Abstract
AbstractNatural scientists have offered reasons to think that some vile human acts have evolutionary explanations. Christians would describe some of these acts as sins, and indeed as sins potentially worthy of damnation. However, I argue that, on the supposition that such sins have evolutionary causes, the agents who commit these sins are not justly damnable for the acts in question. This is because the justice of damnation minimally depends on two criteria: 1) that sinful acts are properly voluntary; and 2) that asymmetrical fault between sinners and God holds for said acts. Because, on the assumption that dispositions to sin have evolved, one or both of these criteria cannot be sustained, theologians face a choice. They must either affirm the evolutionary origins of some sinful acts and deny damnation in the relevant cases, or, if they wish to affirm damnation in all relevant cases, they must deny that there are evolved dispositions to sin. Whichever way it is resolved, the dilemma is serious and concrete. Because it is serious, it requires careful attention from all theologians, not only theology‐and‐science specialists. Because it is concrete, it cannot be dissolved with methodological strategies alone.
Highlights
Many animals behave in the way they do by inclination honed through evolutionary forces
I argue that, on the supposition that such sins have evolutionary causes, the agents who commit these sins are not justly damnable for the acts in question. This is because the justice of damnation minimally depends on two criteria: 1) that sinful acts are properly voluntary; and 2) that asymmetrical fault between sinners and God holds for said acts
I conclude that Christian theologians must either commit themselves to the position that there are not, and could not be, in principle, any evolved dispositions to sin, or they must reject the possibility of damnation in all the relevant cases
Summary
Many animals behave in the way they do by inclination honed through evolutionary forces. On the assumption that at least some dispositions to sin have evolutionary origins, it is impossible, I contend, to secure the justice of damnation for the relevant acts. I conclude that Christian theologians must either commit themselves to the position that there are not, and could not be, in principle, any evolved dispositions to sin, or they must reject the possibility of damnation in all the relevant cases. I look at the two main problems this assumption introduces for the justice of damnation: first, securing the blameworthiness of the human agents in question, and, second, guarding God against the same blame in return. I argue that all are insufficient to secure the justice of damnation on the assumption of evolved dispositions to sin, though each for different reasons. The question of whether there are, evolved dispositions to sin is a serious and specific matter deserving the care and attention of theologians which cannot be resolved with mere method-dealing and cannot be relegated to theology-and-science specialists
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