Between Apparency and Indeterminacy

The attitude to the question of the possibility of the existence of interpretative norms in Soviet and modern Russian jurisprudence has always been ambiguous – from full support to complete denial. The article analyzes the existing approaches to the concept, signs and types of interpretative norms, and offers the author’s vision of the problem. In particular, the main quality that should be inherent in the interpretative norm and distinguishes it from other acts of interpretation is a fundamentally new provision with normative significance, which is the result of interpretative activity. The interrelation of interpretative norms and interpretative acts is shown. If such an act is the result of concretizing law-making or law-making interpretation, and these acts are normative, then their content forms interpretative norms. Attention is drawn to the fact that not every official interpretation creates an interpretative norm. It is emphasized that it is not necessary to absolutize the role of the court in the process of creating interpretative norms, belittling the importance of other subjects of interpretative activity. With regard to the types of interpretative norms, it is argued that the correctly chosen classification criterion and compliance with the principle of dichotomy make classification stable and in demand by both legal science and practice. Some of the existing classifications are analyzed. It is concluded that the problem of interpretative norms still represents an extensive field for general theoretical, sectoral and practice-oriented legal research. It is proposed to move away from the well-established cliche, according to which the interpretation of law, and therefore interpretative acts and interpretative norms, are auxiliary in the mechanism of legal regulation.

The results of official interpretation are important for ensuring the unity and stability of law enforcement practice. Among them interpretative norms are of particular importance, which, due to their general nature, play a key role in ensuring the effectiveness of the legal regulation. In this regard, there is a need in a deeper understanding of their nature. The paper provides an overview of various approaches to the understanding of interpretative norms proposed by scientists in different historical epochs. Special attention is paid to the works of the Soviet period, since it was then that the term «interpretative norms» was used for the first time. It is proposed to consider interpretative norms as an independent legal category. The author highlights the essential features of these norms, such as normativity and formal certainty, notes that they are of an organizational and auxiliary nature, they are provided with state power and are also created by the highest jurisdictional bodies. The author’s definition of interpretative norms is formulated, and they are considered as rules of interpretation, samples of understanding of the rule of law. It is separately noted that interpretative norms, despite their normative nature, are not norms of law, but are only of auxiliary nature, they reveal the meaning of the basic norm. The distinction has been made between interpretative norms and several related concepts.

El propósito principal de este trabajo es presentar un argumento crítico aplicable a aquellas posiciones interpretativistas según las cuales, en la medida en que el objetivo de la teoría jurídica es identificar y explicar conceptos institucionales, es imprescindible asumir la necesidad de un punto de vista interno. Una parte substancial del artículo está dedicada, por una parte, a mostrar la ambigüedad de esta tesis y, por otra, a justificar la distinción entre dos sentidos, uno epistemológico y otro pragmático, en los que las expresiones “punto de vista interno” y “punto de vista externo” pueden ser entendidas. Detectar esta ambigüedad, en primer lugar, permite mostrar diferentes formas de entender los conceptos institucionales. En segundo lugar, hace posible captar un peculiar tipo de indeterminación que afecta a todo discurso referido a las instituciones sociales en general y a las instituciones jurídicas en particular.La tesis central sostenida en este trabajo es que, para identificar y explicar un concepto institucional, la teoría jurídica debe necesariamente adoptar un punto de vista interno en sentido epistemológico, pero no en sentido pragmático. En la parte final del ensayo se sugiere que es posible generalizar la crítica formulada a las posiciones interpretativistas que sostienen indistintamente la necesidad de un punto de vista interno y aplicarla también a aquellas posiciones según las cuales, para identificar y explicar un concepto institucional, debemos necesariamente adoptar un punto de vista externo. La conclusión es que no existe un único método de estudio en la teoría jurídica y, sobre todo, que dicho método depende del modo en el que se configure el objeto de estudio. En este caso, los conceptos institucionales o el contenido de las instituciones jurídicas.

