Blessing or curse? A critical review of the paradoxical consequences of direct public funding for political parties

The process of the formation of the party system of Cyprus was considered. The period from colonial to 1981 is covered. The factors that influenced the evolution of the parties of Cyprus, in particular the internal conflict, were underlined. Emphasizes the importance of the ethnic component of the population of Cyprus. The attention was paid to the role of the Orthodox Church in shaping the political system of Cyprus. The article analyzes the norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960) concerning political parties, in which the focus was on the parliamentary aspect of party activity. The role of Archbishop Makarios III, the first president of Cyprus, for the further evolution of the party system in the 1960–70s was revealed. Presented chronology of the appearance of the main parties of Cyprus and their participation in elections and coalitions. The article emphasizes that after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, the party system of the state is experiencing the trend of the newest European tendencies on the national party palette: the level of people’s confidence in the parties is decreasing, the party identity is blurred, the voter turnout is gradually decreasing, new types of parties are emerging, Radicalization is notable and so on. The party system of Cyprus is special, even if only within the EU there is a pro-communist party (Progressive Party of the Labor People of Cyprus), represented in the European Parliament, among the leading political forces. It was emphasized that the political parties of Cyprus until 1974 were purely electoral mechanisms. The new stage of development began with the stabilization of the post-colonial political system of Cyprus. At this time, the church lost its past influence, and the majoritarian electoral system alienated itself. This led to a new stage in the development of the party system in the late 1970s. It is noted that the determining factor was the transition to a proportional electoral system and the introduction of mandatory participation of voters in the vote. It was emphasized that these legislative innovations became important factors in the development of the modern party system of Cyprus. Since that time, the Cypriot parties have become more independent and united in the coalition.

This article investigates several aspects to which 1996 Seimas elections contribute. The author argues that these elections confirmed certain tendencies in the development of the party system as well as attached new features to it. Aspects that have led to both a short-run victory of the conservative and the Christian democratic parties, and a long-run perspective – emergence of a multiparty system, are being researched profoundly. First of them displays the following points: amendments to the Law of Seimas Elections, their influence on the electoral behaviour of the parties and the suffragettes. The second point is the indices that have articulated certain division of the electoral votes. In the opening part of the article, the author elucidates some premises that have conditioned certain pre-electoral behaviour of the parties: the most important is that the parties reviewed the laws that regulate their activity. The author discusses the way how the new editorships of the Law on the elections affected the shift of the entire political system and resulted in 1996 elections. We are informed that the manipulatory power of the electoral system has been finally realised. The author depicts some discrepancies of the editorships to the law and propounds their threat to the stability of the entire political system. Adherently we are introduced to a valid aspect which concerns modifications in the electoral behaviour (and, forwardly, the results of the elections). Fragmentation of the political parties is given as evidence which has affected these modifications. The author analyses the causes that stipulated the electoral behaviour, the tendencies elections proved to exist and preferences the parties witnessed. In conclusion, the author challenges those who are convinced of the electoral stability (Table 1 portrays the distribution of the votes). An important theoretical question arises as the author endeavours to answer the question: 'what party system emerges in Lithuania'. We are shown the criteria which motivate and postulate the fact of the existence of the party system itself. By the same token, the author introduces three inductive indices which help to identify this existence, develops them and forces under empirical analysis. Qualitative and quantitative methods of the research are applied as the author tries to estimate quantitative shifts in the party system. These shifts are pictured in a number of graphs. Novagrockienė views positive consequences these 1996 Seimas elections have so far had, emphasises what concrete tendencies it has confirmed or revealed. This study is really rich in its content and is worth attentive analysis by the reader himself.

An on-going debate in the innovation policy arena revolves around the effects of public research funding. While government intervention is usually not questioned, appraising the role of direct research funds (government grants for research projects) versus tax incentives (tax exemption/deduction of research expenses) remains a core issue. In this chapter we make methodological contributions to ex-ante evaluation of these alternative government research funding instruments. Building on the SKIN model, we develop an agent-based simulation of a localized life sciences innovation system (Vienna, Austria). Companies, universities, public research and other relevant research organizations are modelled as heterogeneous agents that make investment decisions about conducting research, exchange assets with other agents and produce knowledge output. Simulation runs refer to a 30 year period, distinguishing three funding scenarios: Direct funding (no tax incentives), tax incentives (no direct funding) and the co-occurrence of both (direct funding and tax incentives). First simulation results for the Vienna life sciences innovation system suggest that the overall volume of required public funds could be lower for tax incentives than for direct funding. However, we find also indications that direct funding—in contrast to tax incentives—could have a decreasing effect on public investment per patent in the long run.

