Abstract
Abstract Mencius’s account of the yi-li (righteousness-benefit) distinction is important in his moral philosophy, and is often compared with consequentialism or deontology in Western moral philosophy. After showing the problems with a naïve deontological reading and a sophisticated consequentialist reading of Mencius, I will argue that both a really sophisticated consequentialist reading and a non-Kantian deontological reading are more defensible. But they couldn’t address the inequality hidden in Mencius’s moral philosophy, making a Nietzschean reading possible. However, Mencius embraced compassion as a key virtue, which Nietzsche would reject. Mencius’s moral philosophy is doubly bifurcated and different from consequentialism, deontology, and also Nietzsche’s philosophy.
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