“Blackshirts” and “Blacklists”: The Politics of Late-Colonial Central Kenya, 1958–1963

The paper critically discusses recent developments in the European Union on (military) cyber defence capability development in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. It provides an overview of the current strategic framework for cyber defence capability development and describes the cyber defence capability development activities from 2011 to the present. It goes on to describe and explain the strategic policy changes in European defence that have taken place in 2016 with the EU Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the NATO–EU Joint Declaration and the European Defence Action Plan. Finally, it assesses the implications of these initiatives for cyber defence capability development in light of the changed global strategic environment and provides recommendations on how the cyber defence community can leverage these initiatives to accelerate the availability of sufficient and effective cyber defence capabilities and capacities for CSDP.

Reviewed by: Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy Ralph Hitchens Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy. By Zeev Maoz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. ISBN 0-472-11540-5. Maps. Tables. Figures. Glossary. Notes. References. Indexes. Pp. xii, 713. $45.00. Let's get the criticism out of the way. Israeli scholar Zeev Maoz has written a landmark book about Israel's "forever war" against the Arabs and Palestinians. But it's also a "forever book"—he could have done it in half the number of pages, with the excess profitably spun off into monographs and articles. Maoz's thesis is succinctly captured in a bumper sticker I saw recently: "War isn't working." The simplified story line of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that Israel was the heroic underdog from the 1948 War of Independence through the dramatic success of the 1967 Six Day War, after which things began to go south: the seemingly pointless War of Attrition, the nasty surprise of the Yom Kippur War, the invasion of Lebanon that dragged on for an incredible eighteen years, while festering in the background was the rising tide of unrest in the occupied territories. Maoz, however, takes us all the way back to demonstrate that while the War of Independence might have been a "just war," it was the only one to which Israelis can point. In subsequent decades, he argues, Israel consistently relied on military force as the principal instrument of foreign policy—fumbling, time and again, genuine diplomatic opportunities to resolve crises and build stable relationships with its neighbors. From the outset Israel's political leadership and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) settled on the "limited use of military force" as the best way to deal with their apparently intractable Arab neighbors. Reasonable, you might think, until Maoz explains that what they really meant was "unlimited use of limited military force"—an ongoing policy of military reprisals directed at the neighboring states from which cross-border terrorist activity was launched. This was intended to confront Arab governments [End Page 585] with unpalatable choices: if they were unwilling to restrain Palestinian guerrillas and other terrorists operating from their territory, IDF reprisals would escalate to unacceptable proportions and war would be the only option. This, of course, played into the hands of the IDF with its carefully nurtured "escalation dominance" posture while allowing Israel to avoid being identified as the aggressor. The Sinai war of 1956 (in collusion with Britain and France) was undeniably aggressive, but the notion that Israel is to blame for the 1967 and 1973 wars appears harder to swallow. Maoz methodically deconstructs through each case, summarizing the consensus scholarly viewpoints before presenting his own analysis of policy alternatives. Well-documented and sometimes deeply laced with counterfactual reasoning, these lead the reader to conclude that during the past five decades Israel's troubles have overwhelmingly been of its own making. Maoz supports his case in part by recourse to databases he has compiled, detailing every instance of conflict in Israel's history, no matter how insignificant: cross-border terrorist attacks and IDF reprisal raids, small and large. He's the very model of the modern political scientist, wielding just enough quantitative data to disabuse his readers of their preconceptions without overwhelming them. He also proves himself a competent narrative historian, refreshingly free of the academic jargon within which all too many in his discipline take refuge. (Furthermore, he's a former paratroop officer, no ivory-tower academic.) The architects of the "unlimited use of limited military force" strategy are the usual suspects, starting with David Ben-Gurion and continuing through a succession of defense ministers and IDF chiefs of staff. In recent decades, Maoz notes, an astonishingly high percentage of the latter came out of the paratroops or commando units, where they made their bones in cross-border reprisal operations. Interestingly, Ben-Gurion himself in his twilight years began to have second thoughts about the policy he set in motion. Maoz describes a famous incident immediately preceding the Six Day War, in which IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin...