This article examines a parliamentary development in post-Soviet Kazakhstan during 2007-2012 years from historical and institutional point of view. It exclusively deals with the formation and development of the sixth post-Soviet Parliament of Kazakhstan, which was technically called the fourth convocation of Parliament. Authors analyse the parliamentary reforms of 2007 and its consequences and impact for the development of parliamentarism and party system in Kazakhstan. A case study of this particular convocation of modern Kazakh legislature allows us to make an in-depth research and helps us to better understand main peculiarities of legislative development during the period of 2007-2012. Article concludes that the forth convocation of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, which functioned during the 2007-2012, proved to be even more unanimous and homogenous in terms of both party affiliations and political orientations in comparison to its predecessors. On the one hand, this kind of solidarity contributed to the political stability and smooth political reforms; on the other hand, homogeneity of the Parliament impacted the lack of competitiveness and hampered the development of party factions and deputy groups within Parliament and the development of party system per se. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6s1p335

Party regulation in general and its systemic consequences in particular have not been a matter of concern for scholars until very recently. Despite recent efforts to study how political parties are regulated in post-authoritarian democracies and in conflict-prone societies, the question of how party legislation affects party formation and party system development in the Western Balkans still remains a mystery. Adopting a multi-disciplinary (that is, legal and political) approach, this article attempts to fill a gap in the literature by analysing how different party (finance) regulations shaped the party system in Macedonia, one of Europe's most recent (and under-researched) democracies, while controlling for changes in electoral regimes. There are two main findings. On the one hand, registration requirements had the strongest impact on the party system format, even when the electoral system pushed in the opposite direction. On the other, public funding, rather than “cartelizing” the system, mainly facilitated the survival of (both big and small) parties. Finally, the article also points to the need to explore the role of shadow financing and corruption when analysing the effects of party finance in new democracies.

The article reviews the ‘classic’ organizational models of political parties in the light of the evolution of party financing in Italy, emphasizing agreements and disagreements. Based on the parties’ official balance sheets, it presents empirical evidence on the different sources of party income over-time as well as the parties’ own narrative concerning public funding from 1974, when direct public funding of political parties was introduced, until 2014, when it was repealed. It concludes that the repeal of public funding may have an important impact on party organizations, further stimulating the ongoing processes of personalization and disaggregation of political parties as cohesive units.

Political parties play a fundamental role in the representative political systems of northern industrialized democracies. They connect civil and political society, advance the perceived interests of individuals, groups, and social strata while aiming consciously to develop these constituencies, and provide a link between society and the state, espousing the claims of the one and enforcing the rules of the other (Sakwa 1995, 169). Political parties provide representation and accountability, electoral pressure for partisan constituencies, and the basis for structuring political choice in the competition of interests in the political arena. In short, they serve as an integral aspect of representative democracies, and thus are perceived as the bedrock for the process of democratization. It is the argument of this article, however, that Russia's transition to democracy actually has been inhibited by the development of a dysfunctional and extremely unstable party system. An important starting point for understanding the woeful state of Russia's contemporary party system is examining the motivations surrounding the choices made by self-interested political elites. The desire of those who already possess power to maintain it and the desire to obtain the goods of political office--most notably power and personal enrichment--by those who seek them, have adversely impacted party system formation. These motivations also have had an impact on the structure of the institutions of government with which the parties interact, creating a political environment that reduces the importance of the role played by parties. In this regard, Russia's transition to democracy played a key role, because it served to enhance the freedom of action of the political elites, allowing them to better mold the political system according to their desires. This analysis emphasizes the profound impact of two factors on the development of Russia's party system: the course of the initial transition and the role of elites during and after the transition process. The sudden collapse of the Soviet system disrupted the development of the nascent party system, severing its connections to society and leaving it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with the society and the political system. In these circumstances, the parties became led by the elite. The later changes made to the overall political system during the 1993-95 and 1999-2000 election cycles have reinforced the party system's susceptibility to the behavior of the elite but at the expense of developing links between political and civil society. Those changes also shaped the incentives for elite action in ways that have led away from the development of a well-structured party system. Until the party system re-establishes its links with society and the incentives of party elite behavior are shaped by the need to promote societal interests rather than their own, Russia's party system will continue to be dysfunctional in the ongoing process of democratization. The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. Section one discusses how the collapse of the Soviet Union granted elites the leeway to fashion a party system and political institutions according to their own desires. Sections two and three describe the major developments in party system formation during the 1993-1995 and 1999-2000 election cycles, respectively. Section four draws on the historical evidence described in the preceding three sections to outline the principal factors that have contributed to the dysfunctional nature of Russia's political party system and its impact on the consolidation of Russian democracy. Section five offers general conclusions and prescriptions for the future. Impact of the Soviet Union's Collapse on the Emergence of a Nascent Multiparty System Competitive provoke party development, and this is one reason that founding elections are considered to be so important in transitions to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 57). …

