Behind the Enemy News: issue salience in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Purpose The purpose of the chapter is to determine the reasons of emergence of tax crisis in modern Russia and to develop recommendations for optimization of crisis management in the taxation system. Methodology The authors conduct complex study of peculiarities of formation and development of the modern Russia’s tax system with application of the methodology of systemic, problem, and logical analysis, which allows determining the essence and causal connections of emergence of its current crisis and determining the perspectives of overcoming this crisis. Results The authors come to the conclusion that the current tax crisis in modern Russia appeared as a result of non-optimal crisis management in the taxation system. The crisis was formed during the whole period of formation of the Russian tax system (due to absence of preparations for a crisis) and came into effect under the influence of unfavorable internal (aggravation of demographic situation) and external (global economic recession) factors. The implemented anti-crisis measures accelerated the tax crisis in Russia, as they had not been approved by taxpayers. This closed the circle of deepening of the tax crisis; in order to overcome it, it is necessary to change the principles of crisis management in the modern Russia’s taxation system. Recommendations These principles should include mutual responsibility of the state and taxpayers and openness and predictability of state tax policy. It is recommended to implement the developed authors’ algorithm of crisis management in the modern Russia’s taxation system, which reflects the logic of overcoming the current crisis in the Russian tax system and preventing emergence of new crises in the future.

The study examines the methods and effectiveness of Russian propaganda during the Russo-Ukrainian war, focusing on three specific cases: the declared number of casualties, the denial of the Bucha massacre, and the dirty bomb narrative. The success of Russian propaganda is evaluated through the level of support for the “special operation” in Ukraine. Three cases of propaganda were evaluated thro ugh five criteria. To investigate their efficiency, propaganda cases were subjected to indirect assessments, leveraging secondary sources. Finally, secondary data on the Russian public’s support for activities in Ukraine and some views on the media were presented, which in this analysis provide additional argumentation to the pre viously analysed cases. The analysis assesses whether only emotional manipulation techniques were used or whether additional tactics were employed. The technical quality of the individual propaganda campaigns is also assessed. Despite the be low-average quality of the individual campaigns, the study shows that Russian pro paganda achieves its goals by evoking emotional reactions. In particular, it finds greater support among older, less educated people who rely primarily on televisi on programmes (which are largely controlled by the central Kremlin authorities). Although the propaganda also has an impact on younger viewers, its influence is comparatively weaker. Ultimately, the study considers Russian propaganda to be successful because it is able to generate significant emotional engagement among the domestic public and thus contribute to support for the war.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. On the weakness of the Russian state under Yeltsin, see Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty (Routledge, 2002). On Russian oligarchy, see Peter Rutland, ‘Introduction: Business and State in Russia’, in Peter Rutland (ed.), Business and the State in Contemporary Russia (Westview, 2001), pp. 1–32. 2. For the causes of the August 1998 crisis, see Neil Robinson, ‘The Global Economy, Reform and Crisis in Russia’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), pp. 531–64. For the political turmoil at the end of the Yeltsin era, see Lilia Shevtsova, Putin's Russia (Carnegie Endowment, 2005), chs 1 & 2. 3. Archie Brown, ‘Introduction’, in Archie Brown & Lilia Shevtsova (eds), Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin. Political Leadership in Russia's Transition (Carnegie Endowment, 2001), p. 4. 4. Central Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/print.asp? file = liquidity_e.htm (accessed 13 November 2007). 5. On the collapse of political opposition and the centralisation of power in Russia, see Vladimir Gel'man, ‘Political Opposition in Russia. A Dying Species?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2005), pp. 226–46, and ‘Vozrashchenie Leviafana? (Politka retsentralizatsii v sovremennoi Rossii)’, Polis, No. 2 (2006), pp. 90–109. 6. The most comprehensive review of Russian politics under Putin can be found in Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 2nd edn (Routledge, 2008). 7. For arguments that Putin is building a form of state capitalism, see A. Radygin, ‘Rossiya v 2000–2004: na puti k gosudarstvennomu kapitalizmu?’, Voprosy ekonomki, No. 4 (2004), pp. 42–65; Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘Wealth versus Political Power: The Russian Case’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2004), pp. 135–60; Andrei Illarionov, Press conference, 21 December 2005, www.fednews.ru/ (accessed 5 January 2006). 8. OECD, Russian Federation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), p. 32; Philip Hanson, ‘The Russian Economic Puzzle: Going Forwards, Backwards or Sideways?’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (2007), pp. 869–89. 9. Growth in 1999 and 2000 was prompted by devaluation of the ruble, but thereafter it was driven by oil price rises, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly through energy revenues raising consumer good demand. See Hanson, ‘The Russian Economic Puzzle’. The precise degree to which changing oil prices affects Russian GDP is hard to pin down, but there is consensus that its influence is considerable. For example, a recent study estimates that Russia's GDP would be 12 per cent lower if oil prices had remained at their 2001 levels and that, without the impact of oil prices on domestic demand, GDP growth for 2006 might have been as low as 1 per cent, that is, 6 points lower than it actually was. See Paavo Suni, ‘Oil Prices and the Russian Economy. Some Simulation Studies with NiGEM’, ETLA Discussion Papers, No. 1088 (2007), p. 6. It is easier to see how dependent the Russian budget is on oil revenue: without oil revenue the budget would consistently be in deficit. See the figures in IMF, Russian Federation: 2007 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion (International Monetary Fund, 2007), p. 27. 10. Neil Robinson, ‘So What Changed? The 1998 Economic Crisis in Russia and Russia's Economic and Political Development’, Demokratizatsiya. A Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2007), pp. 245–59; Julian Cooper, ‘Can Russia Compete in the Global Economy?’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2006), pp. 407–26. Additional informationNotes on contributorsNeil RobinsonNeil Robinson, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland.