The development of renewable energy technologies (RETs) in many areas far from grid-based electricity have primarily involved solar photovoltaics (SPVs) which tap solar radiation to provide heat, light, hot water, electricity, and cooling for homes, businesses, and industry. A study on RETs took place in the Wiyumiririe Location of Laikipia District (north-central Kenya), a rich agricultural region. To explore this solar initiative in such a remote part of the country, a purposive randomized convenience sample of 246 households was selected and landowner interviews conducted, followed by field visits and observations. Although more than half of the households visited had SPV installations, solar energy was found to contribute only 18% of household estimated total energy needs; most residents still primarily relying on traditional energy sources. Several types of solar panels of different capacities and costs were utilized. Many landowners had at least one or two rooms using solar energy for household lighting, for appliance charging and to power radio and television. Almost all respondents appreciated that solar energy was clean renewable energy that greatly improved household living conditions; gave them some prestige; was easy to use and maintain; and was available year around. Although such significant benefits were associated with SPVs, only about 40% of residents interviewed were somehow satisfied with its development. Respondents expressed specific developmental initiatives that were closely associated with the availability of solar energy. Nevertheless, a number of challenges were raised associated with SPVs primarily investment capital and equipment costs and maintenance. As solutions to capital building will not solely rely on subsidies or individual farmer inputs, strategies must be found to mobilize the essential and tested tools for success including sustainable capital generation, building local institutions and capacities that integrate rural people, local participation in rural development activities and public education and training. Keywords: appliance charging,battery,development initiatives, household lighting, landowners,solar energy, SPVs, solar equipment and accessories

This article examines lay narratives about abortion among adult men and women in Nyeri district, central Kenya. The women studied do not champion or defend abortion and they do not necessarily condemn it. To them, abortion shields not merely against the shame of mistimed or socially unviable entry into recognized motherhood but more importantly against the negative socioeconomic consequences of mistimed or unnecessary childbearing and inconvenient entry into motherhood. The men, on the other hand, were generally condemnatory toward abortion, viewing it as women's strategy for concealing their deviation from culturally acceptable gender and motherhood standards. Induced abortion will persist in Kenya not primarily because it protects against the shame associated with mistimed childbearing and entry into motherhood, but largely because women associate mistimed childbearing and inconvenient entry into motherhood with poverty and loss of marital viability. Kenyan women seeking abortion may also continue to rely on poor quality abortion services because qualified providers who clandestinely perform abortion charge prohibitively.

Dimensions of the nature, scope, and complexity of collective action in Kenya have evolved over many years. In studying collective action, the aim is to understand why and how people participate in networks of trust. The purpose of this study was to investigate the different objectives that farmers pursue through collective action with the aim of understanding the patterns of people's participation in collective action, identify factors that influence people to join groups, and identify the costs and benefits of participating in activities of groups. The study was carried out in four sites spread across the highlands of central Kenya. Data was collected from a total of 442 households, focusing on whether members of those households belonged to groups and if so, what type of groups these were and their activities. In addition we looked at how these groups functioned and identified some of the contributions members make to these groups and the benefits from the same. The analysis shows that collective action is used to accomplish a range of activities for different socioeconomic categories and that the majority of households in central Kenya engage in some form of group activity.... The study suggests that where institutions and policies that promote individual or private sector growth are weak, collective action can help to overcome these weaknesses and connect individuals in these institutions and policies. from Author's Abstract

This annotated bibliography has been produced as part of the inception phase of the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre. This research centre based at Manchester University, with funding from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), has been set up to examine the politics of different routes towards social justice.This annotated bibliography offers a starting point for these investigations drawing together what is known about the politics of what works, and laying out current insights into the key political processes which operate to build effective states and enable inclusive development. The bibliography concentrates on scholarship focused on three areas; Developmental States, Political Settlements and Citizenship Formation. These key concepts are a crucial element of the foundation on which ESID’s research will be built.

What explains why protest movements refuse the support of opposition parties despite the correlation in their demands? Answers to this question make up the content of this paper. In recent years, protest movements have dominated the political space of several sub-Saharan African countries, many of which have claimed to have no partisan ties. Relying on insights from the detachment thesis, this paper argues that the nature of the strategies adopted by protest movements in relation to political parties depends on the nature of the country’s political settlements. The study uses the FixTheCountry protest movement in Ghana as a case study. After a discourse analysis into speeches and press statements, an analysis of 15 qualitative interviews conducted in Ghana, as well as a review of various secondary literature ranging from journal articles to books, this paper concludes that protest movements instrumentalise the competitive nature of a country’s political settlements to gain popular support from the citizenry. Given that only two political parties dominate Ghana’s political arena, the protest movement presents itself as non-partisan, a strategy intended to first, express distrust in both parties; and second, attract the attention of non-partisan citizens and disaffected supporters of both parties. The paper demonstrates that the nature of a country’s political settlements is a key determinant of the nature of the relationship between protest movements and political parties, both ruling and opposition ones. This paper’s findings contribute to our understanding of how contemporary African protest movements continue to shape and reshape their relationship with political parties and the relevance of a country’s political structure in the process.

