code and best practices, and (7) manage company relations.
 
 Contributions: The analysis in this paper presents four key findings - types of articles, geographical location, theory, and company secretary roles that reflect the research gaps present in the corporate governance literature, thus highlighting significant future research avenues.
 
 Keywords: Board effectiveness, company secretary, corporate governance, roles, systematic literature review.
 
 Cite as: Halim, S. A. A, Lokman, N., & Othman, S. (2023). Corporate governance and board effectiveness: A systematic literature review of the company secretary role. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 8(TI), 209-234. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol8issTIpp209-234

The basic aim of this paper is to systematically review the corporate governance research trends in Pakistan and to give directions for future researchers in this field. The methodology adopted in this paper is “Systematic Literature Review,” 108 papers have been used from the period 2002–2020 along with 17 research theses in this study. The findings of this study show two trends in corporate governance research first one form 2008 to 2016 and the second one is from 2017 to 2020. The first trend shows that corporate governance (variables) is linked with traditional topics such as firm performance, dividend policy, capital structure, cost of capital and earnings management. The theory which is mostly used in the first corporate governance trend is the agency theory. In the second trend, corporate governance (variables) are linked with multiple issues while taking various theoretical perspectives such as risk taking, tunneling, CSR, investment portfolios, board-related issues, financial distress and much more. This paper has identified and filled the research gap by writing a comprehensive review paper of the prevailing corporate governance literature and has given directions for future researchers to consider it. To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this is the first study that has systematically reviewed and synthesized the corporate governance literature by adopting the systematic literature review methodology in Pakistan an emerging economy. It is an extensive effort for the purpose to encourage the interested researchers/scholars to add and expand their contributions to the corporate governance literature in Pakistan on the potentially identified areas of corporate governance.

This paper is a literature review paper. We discussed the influence and results of using blockchain in corporate governance. In this paper, we considered both the advantages and disadvantages of using blockchain technology. Our research areas included distributed ledgers, smart contracts, corporate governance, DAO “hack” case (2016), blockchain distributed platform, the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), customer loyalty plan using blockchain, the proof-of-work system using blockchain, and the blockchain technology in international business. We selected a sample of around 20 articles on blockchain to study the benefit of using blockchain in corporate governance. Based on the convenience and effectiveness of using blockchain, we made the hypothesis that using blockchain in corporate governance would be able to have more transparent, real-time, reliable, cost-effective, verifiable, and accessible transaction records. We hypothesize that using blockchain in corporate governance has more benefits than using the database. Blockchain technology also has some disadvantages such as shareholder protection weakness, fraud transactions, anonymous voting, etc. Generally speaking, based on our analysis of selected articles and literature reviews, we made the following conclusion that blockchain technology will have more benefits in corporate governance compared to traditional systems and other database management systems.

This study examines the impact of blockchain technology (BCT) and corporate governance practices on firm performance. Using GMM on a sample of 2,844 firms, the results show that BCT improves firm performance. The results show an average difference in corporate governance and financial variables between BCT firms and firms from other sectors. In the presence of BCT, independent and female directors, and Top10-Shareholdings no longer positively affect firm performance, while the impact of board size and Largest-Shareholdings become positive. Chief executive officer (CEO)-Duality negatively, while Institutional-Shareholdings positively affect the firm’s performance, either individually or in the presence of BCT. Managerial-Shareholdings showed mixed results. A sub-sample analysis reveals that the role of board size and CEO-Duality becomes ineffective in BCT firms. This study reveals that the monitoring function of corporate governance practices in optimizing agency costs and maximizing firm performance is different in the firms using BCT. Our results hold up to economic parameters such as difference-in-differences and propensity score matching.

The mining industry is an important industry for the central government as a source of funds to finance the country's development. Therefore, the performance of companies in this industry has been being an interest of academics and practitioners. However, less attention has been given to the role of corporate governance in moderating the relationship between dividend policy and performance. with the uniqueness of Indonesia's corporate governance system, this study will enrich the dividend policy and corporate governance literature. This study aims to investigate the corporate governance role in moderating the relationship between dividend policy and performance. Besides, this study also looks at the effect of dividend policy and performance. with a final sample of 21 companies for 3 years, we use the Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) Before the regression run, we conduct several analyses, such as normality. The means score of each variable Return On Assets, Dividend Payout Ratio, Public Ownership, Company Age, and Company size hows that 4.77%, 32%, 29.6%, 23 years, and Rp. 13,6 T. Testing the first hypothesis in this study shows that the dividend payout ratio is accepted in a positive direction, the second hypothesis is Public Ownership, Company Age, Company Size, is rejected and the third hypothesis is Return On Assets is accepted at 10%. The interaction of dividend policy and corporate governance on performance is explained by agency theory. In practice, companies must implement corporate governance effectively.