Currency Crisis in Russia on the Spun of 2014 and 2015: Causes and Consequences

The article is dedicated to analyzing the prospects of countering the ideology of Rashism in the context of the Russo- Ukrainian war and the post-war period. Rashism, as an aggressive and chauvinistic ideology that is shaped by contemporary Russian politics, serves as one of the key elements justifying Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The paper examines strategic and tactical methods of combating this ideology at different stages of the confiict, from military operations to information and cultural warfare. Special attention is given to the necessity of establishing an international support system for Ukraine, developing national identity, and building mechanisms for long-term resistance to Russian propaganda. The article also highlights the challenges that may arise in the post-war period, particularly in terms of societal rehabilitation and restoring stability. The role of education, media, and international organizations in overcoming Rashism and its consequences for future generations is evaluated.

This study employs critical discourse analysis to examine two opinion articles published in Western press that propose divergent strategies for the West in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The analysis focuses on three key aspects: representations of the war, evaluations, and dialogicality. The study also analyses Ukrainian journalistic translations of the articles. One article argues for equipping Ukraine with all necessary weapons for a swift victory over Russia, while the other supports incremental weapons supplies, leading to a prolonged war. The findings reveal that the former article portrays the war as Ukraine’s fight for independence and a battle to uphold international law, whereas the latter predominantly depicts it as territorial aggression that threatens global nuclear security. The former article employs a wide range of evaluative devices to underscore Russia’s brutality and condemn the delayed provision of Western weapons to Ukraine. In contrast, the other article primarily employs evaluative language to amplify fears of nuclear escalation. Regarding dialogicality, one author structures his text as an implied dialogue with hypothetical opponents, employing rhetorical questions, imperative sentences, irony, and first-person narration, whereas the other author references individuals with institutional authority to validate his assertions. The divergent treatment of these articles by the Ukrainian media, both at the macro and micro levels – reflected in the significant disparity in translations (12 to 1) and the manner in which the articles were reframed during translation – reveals the gatekeeping function of translation and suggests the Ukrainian media’s focus on positive news from the West as a means to keep up the country’s morale.