Reviewed by: Violence as Usual: Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa by Marie Muschalek Martin Kalb Violence as Usual: Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa. By Marie Muschalek. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 255. Cloth $49.95. ISBN 978-1501742859. Everyday colonial violence and the Landespolizei police force in German Southwest Africa (modern-day Namibia) are at the center of Marie Muschalek’s admirable monograph. Following recent studies by Isabell Hull, Susanne Kuss, Michelle Moyd, and others, Muschalek aims to complicate our understanding of the colonial state. Her focus on the period following the 1904 uprising and the German genocide makes this volume of particular interest. In her view, “the organization of state power was not merely a matter of claiming the monopoly of force and thus proscribing any excessive, disruptive, and nonofficial violence”; rather, she argues, “colonial rule consisted in diffusing and regulating specific types of seemingly self-evident harm throughout society” (9). Violence as Usual first concentrates on the identity formation of policemen. Muschalek relies on sample data from the personal files of the Landespolizei to discuss socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds; she also comments on upbringings and contextualizes work environments, exploring how fantasies of adventure and aspirations for bourgeois life clashed with everyday realities. Patrols found themselves traversing arid frontier landscapes with little expertise, resources, or support. Honor, status, and masculinity are the main themes throughout this chapter as Muschalek focuses on both German policemen and their local African auxiliaries. Sources are slim for colonial “assistants,” but she is able to uncover an array of daily interactions and encounters. And while Muschalek might have drawn on additional materials relating to the personal motivations of policemen, she is ultimately successful in [End Page 625] unpacking the professional identities and makeup of colonial law enforcement in Germany’s only true settler colony. The second chapter adds layers to Muschalek’s findings by analyzing what she calls “soldier-bureaucrats” in the “hybrid institutional setting of a semi-military, semi-civilian institution within which police codes of behavior emerged” (44). Muschalek argues that honor and proper bearing mattered a great deal and gave cohesion to policing. Policemen had to contend with scarce resources and what they saw as a hostile environment; they also lacked training, with many having to learn on the job. The German presence on the ground was colored by general imperial anxieties as well as a more immediate nervousness that arose from operating on the frontiers of the empire. The discussion of such dynamics from below, maybe in combination with Matthias Häußler’s recent volume on the genocide, is invaluable for anyone interested in colonial violence. The use of tools and technologies—specifically whips, shackles, and guns—is the subject of chapter 3 and is likewise consonant with ongoing scholarly discussions about German colonial violence. Muschalek notes that “although European technologies of themselves explain little, the specific improvised practices of the police illuminate how the technologies of violence helped the German regime refine and maintain colonial rule” (97). This was indicative of some sort of “postwar paranoia” (89), to borrow one of the author’s terms. Muschalek touches briefly on specific laws legalizing “hunting parties” against the San people, which resulted in what anthropologist Robert Gordon has called “the ‘Forgotten’ Bushman Genocides.” Local newspapers from Windhoek, Swakopmund, and Lüderitzbucht made countless references to German police raids meant to pick up real and imagined Feldherero (vagrant Herero) during the postwar years that might have added another component to this chapter. The discussion of patrol logs and reports in chapter 4 captures the daily “tasks, working conditions, routines, and procedures” of the police (99). This section underscores the value of Alltagsgeschichte, a framework aptly employed throughout this volume. Muschalek demonstrates that improvisation on the job was key and the practices of policemen were rarely efficient. At the same time, and as she concludes here, the police presence and actions “were by all accounts transformative” (129). Although fantasies of totalitarian control were rarely fulfilled, the employment of certain technologies and infrastructures, laws as well as a powerful bureaucracy, in addition to everyday assistance from farmers, resulted in the terrorizing of...