Slovenia: Between Bipolarity and Broad Coalition-Building

Labor movements and party system development: Why does the Caribbean have stable two-party systems, but the Pacific does not?

Spain has made a number of experiments with democracy, but only since the mid‐1970s has this been successful. At that time, strenuous efforts were made to ensure that political parties would come forward, and as a result the new democracy had two key aspects: the creation of synthetic parties (in the sense that they are supported more from above than below), and the building of a parties state. The introductory part of the chapter discusses these changes and also has a section looking at the institutional framework that had such a shaping effect on party politics; this discusses the electoral system, and the rules governing parliamentary group organization and party finance. The next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy (party membership, electoral turnout and volatility, popular assessments, party–voter ties, and evaluating party legitimacy), party organizational strength (parliamentary party organization, mass party organization, party finance, ‘goods in kind’ received by parties, and evaluating party organizational strength), and the systemic functionality of parties (governance, political recruitment and patronage, interest articulation and aggregation, political participation, political communication and education, and evaluating the systemic functionality of parties). The concluding section assesses the viability of Spain's parties state and gives a comparative analysis of its experience of democracy.

Modern representative democracy cannot function without political parties, however rudimentary. Parties in turn cannot function without money. The subject of party finance is therefore central to the construction of contemporary democracies. Latin American countries have attempted to meet the challenges of preserving democracy while providing for political parties across three main areas of financial regulation: provision of public finance, regulation of private finance, and limiting campaign spending. In all three areas, transparency (reporting), oversight, and enforcement of existing legal regulations remain important problems for the health of the political system. In the late 20th century, Latin American countries increasingly turned to public finance as a way of supplementing existing systems of private contributions. This trend seems to have been inspired both by a desire to reduce the inequalities inherent in Latin America’s socioeconomic structure and by efforts to contain and prevent episodes of scandal and undue influence generated by private contributors. Public finance particularly benefits small parties and parties with fewer connections to the wealthy sectors that tend to dominate private contributions. Public finance may contribute to the institutionalization of both party organizations and party systems, but it may also weaken the dependence of parties on their members and supporters in ways that undermine representation. Private finance in Latin America remains largely obscure. We know that relatively few private donors account for the lion’s share of party donations, but it is unclear in many cases exactly who donates, or what their money buys. It is therefore difficult for voters (and analysts) to determine the structure of party obligations to donors and to hold parties accountable. Partly as a result, drug money is believed to have penetrated the political systems of many Latin American countries, especially but not exclusively at the local level. Campaign spending limits, including limits on the duration of campaigns and campaign advertising, have been employed in some cases to try to contain costs and thus reduce the incentives of parties to seek out private donations, especially of questionable origin. Lax enforcement, however, limits the impact of these initiatives.

