Being We: Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology, written by Dan Zahavi

In the last years, one can observe an increasing interest in phenomenological contributions to social ontology and collective or we-intentionality studies. Some of the accounts about we-intentionality that were developed especially within early phenomenology are currently in the process of being rediscovered, reevaluated and reassessed in the light of more recent debates. In this strand of research, the name of Kurt Stavenhagen has largely been neglected. This is unfortunate given that substantial parts of his philosophical production are devoted to foundational issues in the social sciences. The main aim of this paper is to contribute to this line of research by introducing Kurt Stavenhagen’s work on social phenomenology and, in particular, his account of how communities can arise based on shared preferences (Stavenhagen calls communities formed in this way “charismatic unifications”). Stavenhagen’s ideas on social ontology are original and interesting at once. In fact, not only does he offer a description of we-experiences that in many ways is unprecedented within phenomenology, but also he provides an explanation for why individuals identify when they have coincident preferences. According to Stavenhagen, this explanation is to be sought in a difference between two forms of communities or unifications. According to him, “mediate” unifications (the kinds of we that arises from the individuals’ mutual awareness of their overlapping preferences) are grounded in unifications of an “immediate” kind (these are I-Thou relations that rely on reciprocal friendly sentiments) in the sense that the former are weaker – i.e., not yet fully actualized – forms of the latter.

Phenomenological Discoveries Concerning the 'We': Mapping the Terrain Thomas Szanto, Dermot Moran Part I: Historical and Methodological Issues 1. Locating Shared Life in the 'Thou': Some Historical and Thematic Considerations James Risser 2. Hannah Arendt's Conception of Actualized Plurality Sophie Loidolt 3. Habermas and Social Phenomenology: From Verstehen to Lebenswelt Richard Wolin 4. Second-Person Phenomenology Steven Crowell Part II: Intersubjectivity, the 'We-World,' and Objectivity 5. Concrete Interpersonal Encounters or Sharing a Common World: Which is More Fundamental in Phenomenological Approaches to Sociality? Jo-Jo Koo 6. Ineinandersein and l'interlacs: The Constitution of the Social World or 'We-World' (Wir-Welt) Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty Dermot Moran 7. Davidson and Husserl on the Social Origin of Our Concept of Objectivity Cathal O'Madagain Part III: Social Cognition, Embodiment, and Social Emotions 8. From Types to Tokens: Empathy and Typification Joona Taipale 9. An Interactionist Approach to Shared Cognition: Some Prospects and Challenges Felipe Leon 10. If I had to live like you, I think I'd kill myself: Social Dimensions of the Experience of Illness Havi Carel 11. Shame as Fellow Feeling Christian Skirke 12. Relating to the Dead: Social Cognition and the Phenomenology of Grief Matthew Ratcliffe Part IV: Collective Intentionality and Affectivity 13. Affective Intentionality: Early Phenomenological Contributions to a New Phenomenological Sociology Ingrid Vendrell Ferran 14. Love and Other Social Stances in Early Phenomenology Alessandro Salice 15. Gurwitsch and the Role of Emotion in Collective Intentionality Eric Chelstrom 16. The Affective 'We': Self-regulation and Shared Emotions Joel Krueger Part V: Collective Agency and Group Personhood 17. Husserl on Groupings: Social Ontology and Phenomenology of We-Intentionality Emanuele Caminada 18. Collectivizing Persons and Personifying Collectives: Reassessing Scheler on Group Personhood Thomas Szanto 19. Brothers in Arms: Fraternity-Terror in Sartre's Social Ontology Nicolas de Warren