Blaming Yourself for Wronging Yourself

800x600 Ethical problems are arising among this decade, especially in marketing. In Indonesia ethical problems in organization also arise in this decade. Ethics is the discipline that deals with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation. Ethics can also be regarded as a set of moral principles or values. Morality is a doctrine or system of moral conduct. Moral conduct refers to that which relates to principles of right and wrong in behavior. Business ethics, therefore, is concerned with good and bad or right and wrong behavior that takes place within a business context. Concepts of right and wrong are increasingly being interpreted today to include the more difficult and subtle questions of fairness, justice, and equity. The aim of this paper was to integrate personal moral philosophies and ethical perceptions to business decision making. Two different sub cultures are present in this paper: Yogyakarta and Bali, which has identical sub culture. The conclusion of this literature review is decision making of organization and consumer can effect by personal moral philosophies and ethical perception. Bali has idealistic moral philosophies and Yogyakarta has relativism moral philosophies. Keywords : Ethics, Personal Moral Philosophies, Ethical Perceptions, Decision Making Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

Recentemente, duas discussões em vêm ganhando destaque em filosofia moral. Por um lado, a visão de moralidade e de filosofia moral presente nas abordagens tradicionais desde a modernidade, como por exemplo as teorias da obrigação moral, tem sido posta em dúvida desde o diagnóstico de Anscombe (1958) de que a mesma não cumpre os seus propósitos. Por outro lado, com os desenvolvimentos dos estudos em filosofia da mente e em ciência cognitiva, parte da literatura da área tomou o conceito de “consciência moral” e as questões que estão relacionadas ao mesmo como tópico central. Neste artigo, tais abordagens são relacionadas através das considerações sobre os limites do âmbito argumentativo e da busca por meios não argumentativos de proceder em filosofia moral, oferecendo a literatura como um meio para tal.

As this highly original work explains, morality is not fixed objectively, independently of all human judgment, nor is it something that we “invent.” Rather, working within zones of objective indeterminacy, the moral community—the community of all persons—has the authority to introduce new moral norms. These further specify the preexisting moral norms, making an objective difference to individuals’ moral rights and duties. The moral community, so-called, could not exercise authority unless it had some structure whereby it could act. Unlike political communities, which are centralized, noninclusive, and backed by coercion, the moral community is decentralized and inclusive. Its structure depends upon dyadic duties—ones that one individual owes to another. Such duties, the book argues, empower efforts by individuals to work out intelligently with one another how to respond to morally important concerns. The innovative moral input that these efforts can provide is initially authoritative only over the parties involved. Yet when such innovations gain sufficient uptake and have been reflectively accepted by the moral community, they become new moral norms. This account of the moral community’s moral authority is motivated by, and supports, a type of normative ethical theory, constructive ethical pragmatism (CEP), which rejects the consequentialist claim that rightness is to be defined as a function of goodness and the deontological claim that principles of right are fixed independently of the good. Rather, it holds instead that what we ought to do is fixed by our continuing efforts to specify the right and the good in light of each other.

There is much controversy over the effectiveness of the influenza vaccination; yet, globally, many health institutions are implementing policies that require health providers to either receive the influenza vaccination or wear a surgical mask. This vaccinate-or-mask policy has caused great hullabaloo among health care providers and the institutions wherein they work. In light of the limitations to best practice evidence, we conducted an analysis of the policy and its implications based first on the bioethical principles of beneficence, nonmaleficience, respect for autonomy, and justice and then on the ethical theories of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. The most important ethical issue was threat to patient safety and welfare in the event of receiving care from a health provider who chose to forego the influenza vaccination and surgical mask requirement. We concluded that policies requiring health care providers to receive the influenza vaccination or wear a surgical mask are only partially supported by the bioethical principle approach; however, they are clearly justified from a deontological standpoint. That is, Kant would argue the rightness of the policy as a moral imperative for health care providers to not impose a health risk to those they serve and for health care institutions to ensure professional care giver vaccination. In further considering the vaccinate-or-mask policy in terms of the utilitarian “greatest good for the greatest number”, we determined that Mill would argue that this type of policy is ethically right and just, but also that policies solely requiring immunization would be ethical as public well-being is promoted.

Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science is an authority in moral issues. Science can help us understand what our moral duties are, and what is right and wrong in a moral sense. However, the cultural and historical diversity of human behaviors, especially history of wars and conflicts, suggests that it is difficult to show one, common and universal kind of morality. Here we show that Harris’s moral theory is a particular project which could not be “scientifically” justifiable.

Moral behaviour, and more recently wisdom and prudence, are emerging as areas of interest in the study of business ethics and management. The purpose of this article is to illustrate that Cicero—lawyer, politician, orator and prolific writer, and one of the earliest experts in the field recognised the significance of moral behaviour in his society. Cicero wrote 'Moral Duties' (De Officiis) about 44 BC. He addressed the four cardinal virtues wisdom, justice, courage and temperance, illustrating how practical wis- dom, theoretical/conceptual wisdom and justice were viewed in Rome of the first century BC. 'Moral Duties' is a letter admonishing his son, Marcus. It refers to personal behaviour, business practice and analyses terms such as good faith and criminal fraud. In addition, it contains material which would be suitable for tutorials/seminars and discussions, particularly in the areas of critical thinking in business ethics and general management. A study of De Officiis in respect to present day management and business practice could give a wider perspective to business ethics and management students. If concepts such as moral virtue, moral propriety and moral goodness, many of which seem to be ignored in business situations today, are to be embedded in business leaders of the future, it is reasonable to expect that these qualities will be analysed and discussed by business students today. Further, a study of Cicero's six- step approach, when preparing an address/speech, could be useful and productive for practitioners and students in this area.

Ethics: an American growth industry.

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.

Reviewed by: Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics by Jonathan J. Sanford William C. Mattison III Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics. By Jonathan J. Sanford. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015. Pp. x + 280. $65.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-2739-9. "Aristotle's ethics is not a virtue ethics" (180; cf. 15). This arresting claim is at the literal and conceptual center of Jonathan Sanford's insightful Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics. The claim is jarring to anyone casually and even well familiar with the recent turn to virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy, a move that nearly always draws significantly upon the thought of Aristotle. To establish his claim, Sanders must of course provide an account of what contemporary virtue ethics is and then a basic account of Aristotle's ethics. This is precisely the structure of Before Virtue. The first half of the book sets up the project and narrates the origins and varieties of contemporary virtue ethics. The second half of the book offers an overview of a robustly Aristotelian ethic. Sanford starts from the often-made claim that contemporary virtue ethics finds its origin in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy," which offered a rousing critique of the subject named in its title. However, he argues that virtue ethics has succumbed to the very same limitations of modern moral philosophy outlined by Anscombe and others, and thus neither responds to Anscombe's clarion call nor offers a truly Aristotelian ethic that would indeed constitute such a response. Thus, his book might be understood as an attempt to "save" Aristotle from contemporary virtue ethics, the latter of which is apparently referenced in the title Before Virtue. Sanford's book is of enormous value to proponents of traditional Aristotelian and Thomistic accounts of morality. He offers an insightful and accurate narrative of the rise of contemporary virtue ethics. Perhaps his greatest contribution is the way he substantiates his thesis about this movement's failure to break out of the shackles of modern moral philosophy by his careful delineation of its many varieties through reliance on its most prominent exponents (e.g., Hursthouse, Slote, Annas, Nussbaum). Sanford provides a mental map of contemporary virtue ethics that is of great value to readers of this journal and that would be a service to the thinkers just [End Page 286] mentioned as well. The book's second half, an overview of a thoroughly Aristotelian ethic (one augmented by an occasional turn to St. Thomas), will surely be appreciated by scholarly readers as accurate, even though they will find less there they do not already know. Sanford's introduction and chapter 1 present the overall thesis of the book and do some needed brush-clearing for his later analysis. For instance, chapter 1 claims that all contemporary moral philosophers address, in one way or another, sets of basic questions about who we are, why we are here, and how we are to live (31-37). Sanford also claims that every contemporary moral philosophy relies on a metaphysics, explicitly or implicitly, and offers a very helpful distinction between metaphysical and religious claims (40). He then turns in chapter 2 to the near-universally regarded matriarch of contemporary virtue ethics, Elizabeth Anscombe. He uses her classic essay to distill three theses about the inadequacy of modern moral philosophy: (a) it is not profitable to do moral philosophy until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology; (b) concepts of moral obligation and moral duty ought to be jettisoned as survivals of older conceptions of ethics no longer regnant; and (c) the differences between modern English moral philosophers are actually, in Anscombe's words, "of little importance" (62). Sanford uses Anscombe's theses as well as related markers of modern moral philosophy (relying on Solomon [see 108 and 121; cf. 151]) as standards with which to evaluate contemporary virtue ethics. He concludes that contemporary virtue ethics fails to heed the former and continues to be characterized by the latter. It is in chapters 3 and 4 that Sanford's scholarship shines brightest. He argues that contemporary virtue ethics is marked more by the "loose unity...

