Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency

Abstract

The US military has made considerable progress in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and doctrine, including the publication of Army Field Manual 3-24 and the military's successes in working with the population to stem the insurgency in Iraq. The short-term goals of COIN are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their support. Whichever side wins the support of the population--either the host nation (and US forces that support it) or the insurgents--wins the battle. The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of functioning state, government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in counterinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population engagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and less understood. It is important for the military to understand the long-term goals of counterinsurgency in order to take the appropriate measures in the near-term that support the objective of creating functional state. To that end, this article outlines three analytical stages to achieve victory in COIN: population engagement, stability operations, and the creation of functioning state. It contends that actions taken in the early stages of COIN should always keep in perspective the long-term goal of creating viable state. Without this foresight, actions taken in the short-term may undermine the stability of the state and result in defeat. Stage 1: Population Engagement Most scholars agree that insurgency is form of political violence that aims to challenge the existing authority in state, be it the government or occupying force. Insurgent violence, in other words, is not random violence but violence with greater purpose. French insurgency expert David Galula defines insurgency as a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order. (1) The US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual echoes this definition, describing insurgency as an organized, protracted, politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. (2) Unlike conventional wars, where one military aims to defeat another on the battlefield, the center of gravity in insurgencies is the population. (3) In other words, the battle between insurgents and the state is tug-of-war for the loyalty and support of the population. Galula contends: If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent [the government], to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. (4) Without the population's support, insurgents cannot survive. Likewise, without the population's support, state's government lacks legitimacy and is unlikely to survive. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires winning the population away from insurgents by drawing on mixture of kinetic and nonkinetic actions. Finding the balance between kinetic and nonkinetic operations is perhaps the greatest challenge in the early stages of counterinsurgency. (5) If the goal is to build rapport with the population and win their trust, then kinetic operations alone are unlikely to achieve this end. If the population and insurgents are intertwined, as they usually are in the early stages of COIN, then kinetic operations run the risk of collateral damage to the individuals and infrastructure, which will cause loss of trust and support. …