Abstract
AbstractThis article provides the first detailed discussion of an objection to Kant's theory of freedom in Henri Bergson's 1904‐05 lectures at the Collège de France. According to Bergson, if Kant succeeds in defending the possibility of human freedom, this is not the freedom of any particular human being, but rather the freedom of the ‘moi en général’. I compare this objection to arguments against Kant's theory of freedom by other late nineteenth/early twentieth century French philosophers such as Émile Boutroux, Charles Renouvier and Victor Delbos, as well as to one of the best known objections to this theory in the subsequent anglophone literature. I argue that Bergson's objection rests on the false assumption that, according to Kant, “there is no difference in nature… between time and space.”
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