What is medical ethics?

I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought,” ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the wellknown English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.

A review of Morals, Reason, and philosophy is (in)famous, the combined force of their Animals by Steven F. Sapontzis work has been to put apologists for theory's traditional (Philadelphia: Temple University pretensions somewhat on the defensive. The critics' Press, 1987) positive views about the form of moral philosophy sans moral theory, have, however, been even more varied (and rather vaguer) than their critiques. From the lack of an articulate positive program, along with suspicions that antitheory in ethics might have strongly conservative implications, the theorists have taken heart. Sapontzis' contribution to this debate-although he modestly does not identify it as such-is quite important. He provides an object lesson in how to do In a series of articles dating back to the late moral philosophy without a commitment to a single 1970's, Steven F. Sapontzis has developed a position unified theory which demonstrates in the abstract what on our moral relationship to nonhuman animals which makes right acts right. In so doing, he shows that it is at least as searching and as original as the better­ doesn't take such a theory to provide an intellectually known work of Singer and Regan. Morals. Reason, respectable critique of a major social institution. and Animals assembles and refines the themes introduced in his earlier essays. The result is an *** interesting contribution to a discussion in contemporary moral theory, as well as an examination of our dealings Sapontzis' own anti-theoretical tendencies with nonhumans that shows just how thoroughly dovetail with what is perhaps the leading idea of his dubious they are. book, namely, that we have made altogether too much A major ongoing debate in moral philosophy of reason as a qualification for moral status. The kind concerns what, to use a characteristically Sapontzian of reason of which philosophers tend to be fond, as way of putting things, might be called the Sapontzis sees it, not only can't build theories that will (in)Significance of Moral Theory. Influential writers conclusively resolve moral quandaries, but is also beside such as Bernard Williams, Annette Baier, Martha the point as a requirement for being morally significant. Nussbaum, and Alasdair MacIntyre, among many others, have all raised considerable doubts about the philosophical enterprise ofgrounding ethics in moral theory, especially if that is taken to mean one which claims to be able to derive our moral duties from a small number of basic principles. l Although the critics' REVIEW reasons for inveighing against the standard conception of ethical theory exhibit the variety for which

The history of Hegel’s critical controversy with Kant’s moral philosophy starts with the Frankfurt period of his work, when Hegel first opposed what he believed to be Kant’s absolutisation of the concept of duty and his neglect of the social content of morality. Although Hegel more than once addressed Kant’s moral philosophy, it is only in “Phenomenology of Spirit” that he formulated a more systemic and radical criticism. The basis of his critical argumentation is an attempt to reveal the main contradiction in Kant’s ethics by showing that the fulfilment of unconditional moral requirements leads to the complete elimination of morality itself. By uncovering the internal contradictions in Kant’s unconditional duty, Hegel demonstrates a certain kind of pragmatism in the interpretation of moral duty and offers instead a religious faith in the transcendental power of “communal” consciousness, which will become a principle that supposedly removes all contradictions of a moral worldview. These debates between the two most prominent classics of German idealism on the issue of whether moral demands are universal in nature or are always socially determined, has not lost its significance even today. This is because they present two substantially different ethical doctrines: one affirms the idea of the autonomy of moral consciousness and its formal unconditional character, while the other assumes that a certain moral duty can be legitimate only under specific socio-historical conditions.

