Abstract
ABSTRACTIn December 2014, several high-ranking field commanders from the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK), an insurgent and designated terrorist group in Russia’s North Caucasus, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Following the subsequent defection of many of the IK’s surviving commanders, IS consolidated its regional presence with the establishment of a formal branch, the Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW). This paper uses Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to interpret North Caucasus insurgent leaders’ response to the Syrian conflict and identify the differences in the competing factions’ articulated ideologies. It finds that IS/CW leaders have sought to draw on the emotional appeal of the “caliphate” and redirect it back into the local insurgency, while neglecting to articulate alternative tactics or goals. Those leaders who remained loyal to the IK, by contrast, rooted their opposition in jihadi scholarship and rejected the legitimacy of the “caliphate”. However, apparent ideological differences have been exacerbated by communication difficulties that have hindered leaders’ ability to negotiate internal and external pressures. This paper contributes to understandings of the differences between the competing factions, illustrates how groups can seek to strengthen their appeal by avoiding explicitness, and demonstrates the importance of operational context in considering ideological change.
Highlights
In December 2014, Rustam Asilderov, head of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK) insurgent and designated terrorist group’s Dagestan Wilayah, became the region’s first senior rebel leader to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (IS).1 Accompanied by a prominent mid-level commander, Asilderov called on the region’s rebel commanders to follow suit and support the “caliphate” (2014)
By the time of their defections, the insurgency was in a parlous state – with its long-term decline exacerbated by the twin pressures of sustained security service operations initially designed to secure the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the conflict in Syria – and justifying the decision through rational explanations of how it would fundamentally change the situation in the North Caucasus is no easy feat
The picture that emerges from examining the communiqués of North Caucasus rebel leaders is somewhat ambiguous as to the role that ideology has played in the splintering of the insurgency
Summary
In December 2014, Rustam Asilderov (nom-de-guerre: Abu Mukhammad al-Kadari), head of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK) insurgent and designated terrorist group’s Dagestan Wilayah, became the region’s first senior rebel leader to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (IS).1 Accompanied by a prominent mid-level commander, Asilderov called on the region’s rebel commanders to follow suit and support the “caliphate” (2014). This paper uses Social Movement Theory’s concept of framing to interpret North Caucasus insurgent leaders’ response to the Syrian conflict and identify the differences in the competing factions’ articulated ideologies.
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