Legal philosophy as a discipline, was, at best, a marginal topic of philosophical inquiry before H. L. A. Hart turned his attention to it. It may be said of Hart that no philosopher after Hart's work in the philosophy of law could ever reasonably regard legal philosophy as marginal again. Before Hart, legal positivism had, of course, its important advocates, but Hart's The Concept of Law showed that its earlier proponents had been wedded either to a command theory of law that was clearly indefensible (Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin) or a conception of norms that was inadequately defended (Kelsen, Hagerstrom, Alf Ross). In the place of the foundational concepts of command or norm, Hart rigorously defended a sociologically informed account of the operation of legal systems (marked by certain indicia of observance and acceptance) and an illuminating distinction between primary and secondary rules that explained important distinctions in law, for example, between the criminal and civil law and the constitutional law establishing the scope and limits of the competence of officials. On this basis, Hart offered an account of law as a subset of social rules, marked by its monopoly of coercive power over a well-defined territory and the finality of its authority over matters involving the scope and limits of such power. Since truth claims about law are made on the basis of ascertaining such rules, determined by observance and acceptance, such claims in law truthfully can be and are made without knowing whether such rules are substantively just according to a philosophically defensible theory of justice. For this reason, Hart argued that legal positivism is the better philosophy of law, since law can be known without knowing its justice, and positivism makes clear the responsibility of independent ethical criticism of law's sometime amorality and immorality. No one after Hart wrote about these matters, would ever think of law in the same way, and the case for legal positivism, as a philosophy of law, had been placed on an altogether sounder philosophical basis.

This Work is a part of Author`s Promotion Work Study in the framework of evidences in tax legislation. Author has only set a goal to classify tax disputes by clearly understandable criteria. Author comes to the conclusion that tax disputes are divided into two groups, one of which, in turn, is divided into two subgroups. Author classifies tax disputes into law applied and legal relationship subjects. Author`s work reflects variety of scientific methods. Author provides subjects of involved tax disputes and definitions. The author classifies tax disputes by entities, involved in them, dividing in three pairs. In a wider scope, Author examines types of disputes between a tax authority and a taxpayer, Author classifies these disputes with regard to legal provisions used in solving relationships. They shall be divided in two groups. One group includes disputes arising of the interpretation of legal norms, and the second includes disputes arising from the violation of norms. The author divides the second group in two sub-groups - administrative offenses and criminal offenses.

The "waste products" normative concept used in the normative-legal documentation is analyzed. The ambiguity of interpretation is shown to be able to affect the accounting system in handling with waste products.

This study will address the life and work of Carl Schmitt, highlighting his legal theory, his relationship with the Nazi regime and the impact of his ideas on the process of Nazification of German law. Schmitt was a controversial thinker of the 20th century, whose legal reflection was intertwined with his political ideas and the historical context of his time. His theory of decisionism established a direct correlation between Law and Sovereignty, questioning formal normativism and liberalism. Despite being criticized for his affiliation with the Nazi party in 1933, his legal work is considered profound and coherent, deserving scientific study independent of ideologies. During the Weimar Republic, Schmitt feared the crisis and fragmentation of the German State and defended exceptional powers for the President of the Reich. The rise of the Nazis to power surprised him, but he tried to realize his constitutional theory of the "Total State", which ended up influencing the Nazification of law. The use of general clauses and vague concepts allowed the interpretation of norms in accordance with the Nazi worldview. Schmitt argued that judges should fill out the content of the clauses in accordance with the Führer's vision, aligning the courts' actions with the interests of the German people. Schmitt's relationship with the Nazi regime was ambiguous, oscillating between moments of support and distrust of Hitler. The work highlights the importance of historical contextualization to understand Schmitt's reflections and the impact of his ideas on the application of law during the Nazi period. The research seeks to offer a critical and independent analysis, aiming to deepen the understanding of the thinker and his legacy, which still resonate in contemporary debates on law and politics.