I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty— moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought,” ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the wellknown English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.

Ciceronian Officium and Kantian Duty Andree Hahmann and Michael Vazquez One of the characteristic markers of the advent of modern moral philosophy is the conceptual distinction between morality and one's own happiness.1 Nowhere is this innovation more visible than with the concept of "moral duty," which in modern terms is often defined precisely by its opposition to prudential self-interest or one's own happiness.2 It is generally assumed that the Stoics are ancient precursors to this decidedly modern concept.3 The concept of duty, or [End Page 667] something like it, plays a central role not only in their account of the psychology of human action but also in their prototypical conception of natural law ethics.4 Yet as recent commentators have emphasized, while the commonalities are tantalizing, appearances are misleading. The Stoics are, at bottom, eudaimonists in the Socratic tradition for whom the modern distinction between morality and prudence would be incoherent.5 No historian of philosophy will deny the vast expanse that separates Stoicism from modern moral philosophy, but the picture [End Page 668] remains largely obscure. It has long been suspected that Cicero played a decisive role in this development due to his crucial role as a translator and mediator of Greek philosophy. After all, Cicero is responsible not only for giving Greek philosophy a Latin dress, but also for shaping the linguistic and conceptual resources of Western philosophy for centuries to come. Scholars have offered varying explanations for Cicero's role in the movement away from eudaimonism: Cicero's Antiochean and syncretizing tendencies,6 the Roman and juridical cast of his appropriation of Stoic ethics and natural law,7 his emphasis on moral progress and the performance of officia by nonvirtuous agents (a [End Page 669] feature of middle Stoicism),8 his anti-Epicurean polemics,9 or some combination thereof. Most important from the point of view of the history of ethics is the fact that Cicero's ethics of officia, although articulated in a decidedly eudaimonistic framework, eventually formed the basis of an ethical system in which moral principles function to place limits on and constrain one's pursuit and maximization of happiness. Furthermore, when we arrive at Kant, whose radical reconception of moral philosophy is a watershed moment in the history of philosophy, we find a direct reference to Cicero at a crucial point in which he explicitly carries out the separation between morality and happiness. In this article, we would like to unpack this story about the history of ideas and look more thoroughly at the ways in which Cicero could have contributed to the development of the modern understanding of moral duty. In so doing, we also shed new light on the intellectual context within which Kant worked out his first major contribution to moral philosophy. [End Page 670] The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. In the second section we outline basic features of the Stoic concept of καθῆκον. In the third section we examine Cicero's translation of the notion into Latin as officium. While Cicero problematized and deliberated over his translational decision, we do not find an adequate basis to conclude that his translation of the Stoic doctrine into Latin and into a Romanized context led to the sort of development some commentators have suggested. Instead, we find that Cicero's translation largely preserves the basic core of the Stoic doctrine of καθῆκον. In the fourth section, we examine important developments in the meaning of "duty" between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, with a particular focus on Pufendorf's reworking of Ciceronian officium in ways that anticipate Kant's critique of Garve's Ciceronian ethics. While it is not Cicero's translation and appropriation of καθῆκον into Latin as such that shapes the modern understanding of moral duty, we argue that Cicero did play a decisive role in this notion's development. In particular, we argue in the fifth section that Cicero's impact is indirect but substantial: Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and some of the central theses contained therein are formulated as a direct response to Christian Garve's Ciceronian ethics. Kant, foreshadowed by his predecessor Pufendorf, rejects the Ciceronian...