Land use changes in Kenya's central Highlands were examined with the purpose of comparing findings from Murang'a District with a new study carried out in a similar environment, Nyeri District. In addition, a generalisation of the findings was examined and methods were analysed to investigate its use in other areas. Aerial photographs were used to analyse land use and soil and water conservation in form of terraces. Furthermore, farmers were interviewed in order to obtain information about how they perceive environmental changes and how these changes have affected their livelihoods. Interpretation of aerial photographs together with field verification and interviews give information about environmental changes and their effects. Population censuses were investigated and findings were compared. Results from this study show that the two study areas have similar physical conditions with decreasing soil fertility. The main difference is the cultivated cash crops, tea and coffee in Nyeri, but only coffee in Murang'a. Also, more land is terraced in Nyeri than in Murang'a. The reason why there are adequate terraces in Nyeri is because of the multitude of cash crops that require terraces for their establishment. Compared with Murang'a, farmers in Nyeri are more satisfied with their situation, mainly due to regular payment from tea and a lower population pressure. This study shows that generalisation of the findings can be made but in order to extrapolate it further to the whole central Highlands more studies and knowledge about the whole area are required. The study also shows that methods used to examine environmental changes can be used elsewhere. Although the recommendations are to generalise with caution so that the final results are reliable and true.

This article examines the effects of commercialisation of agriculture on land use and work patterns by means of a case study in the Nyeri district in Kenya. The study uses cross sectional data collected from small-scale farmers in this district. We find that good quality land is allocated to non-food cash crops, which may lead to a reduction in non-cash food crops and expose some households to greater risks of possible famine. Also the proportion of land allocated to food crops declines as the farm size increases while the proportion of land allocated to non-food cash crops rises as the size of farm increases. Cash crops are also not bringing in as much revenue commensurate with the amount of land allocated to them. With growing commercialisation, women still work more hours than men. They not only work on non-cash food crops but also on cash crops including non-food cash crops. Evidence indicates that women living with husbands work longer hours than those married but living alone, and also longer than the unmarried women. Married women seem to lose their decision-making ability with growth of commercialisation, as husbands make most decisions to do with cash crops. Furthermore husbands appropriate family cash income. Husbands are less likely to use such income for the welfare of the family compared to wives due to different expenditure patterns. Married women in Kenya also have little or no power to change the way land is allocated between food and non-food cash crops. Due to deteriorating terms of trade for non-food cash crops, men have started cultivation of food cash crops with the potential of crowding out women. It is found that both the area of non-cash crops tends to rise with farm size but also the proportion of the farm area cash cropped rises in Central Kenya.

Toward the end of 1932, Judge Morris Carter's Land Commission began taking testimony to determine how far Africans in the British colony of Kenya were owed compensation for land taken from them by white settlers. Thousands of people attended the commission's public hearings. In Nyeri district, 129 Gikuyu sub-clans representing 105,550 people made claims before the commission.1 Nyeri's district commissioner reported that virtually every person could be seen walking about with typewritten claim and map in hand.2 In Kiambu District, Chief Koinange and his colleagues became part-time pamphleteers producing petitions to sway Carter's opinion.3 And in Fort Hall, local opinion was so strong that Charles Muhoro, the translator for the commission, was confounded at the profanity the presenters employed.4 Carter Land Commission was plainly a major event in Gikuyu political life. It is therefore surprising that one of Nyeri's major parties, the Kikuyu Central Association, did not pay the commissioners heed. Only a minor KCA official, Waiga Kibanya, testified before the commission during its Nyeri hearings.5 He spoke for a few scant minutes about Gikuyu claims to the Mount Kenya forest. Observers thought him ill prepared.6 KCA in Nyeri did not present a written memorandum for the commission's review. Instead, its officials gatecrashed a meeting of the Progressive Kikuyu Party, their political opponents, hanging about while PKP members drafted a memorandum.7 This essay inquires into the history of Gikuyu political thought by exploring why the Kikuyu Central Association's Nyeri branch had so little to say to Judge Carter. It focuses on the tension between the polite theater of colonial advocacy and the noisy brawl of ethnic argument. It was John Lonsdale who first tuned historians' ears to the competing strains of political discourse within African communities. In his seminal essay The Moral Economy of Mau Mau, Lonsdale contrasted the spare discourse of Kenya's high politics with the earthy culture of Gikuyu thought.8 African leaders represented themselves as leaders of homogeneous, unified peoples, in order to compete for influence on the colonial stage. But within the tribes that leaders purported to represent, people kept arguing. Ethnicities, Lonsdale showed, are forums of argument. Political leaders had always to do creative work in order to convince their doubting constituents to follow their lead. present essay applies Lonsdale's insights to the study of land politics in northern Gikuyuland. My thesis, put simply, is that colonial-era political entrepreneurs created a Gikuyu people by reformulating property as territory. By the sweat of their brows, the precolonial pioneers of central Kenya had once hewn their homesteads from the encroaching forest. They and their descendants saw land as a patrimony, an endowment that enabled family members to flourish. Colonial-era politicians asked central Kenya's proudly independent homesteaders to think about their hard-won property as territory, a gift from a paternal God to an identifiable Gikuyu nation. By refiguring property as territory, political entrepreneurs drew clansmen together as soldiers dedicated to serving their country. Where organizers asked Gikuyu to practice a single-minded discipline, Judge Carter brought clannish local politics to the fore. Carter asked Nyeri people to recount the local histories that divided them. It was this parochial parade, I suggest, that terrified the unifiers of the KCA. Nyeri's organizers did not pronounce on Gikuyu land tenure because they could not. Their project was founded on constituents' strategic willingness to overlook the local politics that set them at odds. Judge Carter threatened to turn organizers' imagined community into a fratricidal absurdity. John Lonsdale taught us to see how thoroughly people sharing an ethnicity could disagree. This essay pays tribute to Lonsdale's pioneering scholarship by documenting the political work by which Gikuyuland was made. …