This thesis examines the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in the UK’s and Germany’s corporate governance systems. The UK and Germany are chosen for this study because they exhibit different board structures, legal systems and capital markets. The differences and similarities across these two corporate governance systems provide an opportunity to explore the effectiveness of firm-level and country-level corporate governance regulations in different corporate governance systems. Using a sample of 120 firms from the UK and Germany for the period 2007-2011, this thesis investigates: (a) the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of firms; and (b) the types and quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. Unlike previous studies, this study focuses on compliance and the explanations reported for non-compliance with a corporate governance code. The concepts of ‘comply’ and ‘explain’ are claimed to be the two most important pillars of an effective corporate governance system. Using an index-based approach, this thesis develops a ‘comply or explain’ index for each firm in the sample. The index captures the level of compliance as well as the quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. Furthermore, a generalised method of moments (GMM) model is used to investigate the govemance-performance relationship and a mechanistic (quantitative) content analysis method is applied to examine the quality of explanations reported in response to non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. The results from the univariate analysis reveal that the UK and Germany exhibit significant differences in terms of compliance with the corporate governance codes, board structures and ownership structures of firms. The results for govemance-performance relationship show that the ‘comply or explain’ index is significantly and positively associated with the operating performance of German firms, while in the UK, the ‘comply or explain’ index has a positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of UK firms. However, the impact of the ‘comply or explain’ index is statistically not significant for the accounting-based measure of firm performance in the UK, and for the market-based measure of firm performance in Germany. The results provide some evidence that the quality of corporate governance (measured by the ‘comply or explain’ index) has positive implications for firms’ performance in both countries. The findings are different for the accounting-based and market-based measures of firm performance, and the mixed empirical evidence is supported by the different theories of corporate governance. For instance, board structure (the percentage of non-executive directors) is positively associated with the operating performance (ROA) of UK firms and with the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of German firms. However, board structure is negatively associated with the market-based measure of firm performance in the UK. The positive and negative impact of board structure on different measures of firm performance can be explained through the lens of agency theory and stewardship theory, respectively. The results for blockholders’ ownership show that non-institutional blockholders have a positive impact on the performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) of German firms. Institutional blockholders’ ownership is positively associated with the operating performance of firms in the UK. However, the impact of institutional blockholders’ ownership is negative for the market-based measure of firm performance in both countries, which raises concerns about the monitoring role of institutional shareholders in both countries. The results from the content analysis of 600 corporate governance reports show that non-compliant firms across the UK and Germany do exploit the ‘explain’ option and flexibility granted by the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The explanations reported in response to non-compliance are largely uninformative and the content of such explanations mostly remained similar over the time and across the firms. Overall, the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between governance and firm performance indicate that the governance-performance relationship cannot be examined through the lens of a single and universal theory of corporate governance. A multiple theoretical perspective could be very helpful in examining the governance-performance relationship in different corporate governance systems. In fact, investigating the complex governance-performance relationship using multiple theories and multiple methods may take us closer to developing a more comprehensive theory of corporate governance.

The blockchain technology (BT)_offers a new means to trade and monitor the ownership of financial assets which is similar to the advent of double-entry bookkeeping centuries ago. This represents a significant development in financial record-keeping. Stock exchanges are investigating BT worldwide to enable businesses to list, to trade and to vote on shares. This adoption has the potential to benefit stockholders through reduced trading costs, faster ownership transfers, improved record accuracy and increased process transparency. This study examines the effect of BT on corporate governance. Using feasible generalised least squares analysis, our study analyses data from 297 European businesses included in the STOXX Europe 600 index between 2016 and 2021. The results show that the adoption of BT improves the quality of board decision-making and streamlines board activities. In addition, the study indicates that BT facilitates greater direct shareholder rights and encourages effective worldwide administration of director and board member compensation. The research contributes to the current body of literature by confirming the positive impact of implementing (BT) on enhancing corporate governance measures. This, in turn, assists managers in formulating appropriate strategies.