This scientific article presents a study of the problem of indeterminacy of the conceptual and categorical apparatus in the field of the judge's integrity in the modern legal system. It is noted that in the modern legal understanding, the integrity of judges is a fundamental ethical and normative aspect that determines the high standard of professional behavior of judges in the context of the exercise of judicial power. This principle includes not only the dispassion (impartiality) and objectivity of the judge in the decisions made, but also his ability for self-reflection, ethical awareness and independence from the influence of external factors. The conceptual-categorical apparatus is the main component of the legal technique, which contributes to the precise and clear expression of legal norms and ensures their effective implementation in society. In the praxeological aspect, questions of integrity of judges arose in many cases when competent authorities did not confirm the appropriate level of integrity of a judge or a candidate for this position. This is due to the essential problems of the imperfection of the legislation, since the concept of «honesty» in the legislation is not clear. The legal system and the legislation system must possess and operate in clear and unambiguous terms to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguous interpretations or recommendations regarding the interpretation of norms. The main signs (characteristics) of the integrity of judges include, in our opinion, the following: impartiality and objectivity, the independence of a judge, which is a fundamental principle of judicial activity, which ensures his dedication to the use of the law and the result of the influence of external factors that can reveal objective consideration affairs; honesty and integrity; high level of knowledge and competence; appropriate level of professional ethics; the opportunity to bear public, legal and moral responsibility.

The relevance of this scientific article is due to the insufficient elaboration of the problem of non-normative laws in the theory of law, as well as the need to clarify the concept of legal normativity, which does not take into account the existence of normative legal facts. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to study certain aspects of non-normative laws, substantiate the expansion of the concept of legal normativity by including normative legal facts in it. Methodology. In the preparation of this article, general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis), general logical methods (induction, deduction, generalization, classification), special legal methods (formal legal, method of interpretation of legal norms) were used. Results. It is noted that in the Russian legal system, the use of non-normative laws in legislative practice has become quite widespread. At the same time, the correctness of the qualification of certain types of laws as non-normative acts in some cases is questionable, since it does not take into account the possibility of fixing in them not only individual legal prescriptions, but also regulatory legal facts. A broader understanding of legal normativity than the traditional one makes it possible to clarify the substantive classification of laws, including regulatory laws. Conclusion. It is summarized that the concept of legal normativity should cover two types of its manifestation: generally binding rules of conduct and normative legal facts.

The abstract idea of a written constitution as the foundational basis of modern democratic societies is a largely undisputed element in much of social, political, and legal theory. At the same time, the nature, form, and distinct functions of the constitution in - and increasingly also beyond - modern democratic societies is an evermore frequent object of dispute. Notwithstanding the identification of a global trend, of the last half century or so, of convergence to an 'amplified' form of modern constitutionalism around a form of ‘new constitutionalism’, more recent trends of pluralization seem to provoke profound changes in the nature of modern constitutionalism and its theorization. While the trends in some ways seem to amplify legalistic and monistic tendencies, they also indicate strong corrosive and diversifying implications for the modern constitutional template. The trends discussed are the fragmentation of sovereignty, cultural pluralism, and substantive or interpretative pluralism. The argument is that the challenges of complex pluralism undermine many of the constraining features of modern constitutionalism, but, while in some cases forms of autonomy and democratic participation are strengthened, in many others, constitutional pluralism tends to further compromise the democratic dimension of constitutionalism. In a normative sense, the chapter critically discusses a number of theoretical reflections on these challenges, and in particular emphasises those approaches that search for the potential reinforcement of participatory, open-ended, and inclusive dimensions in the current constitutional predicament.

The paper investigates phenomenology’s possibilities to describe, reflect and critically analyse political and legal orders. It presents a “toolbox” of methodological reflections, tools and topics, by relating to the classics of the tradition and to the emerging movement of “critical phenomenology,” as well as by touching upon current issues such as experiences of rightlessness, experiences in the digital lifeworld, and experiences of the public sphere. It is argued that phenomenology provides us with a dynamic methodological framework that emphasizes correlational, co-constitutional, and interrelational structures, and thus pays attention to modes of givenness, the making and unmaking of “world,” and, thereby, the inter/subjective, affective, and bodily constitution of meaning. In the case of political and legal orders, questions of power, exclusion, and normativity are central issues. By looking at “best practice” models such as Hannah Arendt’s analyses, the paper points out an analytical tool and flexible framework of “spaces of meaning” that phenomenologists can use and modify as they go along. In the current debates on political and legal issues, the author sees the main task of phenomenology to reclaim experience as world-building and world-opening, also in a normative sense, and to demonstrate how structures and orders are lived while they condition and form spaces of meaning. If we want to understand, criticize, act, or change something, this subjective and intersubjective perspective will remain indispensable.