The primary purpose of this research note is to offer a brief assessment of 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections in light of arguments concerning development of Russia's party system that we presented earlier in Demokratizatsiya (Riggs and Schraeder 2004). In that article, we argued that Russia's transition to democracy has been inhibited by development of a dysfunctional and unstable party system. Specifically, we made three arguments: (1) sudden collapse of Soviet system disrupted development of nascent party system, severing its connections to society and leaving it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with society and political system; (2) later changes made to overall political system during 1993-95 and 1999-2000 election cycles have reinforced party system's susceptibility to behavior of elite at expense of developing links between political and civil society; and (3) those changes also shaped incentives for self-interested elite action in ways that have led away from development of a well-structured party system. We concluded that, until Russian party system re-establishes its links with society and incentives of party elite behavior are shaped by need to promote societal interests rather than their own, Russia's party system will continue to be dysfunctional, contributing to democratic decay as opposed to assisting democratic consolidation. Unfortunately, proponents of strengthening democratic consolidation in Russia cannot take heart from 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections, which have become more elite driven, contributing to Mexicanization of Russian political party system (i.e., creation of a one-party dominant political system).The More Things Change, More Things Remain SameThe 1993 elections for newly created Duma and elections that followed were held under new rules designed to foster a stable party system. Half of Duma's 450 seats are elected by party list through a proportional representation system (in which votes are cast for parties, and seats are apportioned to based on percentage of vote attained), while remaining half are elected through a single-member district plurality system (in which votes are cast for individual candidates in electoral districts, and one with greatest number of votes wins). Rules were added to minimize insignificant and concentrate votes.A cursory examination of results of 2003 Duma election might suggest that a stable multiparty system is developing in Russia (see table 1). Most of have an established identity, whereas new are result of party consolidation rather than constituting elite parties of convenience. The Motherland (People's Patriotic Union) party has brought together more than thirty political organizations under one umbrella. The United Russia party was formed by merger of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia parties. The People's Party of Russian Federation represents transformation of People's Deputies Duma faction of independent candidates into an electoral party. Yeltsin's party of (Our Home Is Russia) has disappeared. Other in Duma hold only six seats divided among four parties, and contingent of independents is down to sixty-eight. In short, 2003 Duma election encouraged a less fragmented party system than had previously existed in Russia.These patterns do not signal that Russian civil society is becoming more vibrant and politically engaged, however. Russia's are still primarily elite driven, with main difference in 2003 and 2004 elections being that President Vladimir Putin became prime mover in Russian politics. The structure United Russia party was not as popular as outcome suggests. In a December 2003 survey that asked what party or political outlook respondents sympathized with most, only 20 percent responded the party of power (United Russia) while 30 percent responded none of them (Russia Votes 2004a). …

This article aims to analyse changes of the Slovak party system from 1992 to the last parliamentary elections of 2020. These elections were the eighth elections in the history of independent Slovakia. There are discussions about stability or instability of individual development stages of the party system. In the article, Attention is paid to changes in the distribution of forces within the development of the party system. In political science, various methods are used to measure the party system’s dynamics to determine the intensity of changes and the trends arising from them. This analysis is based on election results in each electoral cycle (period), which are being compared. Next part of the analysis is focused on the selected comparative indicators: Index of the Effective Number of Parties and Aggregation Index. These indices are chosen based on the criteria of classification of party systems. The results presented in the final part of the paper prove that several significant milestones in development of party system could be identified, as confirmed by the 2020 general elections – a major breakthrough in development trends.

El sistema electoral de México se caracteriza por tener uno de los mecanismos de financiamiento público de partidos políticos más oneroso del mundo. Los partidos han recibido por financiación federal de 1989 a 2020, 83,664 millones de pesos. El financiamiento público fue un factor importante en la transición democrática para construir un sistema de partidos plural, otorgó condiciones básicas para la equidad de la competencia electoral y contribuyó a la alternancia. Los partidos en México, a pesar de disponer de fondos públicos cuantiosos, no han evitado escándalos de corrupción por financiamiento irregular, y su desempeño público se encuentra en una etapa de fuertes críticas por el incumplimiento de expectativas. Actualmente se discute una iniciativa para reformar el financiamiento público, que formula reducirlo en 50%. El artículo hace un análisis sobre la evolución normativa del financiamiento público, refiere los presupuestos asignados por año, señala la cifra histórica recibida por partido político, reflexiona sobre los objetivos cumplidos y por consumar en el marco del financiamiento público. Finalmente, se presenta una propuesta para reformar el sistema de financiamiento público, que consiste en una disminución gradual de la subvención del Estado en un esquema de equilibrio con el financiamiento privado.

Russian parties and the political internet