This article examines the effects of commercialisation of agriculture on land use and work patterns by means of a case study in the Nyeri district in Kenya. The study uses cross sectional data collected from small-scale farmers in this district. We find that good quality land is allocated to non-food cash crops, which may lead to a reduction in non-cash food crops and expose some households to greater risks of possible famine. Also the proportion of land allocated to food crops declines as the farm size increases while the proportion of land allocated to non-food cash crops rises as the size of farm increases. Cash crops are also not bringing in as much revenue commensurate with the amount of land allocated to them. With growing commercialisation, women still work more hours than men. They not only work on non-cash food crops but also on cash crops including non-food cash crops. Evidence indicates that women living with husbands work longer hours than those married but living alone, and also longer than the unmarried women. Married women seem to lose their decision-making ability with growth of commercialisation, as husbands make most decisions to do with cash crops. Furthermore husbands appropriate family cash income. Husbands are less likely to use such income for the welfare of the family compared to wives due to different expenditure patterns. Married women in Kenya also have little or no power to change the way land is allocated between food and non-food cash crops. Due to deteriorating terms of trade for non-food cash crops, men have started cultivation of food cash crops with the potential of crowding out women. It is found that both the area of non-cash crops tends to rise with farm size but also the proportion of the farm area cash cropped rises in Central Kenya.

During the Kenyan Emergency of 1952–1960, one of the most violent episodes in the history of the British Empire, humanitarian organizations colluded with the colonial state to shore up British power. This article examines how aid agencies that claimed to exemplify the progressive internationalism of the postwar period participated in colonial violence. Far from condemning the brutality of the imprisonment and torture during the Kenyan Emergency, aid organizations were deeply implicated in parallel projects for women and children that sought to achieve the same objectives: the remaking of Kikuyu hearts and minds and the weakening of anticolonial resistance. Far from acting as a check on colonial violence in an era of burgeoning rights discourses in 1950s Kenya, self-proclaimed “impartial” internationalist organizations, while claiming to uphold values of universal humanity, worked as auxiliaries to the colonial counterinsurgency. Taking their cue from military counterinsurgency in 1950s Malaya, humanitarians sought to win “hearts and minds” and undertook material provision for imprisoned anticolonial activists and their families on behalf of the colonial state. They did so by importing new humanitarian expertise developed in wartime Europe and adapting it to fit within racist, colonial norms. In providing this allegedly impartial expertise, humanitarian organizations lent credence to the myth that rehabilitation in Kenya was a progressive program enacted by a liberal empire to modernize its subjects, rather than a ruthless attempt to stymie anticolonial resistance by any means necessary. In this case, postwar humanitarian internationalism did not challenge colonial brutality but enabled it.

What does it mean to say that a nation-state is secular? Secular law typically begins when a state has no religious competitor for authority. For this reason, it can be said that the Australian state is secular because its authority is derived from its own laws. What makes Australian law sovereign, the highest authority within the state, is its secularity. However, given Australia's colonial heritage, it is not just the absence of religious authority, such as a state religion, that gives the state its secularity. The law's foundations in colonial violence and the extinguishment of Indigenous sovereignty as a competing authority are also a crucial way in which secular Australian law can continue to operate as the sovereign authority within the state. Using the work of Charles W. Mills, I will critically interrogate how legal and political characterisations of the law as secular work to disavow the state's racialised foundations in colonial violence in the form of a “secular contract”. In developing this notion of a “secular contract” I hope to show that secularism be must re-thought of as not simply the operation of law without religion, but also, as complicit with the ways indigenous sovereignties in (post)colonial states are negated.

Евроинтеграция поневоле? Оценивая “наступательный” характер ОПБО ЕС