Abstract: At the time, the August 1998 financial crisis was described as a watershed in Russia's development. This article looks at the reasons the crisis had a minimal effect on Russia's economy and argues that the political effect of the crisis was more marked. The growth that has occurred in the Russian economy since 1998 may mean that a reoccurrence of crisis will not be as benign as the 1998 crisis turned out to be. Keywords: financial political economy, Russia, virtual economy Introduction It is nearly a decade since the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. At the time, the crisis marked a turning point in the development of Russia's economy. In its immediate aftermath there was some expectation that it would be the prelude to what promises to be a long and painful period of insolvency and crisis, (1) and would lead rapidly to another, more severe, financial crisis. (2) These predictions have not come true. Indeed, Russia's financial crisis experience would seem to be an enviable one: it has not caused a loss of economic sovereignty with international agencies asserting their influence over economic policy as a condition of alleviating the problems of currency collapse and debt default, nor did it presage a period of economic depression. Instead, the power of the Russian state has grown since 1998 and Russia has experienced a near uninterrupted economic recovery since 1999 with gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 6.8 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, growth in industrial production averaging 7 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, unemployment falling from 13.2 percent in 1998 to 7.7 percent in 2005, and average wages rising from $108 to $301 a month. If the 1998 crisis had an effect on Russia, it was positive. Why was the impact of the August 1998 financial crisis so muted economically in Russia? Russia's economic success since 1998 is not because of any particular negative or positive economic effect of the crisis. The crisis of 1998 was not more devastating or influential because of the peculiarities of Russia's postcommunist economic system and the chief problem of this system, the lack of capital to reform industry and create a more competitive economy with a diversified export structure. This problem endures. This article argues that three factors shaped the influence of the August 1998 financial crisis on domestic forces and the subsequent development of Russia's political economy: the legacies of the USSR, the way that earlier reforms under President Boris Yeltsin benefited a small number of financiers and exporters, and the political fall out of 1998. Each of these was largely responsible for shaping one of the main segments of Russia's political economy: the sectors of the economy--those branches of the economy that produce mainly for domestic consumption and do not receive a great level of foreign investment, the sectors of the economy, and the government/state. Each of these segments of Russia's political economy has a peculiar relationship to the global economy. The national economy is isolated from it, receiving benefits indirectly from the general rise in national wealth from energy exports. Its role is passive; its character and structure in the 1990s meant limited foreign involvement in Russia's economy and little pressure to respond to the 1998 financial crisis in ways that would ensure continued capital inflows from abroad. The transnationalized economy and the state have more active relationships with the global economy and are in competition to facilitate Russia's relationship with the global economy. At the moment the state has the upper hand in this relationship. This might, if recovery carries on long enough, eventually turn into a successful response to Russia's problems. However, Russia's ability to grow depends on moving resources into the national economy to modernize it. If it does not, it will bear the cost of a large, unmodernized industrial sector, just as it did in the 1990s. …

This article proposes a political interpretation of the concept of the «Russian crisis». It argues that contemporary Russia is experiencing socio-political turbu- lence. The main indicators of the Russian crisis are identified, including the state’s inability to fulfill basic security and social protection functions, loss of interna- tional positions, export of internal crises beyond the country, centrifugal move- ments, electoral process crises, legitimacy crises, economic instability, growing internal conflicts, ideological hostility, social inequalities, and legitimacy crisis of the state system. The regime of the Russian Federation conceals these tenden- cies and focuses on expanding internal repressive measures and the international influence of authoritarian countries. For a long time, the academic environment has to some extent bypassed the coverage of crisis phenomena within Russia. However, the problem is now actively being reconsidered, as crisis processes in Russia have become comprehensive, occurring against the backdrop of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and political processes, in interactions between in- stitutions, interested groups, and individuals. Studying the Russian crisis is a promising direction for both science and civic education. Objective research will allow for a better understanding of the prob- lems and context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, promote the development of criti- cal thinking and national consciousness among citizens. It is emphasized that crisis phenomena in various spheres of socio-political life are interconnected and only exacerbate destructive tendencies in Russia. The necessity of understan- ding the crisis from an interdisciplinary perspective, based on a wide and veri- fied source base, and using systematic monitoring data, in transparent and secure documentation practices, is justified. In the future, it is important to develop re- search on various aspects of the Russian crisis: political-administrative, techno- logical, military, ecological, social vulnerabilities, and others.

