Abstract

For an elastic demand transportation network with continuously distributed value of time, the system disutility can be measured either in time units or in cost units. The user equilibrium model and the system optimization model are each formulated in two different criteria. The conditions required for making the system optimum link flow pattern equivalent to the user equilibrium link flow pattern are derived. Furthermore, a bi-objective model has been developed which minimizes simultaneously the system travel time and the system travel cost. The existence of a pricing scheme with anonymous link tolls which can decentralize a Pareto system optimum into the user equilibrium has been investigated.

Highlights

  • Roadway congestion is a source of enormous economic costs

  • This paper provided a theoretical investigation of the multi-criteria traffic assignment, including the costversus-time network equilibrium and system optimum in a network with continuous value of time (VOT) distribution and elastic demand

  • We have proven the existence of link tolling schemes that can decentralize an system optimal (SO) link flow pattern into the user equilibrium (UE) link flow pattern in two different criteria, respectively

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Roadway congestion is a source of enormous economic costs. In principle, many of these costs can be prevented because they result from socially inefficient choices made by individuals. The multi-criteria or cost-versus-time network equilibrium and the system optimum problem in a network with a discrete set of VOT user classes were examined by Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol 25, 2013, No 2, 119-125. Yang and Huang [11] examined such a UE–CN mixed equilibrium They showed that in a network with both UE and CN users, applying the conventional marginal-cost pricing in order to reach a system optimum requires all link tolls be differentiated across user classes. Wang and Huang showed that any Pareto optimum, except the time-based one, can be decentralized into a multi-class user equilibrium by a pricing scheme with positive anonymous tolls on all links in the networks with discrete VOTs and elastic demand [15].

TIME-BASED AND COSTBASED EQUILIBRIA
SYSTEM OPTIMA
BI-CRITERIA PARETO SYSTEM OPTIMUM
Decentralization of a given feasible target link flow pattern
Existence of non-negative anonymous link tolls
CONCLUSION

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