In the article I present the concept of the legal norm of conduct proposed by Zygmunt Ziembiński, situating it in the context of the structuralist research attitude – a methodological approach dominant in the Polish theory of law in the period when this key element of Ziembiński’s theory of law was created and shaped (the 1970s and 1980s). I illustrate individual fragments of the presented concept with selected quotations that are representative of the structuralist research approach. In my view, structuralism makes it possible to understand both the overwhelming influence ofZiembiński’s concept of the norm on the Polish legal theory of the second half of the twentieth century, as well as to explain the causes of the controversies that this concept provoked in some representatives of Polish jurisprudence. I also draw attention to the evolution of the concept in question, including the weakening of its structuralist overtones in the last years of the Professor’s scientific work. An example that exemplifies this tendency is the concept of competence norm.

This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 18171 "Normative Multi-Agent Systems". Normative multi-agent systems combine models for multi-agent systems with normative concepts, like obligations, permissions, and prohibitions. As such, they promise to be a suitable model, for example for (regulated) multiagent societies, organizations, electronic institutions, autonomous agent cooperation (with humans-in-the-loop) and much more. The aim of this seminar was to bring together researchers from various scientific disciplines, such as computer science, artificial intelligence, philosophy, law, cognitive science and social sciences to discuss the emerging topic concerning the responsibility of autonomous systems. Autonomous software systems and multi-agent systems in open environments require methodologies, models and tools to analyse and develop flexible control and coordination mechanisms. Without them, it is not possible to steer the behaviour and interaction of such systems and to ensure important overall properties. Normative multi-agent systems is an established area focussing on how norms can be used to control and coordinate autonomous systems and multi-agents systems without restricting the autonomy of the involved systems. Such control and coordination systems allow autonomous systems to violate norms, but respond to norm violations by means of various sanctioning mechanisms. Therefore it is crucial to determine which agents or agent groups are accountable for norm violations. The focus of this seminar laid on how the responsibility of autonomous systems can be defined, modelled, analysed and computed.

The nature of legal statements has been a widely discussed topic in legal theory. The intuitive idea that it is possible to make true or false assertions about the content of law is, however, controversial, and conceals strong theoretical commitments with the most fundamental issues of legal philosophy, like the identification of the law and the relations between law and morality, the interpretation and validity of legal rules, and the theory of adjudication.A brief review of some of the most sophisticated theories of legal statements—like Kelsen’s, Hart’s or Raz’s—allows concluding that not all kinds of legal statements are purely descriptive in character and susceptible of truth values. And though this does not preclude the possibility of distinguishing legal norms from true or false statements about what these norms require, the aim of this paper is to highlight that this possibility poses a kind of dilemma. For, on the one hand, the distinction between norms and true or false norm-propositions only makes sense under a certain conception of norms—a pragmatic conception. But, on the other hand, the pragmatic conception of norms turns problematic the acceptance of logical relations among norms. And this represents a serious challenge in the legal domain, since the determination of the truth or falsehood of many legal statements seem to require taking into account the logical consequences of legal norms.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Eugenio Bulygin (1931–2021)—a native of Kharkiv and an eminent Argentine legal philosopher, honorary professor at the University of Buenos Aires, president of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (1999–2003), and one of the most influential representatives of contemporary legal positivism. Drawing on autobiographical details, memories of friends, and the author’s personal interactions with this remarkable figure, the article outlines the key stages of Eugenio Bulygin’s life and work: his Kharkiv, Austrian, Argentine, and cosmopolitan periods. The profound impact of his academic contributions and personality on the development of contemporary philosophy and legal theory in Ukraine is positively evaluated. Special attention is devoted to analyzing Eugenio Bulygin’s legal-philosophical worldview, which he unequivocally identifies as legal positivism. However, upon deeper analysis, his understanding of law incorporates distinctive features and can be defined as analytical, methodological, and humanistic legal positivism. The article elucidates the core methodological tenets of Bulygin’s legal theory, including his concepts of normativity, validity, and addressing legal gaps, among others. His talent for polemics is demonstrated through examples of his debates with Hans Kelsen and Robert Alexy.