The author examines how monetary and fiscal policy influences the shocks facilities in the Russian economy caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The article aims to provide an economic assessment of the monetary measures by the Central Bank and the Government of the Russian Federation to overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. The author exploited the methods of content analysis, benchmarking, and logical analysis. The study covers the period of March — July 2020 and relies on the analysis of data from international organizations, analytical centers, mass media, official data sources of the Government of Russia and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The literature review and the analysis of the Mundell-Fleming model contribute to the better understanding of monetary policy of countries in its connection with fiscal policy. The author analyzed the monetary and fiscal measures against the COVID-19 crisis in Russia and other countries. The study provides the assessment of the COVID-19 shocks and the remedial actions. The conclusion is that when most economic activity is prohibited, lower interest rates cannot stimulate it in the short term. More visible are the efforts to maintain liquidity in the economy, as financial institutions often have troubles. During the analysis, the work focuses on the theoretical foundations of monetary policy and its connection with fiscal policy, as well as provides a number of stylized facts of its implementation in Russia during the coronavirus pandemic. This can be useful for further empirical research and practical recommendations in the field of monetary and fiscal policy in the Russian Federation.

The Russian economy has a raw orientation. This fact affects features of financial crisis in Russia. While central banks worldwide decreased refinancing rates, the Bank of Russia, in contrast, increased it. In Russia budgetary expenses increase, despite of set of internal problems. In Russia we both the highest inflation and the deepest economic slump. An increase in retail prices and the some time declined wholesale prices. The rich Russian regions appeared among most suffered from crisis. At the same time the poor regions have not noticed the crisis, as their budgets exist due to grants from the federal budget, and their own revenue are little.

The article examines the causes and consequences of such an economic phenomenon as an economic crisis. The problem of economic crises is determined by the fact that, despite the tools created by the world community to prevent them, it is impossible to accurately predict, much less avoid, economic disasters. The article characterises the crises in Russia from 1998 to 2021. Since 1998, there have been four different causes of crisis in the new economic history. It has shown that world economic crises directly or indirectly affect the macroeconomic indicators of the Russia, cause their decrease. It has concluded that the Russian economy is more responsive to the economic macro-conjuncture due to the dependence of the ruble on the dollar, and the impact of the level of commodity prices on the income part of the consolidated budget.

Many scientific works of sociologists, political analysts, psychologists, linguists have been devoted to the study of youth extremism, its various aspects and the fight against it. However, youth extremism still exists, and its violent manifestations destroy political and social stability in different countries including Russia. Therefore, the search for ways to counter this phenomenon continues.
 The purpose of the study is to clarify the concepts of youth extremism, to determine the approach to its study and the fight against it as well as to apply this approach to the predicted specific political crisis in Russia.
 Methodology, methods. The article uses chaos theory adapted to the analysis of social reality as a methodology for the study of youth extremism. To tackle manifestations of youth extremism, the method based on the use of so–called strange attractors is proposed.
 Results. The field of the research is determined through the correlation of the concepts of “extremism”, “radicalism”, “deviation”, “delinquency”. The study clarifies the concept of extremism, gives its classification, and substantiates the boundaries of its social carrier - the youth. Chaos theory is used to study youth extremism and predict the development of social crises in Russia, in which young people can take an active part. The possibility of using so-called strange attractors to prevent active performances of young extremists in a situation of a specific political crisis is shown.
 The scientific novelty lies in the use of chaos theory to study youth extremism in modern Russia and the fight against it.
 Practical significance. A concrete way of countering manifestations of youth extremism in real political conditions is suggested.