PurposeThis paper aims to present evidence that the adoption by Japanese firms of a shareholder‐oriented, more transparent, system of corporate governance creates greater corporate value in comparison to the traditional system of statutory auditors.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses panel data of Tokyo Stock Exchange listed companies to explore the potential convergence of corporate governance systems by examining the value differences between Japanese firms selecting one of two legal systems. A random‐effects panel regression is used to analyze the data. The dependent variable of the study is Tobin's q.FindingsThis paper finds a significant increase in firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's q, for companies that adopted the alternative of the Anglo‐American type committee system, even though comparative financial data show little difference in performance after adoption. This finding is attributed to signal sending, as companies that adopted this system signal a choice toward transparency via monitoring by outsiders, suggesting a reduction of asymmetric agency costs. The paper finds that the committee corporate governance system produces higher corporate value than the traditional auditor governance. The study also finds evidence that it is the signal provided by adoption of the credible system, not the financial performance variables, that accounts for this difference.Social implicationsThe data support the central idea that corporate governance laws have consequences and encourages additional study of the effects of corporate signaling and the consequences of increased shareholder orientation of agents.Originality/valueThis paper takes advantage of the unique opportunity afforded by Japan's introduction of a dual system of corporate governance in 2003, when companies were offered a choice to adopt a new system of outside directors, which is a shareholder‐oriented committee system. It establishes that firm value can be created by a signal that corporate governance provides.

As part of business and management studies, research works addressed blockchain technology (BCT) in logistics and supply chain management (LSCM) first in 2016. Increasing levels of interest from researchers and practitioners alike have led to an increasing number of studies from both ends; however, a thorough bibliometric- and cocitation network analysis of BCT in LSCM research has not been carried out so far. To address this gap and to build a basis for future research endeavors, this article provides a bibliometric analysis on BCT, comprising data from 613 articles from academic supply chain research. It is therefore an easy-to-access entry point for academics and practitioners into the topic of BCT in LSCM. This study aims to understand the status of research of BCT in LSCM. To present the results, this article employs a bibliometric analysis methodology. It adopts a citation network analysis and a cocitation analysis. Based on a cocitation analysis, this article classifies the existing literature into five different research clusters, including theoretical sensemaking, conceptualizing and testing blockchain applications, framing BCT into supply chains, the technical design of BCT applications for real-world LSCM applications, and the role of BCT within digital supply chains.

This paper identifies three aspects of challenges in blockchain practices through textual analysis and case studies in the governance of Chinese public health financial institutions. First, given the conflict of interest in corporate governance, under the background of shareholder activism, the attitude of controlling shareholders towards blockchain technology can become a crucial force in technology commercialization. Second, the massive amount of data derived from blockchain technology can lead to privacy protection problems in the financial development of the public health industry. Third, the lack of business customs can become a commercial factor hindering the application of blockchain technology. Therefore, reflecting on blockchain technology in corporate governance can facilitate the public health industry to adapt to the new opportunities brought by technological changes and cope with risks in advance. These findings are innovative and could provide insights into the future cross-border governance of blockchain technology.

This paper analyzes the Principal-Agent Problem in Corporate Governance.Focus is on the question: One-Tier or Two-Tier system of Corporate Governance – which one is more effective in reducing Agency Costs?The authors analyze provisions regulating corporate governance in different legal systems, and therefore, they conclude: It should be prescribed by Codes of Corporate Governance that system of corporete governance applied in particular company shall depend on its shareholding structure. Consequently, significant indication for potential investors to not invest in the company, would exist if the best practice of corperate governance (including the system of Corporate Governance recommended by CCG) is not applied.

Purpose: This study aims to explore the role of blockchain and corporate governance in enhancing financial reporting quality using a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) approach. Methodology/approach: The analysis was conducted on 36 articles from the Scopus database relevant to blockchain and corporate governance topics, employing the PRISMA method. Findings: The results show that blockchain improves transparency, security, and efficiency in financial reporting through decentralized and immutable record-keeping. Strong corporate governance, characterized by board diversity, independent audit committees, and the adoption of international accounting standards, contributes to the accuracy and reliability of financial reports. The synergy between blockchain and corporate governance creates a more transparent and accountable reporting system. Practical and Theoretical Contribution/Originality: This research provides important insights for policy makers and practitioners to integrate blockchain technology and corporate governance to improve the quality of financial reporting. Research Limitation: This research utilizes literature from various countries and industries, so the findings do not consider how differences in regulations and policies in various countries may affect the effectiveness of blockchain implementation in corporate governance.

Corporate governance can be defined as the way the management of a firm is influenced by many stakeholders, including owners/shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, local residents, and the government. Different economies have systems of corporate governance that differ in how the stakeholders influence the management. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the system of Japanese corporate governance by examining each aspect of the system and to examine its benefits and costs. The paper primarily summarizes what we currently know from the past research about the system of Japanese corporate governance rather than trying to