The purpose of the study is to clarify the peculiarities of the presentation of modern Russian aggression against Ukraine by correspondents of the British news service “BBC News”. The methodological basis of the work is an interdisciplinary approach. Such methods as structural and functional system analysis of historiographical facts and the method of critical analysis of documentary material have been particularly important in research implementation. Scientific novelty: for the first time, the article analyses the reception of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the writings of BBC News journalists. Result. We have concluded that most publications presented a description of the immediate events of the military confrontation, which is consistent with the news focus of the information resource itself. BBC News journalists have provided a detailed report on war crimes committed by Russian troops and Putin-backed separatists. This thematic block also dedicates a lot of the articles to the downing of the MH17 passenger plane in the summer of 2014. The previous story is directly related to the problem of the human price of Putin’s adventure, so BBC News periodically cited UN data on the steady increase of casualties in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Because of such devastating losses for Ukraine’s human potential, the journalists covered in detail the attempts to settle the Russian-Ukrainian war peacefully, focusing on the Minsk process. Another notable topic for BBC News is the Kremlin prisoners. Journalists have repeatedly raised the issue of the economic component of Putin’s aggression. They cited numerous indications that the Russian leadership had tried to destroy the eastern neighbour’s economy by gas blackmail, blocking Ukrainian ports, and stealing or destroying the industrial infrastructure of the occupied territories. The comprehensive attention of British journalists to the latest Ukrainian tragedy is also reflected by the attempt to recreate the daily life of the military conflict, first of all, the lives of ordinary people in the occupied territories. We have concluded that the study showed that BBC News journalists paid a lot of attention to the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Their objective approach to covering Russian aggression has influenced the formation of pro-Ukrainian public opinion in Britain, which has also helped neutralize Putin’s efforts in the country’s information field. As a result, Ukraine is continually supported by official London, despite changes in political government in both countries. This is an important factor in curbing the expansionist appetites of the current Russian leadership.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of Finland on regional policy of NATO and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores political, economic and military aspects of Finland and Ukraine in the light of the Russian aggression while considering their relationships and foreign policy goals on a regional level. The author draws attention to various aspects of Helsinki domestic and foreign policy that is directed to set a balance in the region and, at the same time, to support Kyiv militarily and economically in confrontation with Moscow. Finland’s active policy of promoting stability can be described as a two-track policy, whereby EU membership and intensified military cooperation with Western partners provide a basis for the maintenance and development of relations with Russia. The author focused on energy resources and its importance for Finland that has a long history of energy trade with Russia. The trade is practically one-directional, as Finland lacks domestic fossil fuel reserves in comparison with its substantial demand for energy, whereas Russia has significant export volumes. Along with the above-mentioned issues, the author is observing aggressive Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region. Despite peaceful relationships with Finland, Moscow does not mind to remind neighboring countries who calls the tune in the region. Pursuing this purpose, Russia increases military activity in the Baltic Sea region with relatively frequent airspace and territorial water violations. As a result, there is a risk that collisions or provocations might lead to a rapid and uncontrolled escalation. So, Finland finds its important to keep open channels for political dialogue and to seek ways to re-activate existing confidence-building measures. Finland-NATO relationships are taken into consideration as well. The author described the process of Finland’s accession to the alliance. After almost 30 years of close partnership with NATO, Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023. Its partnership with NATO was historically based on its policy of military non-alignment, which changed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Following Russia’s aggression, Ukraine has requested materiel assistance from the EU and NATO member countries. To date, Finland has donated 23 defence materiel packages to Ukraine. The combined value of all defence materiel packages submitted so far is now over EUR 2 billion.

The Russian-Ukrainian war highlights the role of historical memory as a tool for shaping public sentiment and legitimizing political action. This study investigates how historical narratives are used in the information war between Russia and Ukraine, and the means employed to manipulate historical memory. Through content analysis of scientific literature and data synthesis, the research reveals how the Kremlin regime re-appropriates historical concepts, particularly the history of Rus' and the victory in World War II, to promote a distorted historical memory and justify its aggressive policies. The selective presentation of historical facts, coupled with the active dissemination of manipulated information through digital technologies, underscores the destructive potential of historical memory as a weapon in modern hybrid warfare. Special emphasis is placed on the history of Rus, which in modern Russian propaganda is understood in accordance with the old Soviet paradigms. Another important aspect is the mythologised idea of victory in the Second World War. The conclusions indicate that Russian propaganda selectively presents historical facts, focusing on selected events, which contributes to the formation of distorted historical memory.